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THE STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES OF HOSTAGE/CRISIS NEGOTIATION 
UNITS IN U.S. POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
by
Robert Joseph Louden 
Adviser Professor Warren Benton
Hostage/Crisis negotiation was formally developed as a police function in the 
United States by the New York City Police Department in 1972-1973. The procedure has 
saved countless lives. There have also been many hostage/barricade situations which 
ended in disaster.
This study is an analysis o f the hostage/crisis negotiation practices o f276 local, 
county and state police agencies in the U.S. which employ at least 100 sworn officers and 
utilize some standard system of negotiation for response to hostage and barricade 
situations. A four-page questionnaire developed specifically for the project provided data 
about policy matters, organizational configurations, and about the selection and training o f 
negotiators. Respondents were also requested to provide a copy of their agency policy 
and to react to a series of opinion items about hostage/crisis negotiation. In addition to the 
data collected through the survey instrument, additional variables were obtained from the 
1995 LEMAS report for local police departments employing at least 100 sworn officers, 
issued by the U.S. Department o f Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics in 1995.
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The study first briefly reviews several of the negative incidents which occurred 
between 1974 and 1993. Included in the literature review is an examination of the 
historical development of the first hostage negotiation team in the U.S. Nine hypotheses 
were developed and tested. Several scales were devised to assist in testing the hypotheses 
including, an innovation scale, scales for mechanistic orientation, organic orientation, 
tactical (SWAT) orientation, and negotiation orientation, and a written policy scale. Two 
hypotheses related the year an agency first adopted its hostage negotiation policy to 
agency size and degree o f innovation. The administrative and operational organizational 
configuration and chain of command for the negotiation team was measured against the 
four orientation scales. Opinion scales to determine negotiator satisfaction and perception 
of effectiveness were also compared to mechanistic and organic orientation. Written 
hostage negotiation policy was compared to the written policy scale. Four of the 
hypotheses were supported, four were determined not to be significant and one was 
significant but in the direction opposite than predicted.
In addition to the hypotheses tested, valuable additional descriptive data was 
obtained including hostage/crisis team deployments and results for the years 1995- 1997.
The study concludes that the majority of police agencies have adopted a part-time 
specialized unit to negotiate at hostage and barricade incidents. They utilize a variety of 
organizational arrangements to accomplish their objectives. The findings tend to support a 
caution that police chief executive officers and incident commanders may receive filtered 
information and advice when the negotiation function reports through the tactical element 
rather than directly to the decision maker.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
During the past two decades law enforcement responses to several criminal 
incidents in the U.S. involving armed adversaries resulted in siege events which ended in 
what may be termed disastrous results. Episodes such as these were often subjected to 
extensive media attention as well as post incident inquiries and reports. The lack of a 
negotiation posture as a preferred tactic that police might have employed, or the positive 
value of police negotiation with subjects in such events, was noted in various accounts, 
including some government documents.
However, there had not been a systematic collection and analysis of data about the 
structure and procedures of hostage/crisis negotiation units in U.S. police organizations. 
There was a need to examine department size, organizational structure, staffing and 
administrative issues related to hostage/crisis negotiation. Similarly, there was a lack of 
information about the selection, training and self-expectation of negotiating unit members 
and their role in such events. This research was designed to gather data about the 
formation and current status of hostage/crisis negotiation in U.S. policing. This study 
examined hostage/crisis negotiation unit relationships to variables such as agency size, 
the tactical (SWAT) and negotiation orientation of the agency, written hostage/crisis 
policy, chain of command, and personal satisfaction and perceived effectiveness.
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Some highly publicized siege incidents over a twenty-year period and in different 
geographical areas of the country have had very similar results. One highly publicized 
event was the attempted apprehension of members of the Symbionese Liberation Army 
(SLA) in Los Angeles, California in May 1974. Three months earlier The SLA, a Marxist 
revolutionary group, had kidnapped Patty Hearst. a nineteen-year-old woman who was an 
heir to a publishing fortune. She was still missing when the authorities located a safe 
house occupied by her abductors and possibly her. A Los Angeles Police Department 
SWAT team and the FBI surrounded the building, announced their presence, demanded 
surrender, and eight minutes later fired tear gas into the house. The authorities fired more 
than five thousand rounds of ammunition during the next hour (Payne, et al. 1976). In the 
fire, which was probably started by police tear gas canisters, six members of the SLA died 
(Gurr in Reich, 1990). Vetter and Perlstein(1991) noted that there was an “absence of 
coordination among various law enforcement agencies particularly the FBI and the 
police” (p.77). Hacker, in Crusaders. Criminals and Crazies (1976) was more explicit in 
his criticism: “(I)n this instance, it was the good guys, widely divergent in their views 
about appropriate methods, in their aims, and in their image-making interests, who had no 
consistent command structure”(p. 147).
In her autobiography, Every Secret Thins (1982), Patty Hearst observed, “If I had 
been in that house at that time, Cin [Donald DeFreeze ‘Cinque’ was the SLA leader] 
would have walked me outside as a hostage” (p. 230). She believed that the police would 
have shot her. According to Payne (1976), “(I)t was apparent that the SLA was given no
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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more than a perfunctory chance to surrender*' (p. 289). This apparent decision by law 
enforcement not to negotiate was curious since the FBI had been subjecting various audio 
tapes, provided by the SLA after the abduction, to psycholinguistic analysis in order to 
speculate about “the personalities of the SLA members and [make] suggestions for 
negotiation strategies”(Miron & Goldstein, 1978, p.75).
In 1978 and again in 1985 there were significant negative interactions between the 
Philadelphia Police Department and a group called MOVE. Both incidents resulted in 
death. The MOVE organization was predominantly African-American, anarchistic and 
back to nature in philosophy, and adhered to an absolute refusal to cooperate with the 
organized government of Philadelphia (Nagel, 1991). They made it a practice to harass 
and harangue their neighbors and the local government, particularly the police. In August 
1978, after more than a yearlong stalemate the Police Commissioner “directed a carefully 
planned operation to drive the occupants from the house. Announcing each action in 
advance in order to protect MOVE women and children, whom they regarded as hostages, 
the police used a bulldozer, ram, and armored truck to breach the walls of the compound” 
(Nagel, 1991, p .319). Next, Nagel reported that “gunfire erupted, killing Officer James 
Ramp and wounding eight other policemen and firefighters” (p.319). Assefa and 
Wahrhaftig (1990) concluded in a study of the event that even though it would have been 
difficult to engage in negotiation with MOVE it was possible to “expect that MOVE 
members would be able to understand and engage in rational processes such as dialogue 
and problem solving” (p. 145).
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Wilson Goode, the Mayor of Philadelphia during the period immediately prior to 
the 1985 confrontation, had termed MOVE actions and activities ^psychological warfare 
against their neighbors, holding the block hostage” (Nagel, 1991, p.320). MOVE 
members had been involved in harassing practices and were alleged to have violated 
numerous city ordinances. Warrants were obtained for the arrest o f several of the MOVE 
group. A police plan was devised and on May 13, 1985 an ultimatum was read over a 
bullhorn which demanded surrender within fifteen minutes (Nagel, p.322). Wagner- 
Pacifici (1994) reported that the Police Commissioner began his demand for surrender 
with the statement: “Attention MOVE, this is America. You have to abide by the laws of 
the United States” (p. 42). “When the fifteen minutes had expired, authorities directed 
water, tear gas, and smoke at the house and its roof. According to the police, MOVE 
responded with gunfire, and officers retaliated massively, firing many thousands of 
rounds in the next ninety minutes” (Nagel, 1991, p.322). Wagner-Pacifici (1994) 
speculated that due to intensified pressure from the neighbors, the governments prior 
policy of non-confrontation and avoidance was replaced with “a strategy for resolving the 
problem quickly” (p.87). In the 1985 encounter sixty-one homes owned by
non-participants were burned to the ground when the police dropped an improvised 
explosive device on the roof of the siege house. The fire department then failed to fight 
the ensuing fire. That strategy resulted in a massive fire which destroyed 61 homes and 
left 250 people homeless. “Of the occupants of the MOVE house, one adult and one child 
fled through the flames into police custody. In the ashes were found the bodies of six
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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adults and five children" (Nagel, p. 318).
According to Wagner-Pacifici (1994) the Mayor noted that once a decision to 
arrest individuals was made, “some form of armed confrontation was inevitable" (p. 97). 
The police commissioner believed that hostage negotiation “was not a tactic or 
consideration at that time” (p. 115). Yet a Commission which Mayor Goode appointed to 
investigate this debacle concluded, among other things, that the police had “(f) ailed to 
consider alternative strategies and deprived themselves of expertise - such as the use of 
trained hostage negotiators - that might have resulted in better implementation of their 
plan” (Nagel, p.322).
During August 1992 the U.S. Marshals Service, and subsequently the FBI, 
attempted to apprehend Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Randy Weaver was a self 
proclaimed survivalist and white supremacist who was wanted on a federal warrant for 
failure to appear in court for a weapon related violation originally filed by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). While the U.S. Marshals were conducting a 
surveillance operation in order to take him into custody, a confrontation ensued, resulting 
in the shooting death of a Deputy U.S. Marshall and one of Weaver’s followers. During 
the subsequent siege, Randy Weaver was wounded and his wife was killed by FBI sniper 
fire (Johnston, July 13, 1995).
A Lexis Counsel Connect Internet report, The Shooting at Ruby Ridge (1996), 
contained extensive excerpts from U.S. Congressional Hearings and trial transcripts about 
the incident which had occurred during the period August 21 to 31, 1992. This on-line
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service for attorneys provided the following information: Soon after the U.S. Marshals 
Service contacted the FBI about the incident a decision was made to deploy the FBI 
Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) to the scene. Initially, FBI headquarters rejected an 
operational plan because it did not contain a negotiation component. Prior to that the FBI 
and local police negotiators had played no role in developing the plan. In fact, the HRT 
leader was quoted as having said that this “would be no long siege.” This led the lead 
FBI negotiator at the scene to believe that a tactical solution would be sought without 
negotiations. The negotiator reported no interest in negotiation on the part of the HRT 
commander, and, “available records reflect insufficient consideration of negotiations 
strategy as compared to tactical approaches.” After ten days Randy Weaver surrendered 
to authorities based on the intervention of a third-party non-govemment negotiator. A 
report on the incident in the New York Times, noted that “A 1994 Justice Department 
report on the incident which has never been made public . . .  shows that the FBI fought 
to keep its files closed to outsiders, even Federal prosecutors” (Johnston, July 19, 1995, 
p. 14).
The Branch Davidian compound, Mount Carmel, near Waco, Texas was the scene 
of a fifty-one-day siege in 1993 which began on February 28 when ATF agents attempted 
to serve search and arrest warrants based on a year long investigation into federal firearms 
violations. During the initial encounter four ATF agents were killed and an additional 
twenty agents were wounded. An unknown number of suspects within the compound 
were killed and others, including their leader, David Koresh, were wounded. Although
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negotiations were somewhat successful during the siege, the event ended in the death of 
more than seventy additional individuals inside the compound on April 19. (Dennis. Jr., 
1993)
During the standoff thirty-five individuals were negotiated out including twenty- 
one children. Two additional people who breached the perimeters and entered the 
compound subsequently exited safely. Numerous other Koresh sympathizers tried to join 
him but were repelled by the surrounding authorities. In an internal memorandum dated 
March 22, 1993 the FBI negotiating team stated that “the long-term prospect for a 
peaceful resolution remains good.” As it tumed-out, no Davidian members were 
negotiated out after March 23 (Dennis, Jr., 1993, p. 18, p.28).
Alan A. Stone (1993), a Harvard professor of Psychiatry and Law, conducted a 
review of the incident for the federal government and noted that “During the first phase of 
the FBI’s engagement at Waco, a period of days, the agents on the ground proceeded with 
a strategy of conciliatory negotiation, which had the approval and understanding of the 
entire chain of command” (p.8). However, Stone also reported that a little more than a 
month into the siege the FBI first “took a more aggressive approach to negotiation” and 
later “gave up the process of negotiation” and “was concentrating on tactical pressure 
alone” (p. 10). Stone subsequently concluded that “the FBI command failed to give 
adequate consideration to their own behavioral science and negotiation experts” (p. I).
Another government reviewer, Ariel Merari (1993) of the University of Tel Aviv, 
noted that FBI agents reported that political considerations and embarrassment did not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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influence their decisions to change tactics. Merari believed that such factors were relevant 
and legitimate and that they should have been acknowledged and discussed (p. 7). Finally, 
Nancy T. Ammerman (1993) of Princeton University observed that the advice of the FBI 
negotiators was not heeded in part because “there was an understandable desire among 
many agents in Waco to make Koresh and the Davidians pay for the harm they had 
caused. Arguments for patience and unconventional tactics fell on deaf ears” (p. 4).
Three of the incidents, SLA and both MOVE incidents, were initiated by and the 
responsibility of local police authorities. Federal law enforcement support is generally 
common in such events and was an integral part of the SLA action. Of interest, the U.S. 
Attorney for Philadelphia decided that federal agencies had no jurisdiction to participate 
in the 1985 MOVE crisis. The Ruby Ridge and Branch Davidian incidents were 
primarily the responsibility of federal agencies; the assistance and support of local law 
enforcement were well documented during each of them.
These incidents illustrated that many people inside law enforcement, as well as 
academic advisers to incident reviews, believe that a strategy of formal negotiation may 
be useful in reducing violent outcomes. These incidents also illustrated that a strategy of 
formal negotiation was not fully accepted within the law enforcement community and 
was often set aside in favor of more traditional tactics. In each of the above described 
incidents the effective, if not actual, police agency control was in the domain of the 
SWAT team or of incident commanders who apparently were more oriented toward use 
of force than negotiation. This was not necessarily the norm since other organizational
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configurations exist, including a direct reporting line from the head of hostage negotiation 
to the incident commander. Also, there have been siege events in which local police or 
federal agents have engaged in hostage/crisis negotiation and the outcome was the 
preservation of the lives of hostages, law enforcement personnel and perpetrators.
This research examines hostage/crisis negotiation within the context of local 
policing in the United States, including the extent and rate of adoption of negotiating 
teams. The study investigates the position of such teams within the administrative and 
operational divisions of the overall police department and relates the placement to organic 
or mechanistic organizational models. Agencies are also characterized as predominantly 
SWAT or negotiation oriented and their orientation is also correlated with organic or 
mechanistic styles of organization. A variety of descriptive data is utilized in order to 
provide a composite illustration of team characteristics. Finally, respondent opinions 
about negotiation effectiveness and their satisfaction with negotiation related work is 
examined.
A Definition o f  Hostage/Crisis Negotiation
Negotiation is a transaction between two parties, representing themselves or 
others, which is designed to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution. A dictionary 
definition of negotiation (American Heritage, 1983) includes, “to confer with another in 
order to come to terms.” Negotiation does not automatically presuppose equality between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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parties but does recognize the relative strength or power of each side. Implied in the 
negotiation process is that each side has something that the other wants, that there is no 
better mutually acceptable solution immediately available, and that there is a willingness 
to communicate and to discuss compromise.
Police officers engage in the practice of negotiation throughout their daily 
assignments, especially in these times o f community policing and collaborative 
approaches to problem solving. They negotiate events such as noise complaints, 
neighborhood disputes, situations with disorderly youth, and parking conditions. The 
concept of negotiation which is the subject of this research is somewhat more complex 
because issues of safety, life and death, are always present, and these situations typically 
involve the response of a large number o f  law enforcement personnel, a potentially 
confusing command structure and adherence to special procedures. Media attention is a 
given at virtually every hostage/crisis negotiation scene.
According to Crelinsten and Szabo (1979) “Hostage-taking is a very ancient form 
of criminal activity. In fact, it was even an accepted tool of diplomacy when used by 
legitimate authority”(p. ix). Levitt (1988) stated that hostage-taking is defined by the 
United Nations as “the seizing or detaining and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to 
detain another person to compel a third party to do or abstain from doing any act as a 
condition for the release of the hostage”(p. 14). Rogan, et al (1997) reported that “hostage 
takers act to create an extortionate transaction with the police”(p. 3).
Hostage/crisis negotiation is a police strategy that consists of responding to a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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situation that involves imminent danger to the life or limb of a person(s) being held 
against their will. There is not necessarily an immediately apparent connection between 
captor and victim, as Buhite (1995) noted, individuals are often “taken hostage [only] 
because they were available and vulnerable”(p.xv).
A law enforcement organization designates an individual as the negotiator to 
engage the hostage holder in a dialogue in an effort to find a peaceful resolution to the 
instant problem. Criminal intent, emotional crisis or politics may originally motivate the 
hostage holding. The negotiator will attempt to persuade the holder to release the 
hostage(s) unharmed in return for a pledge that the captor will not be harmed and may be 
assisted in resolving problems in a legitimate way. In this way “negotiation is thought of 
as the process o f discussion engaged in by two or more parties, each of which wants to 
achieve a desired aim” (Edleman and Crain, 1993, p. xii). For situations where 
negotiation does not seem to be effective, the process will attempt to facilitate the rescue 
of the victim and apprehension of the perpetrator by distracting the hostage holder. In a 
discussion on siege management, Bahn (1987) observed that a common element in 
hostage and barricaded subject incidents is defiance by the subject to orders of the 
authorities to come out peacefully. He noted that “a standoff develops between the 
overwhelming power — manpower, firepower and legal authority — of the police, military 
or other authorities and the defiant, trapped offender” (p. 1).
The negotiation process that was the subject of this research involved “law 
enforcement officers who are selected and trained for the task and who are acting on
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behalf of their employing agency" (Volpe & Louden, 1990. p.308). For many years the 
commonly used term was ‘hostage negotiation' and in many jurisdictions it still is. Since 
approximately 1989 (Kaiser, 1990) the FBI switched to ‘crisis negotiation' and many 
agencies have followed suit. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (1991) 
utilizes the term hostage communicator. The term hostage/crisis negotiation was utilized 
throughout this study.
Police hostage/crisis negotiators view ‘‘the negotiation of substantive and 
nonsubstantive wants or demands in similar terms: agreement making through bargaining 
or problem solving, typically via quid pro quo” (Rogan, et al, 1997, p. 11). Police 
hostage/crisis negotiation involves bargaining for the life of an innocent person, or may 
involve dealing with a non-hostage holding barricaded criminal, or dealing with 
individuals who may be emotionally disturbed or mentally ill. Police generally engage in 
hostage/crisis negotiation in order to save hostage lives, without unnecessarily 
endangering the lives of the helpers. Captors and other subjects engage in negotiation for 
these same hostages for a variety of reasons, initially defined by the original motivation 
for the event, whether criminal, political or emotional.




Development o f Hostage/Crisis Negotiation as a Strategy in U.S. Police Organizations
In the late 1960's and early 1970’s, Morton Bard (1974) conducted pioneering 
research which contributed to major shifts in the way police reacted to domestic violence, 
sexual assault and hostage holding. Each of these areas involved a wide range of dispute, 
conflict and crisis intervention issues. Bard acknowledged that "considerable gaps" still 
existed between police and academics but stressed their "commonality of interest.” His 
work sought to establish the "development of a mechanism for coupling the practitioner 
and the researcher " (Bard, 1974, p.20). His applied research during the period 1967 to 
1969 employed crisis intervention techniques for police officers in dealing with domestic 
violence. He was also a significant contributor to the original application of similar 
practices for investigators responding to rape and other sexual assault. His work in 
domestic violence and sex crime was well received by many in the New York City Police 
Department. His research findings were integrated into the Police Academy curriculum. 
Bard's work with sex crime victims was contemporaneous with the development of the 
new hostage negotiation program. Since both activities were functions of the Detective
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Bureau, a serendipitous expansion o f Bard’s interest and techniques was realized. He 
became an early advocate and adviser of the innovative specialty o f hostage/crisis 
negotiation (Bard. 1975: 1976; 1978: Donovan & Sullivan. 1974).
Two hostage events which occurred in New York State, one in 1971 and the other in 
1972, are often referred to in the literature of hostage situations but did not at the time 
prompt any changes in law enforcement policy. The September 1971 Attica prison riot 
and hostage holding in northwest New York State resulted in death for twenty-eight 
correction officers and ten inmates during a rescue attempt. This tragedy prompted 
controversy in criminal justice and social science circles over force versus restraint in 
approaching hostage incidents (Garson, 1972; Wicker, 1975; Useem & Kimball, 1989: 
Shelton, 1994; Strollo and Wills-Raftery, 1994). It did not, however, prompt interest by 
the New York City Police Department; perhaps because it involved prisoners and was 
contained within the walls of a correctional facility located hundreds of miles away. 
Similarly, almost one year later, in August 1972, a bank robbery hostage situation in 
Brooklyn, New York which has been perpetuated in a fictionalized account in the popular 
movie Dog Dav Afternoon (1975) did not immediately result in seeing a need for change 
in situations involving hostages. However Attica and Dog-Day as well as additional 
examples were examined later, when negotiation came to be seen as a viable strategy for 
dealing with hostage situations (Bolz & Hershey, 1979; Moorehead, 1980).
It was not until 1975 that the topic of hostage situations was considered separately 
in standard police texts in the United States. An examination by this researcher of the
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indices of numerous textbooks used in criminal justice education programs and for police 
civil service promotion purposes, published between 1970 and 1980. revealed only one. 
Supervision of Police Personnel (Iannone. 1975) which included a section on hostage 
situations.
Cooper (1985) noted that there was a shift in official responses to hostage 
situations following the 1972 Munich Olympics incident, and Welch (1984) included in 
his historical treatment of hostage negotiations a reference to the influence of the crisis at 
the 1972 Munich Olympics. In the Munich Olympic hostage situation two members of the 
Israeli Olympic team were killed in the original takeover. Additionally, one West 
German police officer, five PLO terrorists and eight Israeli hostages died during an 
attempt to free the hostages by force (Schreiber. 1973; Moorehead, 1980; Soskis & Van 
Zandt, 1986).
The Munich event alerted the New York City Police Department that their 
jurisdiction could provide a similar opportunity for some group to engage in terroristic 
diplomacy. The fact that the hostage holding occurred during the International Olympics, 
involved American allies, Israel and West Germany, and was broadcast live by the media 
was enough to prompt an immediate study of the issues (Gelb, 1977; Bolz and Hershey, 
1979; Gettinger, 1983).
A literature search consisting of four social science data bases, NCJRS. Criminal 
Justice Abstracts. Sociofile, and PsvchLit, revealed that the first two published articles 
about police hostage negotiation in the U.S. were separately authored by two New York
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City Police Department commanders who had a role in the early formulation of the 
policy. Donald F. Cawley (1974) was the Chief of Patrol during the post-Munich policy 
study period and the first field-test, albeit spontaneous, of the new Recommended 
Guidelines: Incidents Involving Hostages (1973). These contingency plans stressed that 
“the primary consideration in such circumstances is to secure the lives and safety of the 
threatened hostages, the police officers, innocent bystanders, and the criminals 
themselves”(p. 1). John A. Culley (1974), a Detective Bureau lieutenant, referring to the 
same document, noted that Chief Inspector Michael J. Codd had recently “reviewed and 
approved plans for hostage situations, plans which [Codd] had been working on with 
various units of the police department since September I972”(p. 1). This original plan did 
not specifically mention hostage negotiators.
In a then far-reaching review of hostage incident responses Gettinger (1983) 
noted that “Shortly after the Munich incident [1972], Patrick Murphy, then New York 
City Police Commissioner gave the order that New York should prepare itself for terrorist 
hostage-taking” (p. 14). His Chief of Special Operations, Simon Eisendorfer, formed a 
committee consisting of patrol, detective, training and psychological service 
representatives. Gettinger further reported that the FBI followed suit in 1973 when it 
initiated research and training in hostage negotiation. One of the original FBI negotiators, 
Conrad Hassel, noted that this specialty was not even conceived until 1972 and that it 
soon spread across the country (see Gettinger, 1983). Soskis (1983), in an article which 
discussed behavioral scientists and law enforcement personnel working together,
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reviewed various possible collaborations and noted that the "new discipline of hostage 
negotiations . . .  had its beginning in the New York City Police Department"! p.49).
Evolution o f the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team and its 
Relationship to Other New York City Police Department Units
In January 1973 a significant event in the evolution of hostage negotiation took place 
over a two-day period in Brooklyn, New York at a location known as John & AlDs 
Sporting Goods Store. The local precinct police had responded to a silent alarm call of a 
possible robbery in progress and were met with gunfire from within the store. 
Reenforcements arrived, including Emergency Service Unit (ESU) tactical officers, which 
is the equivalent of SWAT Team personnel in some other jurisdictions. One ESU officer 
was killed and two other officers wounded in the quickly unfolding event. One of four 
suspects was also wounded and eight hostages were held in the store. The new 
operational plan for incidents involving hostages, which Chief Eisendorfer had organized 
a few months earlier at Commissioner Murphy’s direction, was implemented for the first 
time. Its primary concerns were with containment of the scene, control of personnel and 
resources and communication with the captors (Cawley, 1974). Forty-seven hours after 
the incident began, all of the hostages were safe, the four perpetrators were in custody and 
there was no further injury to police officers or other responders.
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A comprehensive critique of the incident at John & Al's was undertaken. Although, 
according to Welch (1984), the plan had not been eagerly received throughout the 
Department, its basic principles were validated by the activities surrounding the forty- 
seven-hour siege at John & Al's. Even though the original plan had stressed the 
importance o f communicating with hostage holders, there had been no prior indication as 
to who the negotiator would be. The critique made commanders aware o f “negotiation 
deficits” (Welch, p. 66). A wide variety of police and non-police had ‘negotiated’ during 
the forty-seven hours, largely without measurable success. As a result of the incident, the 
idea of having specific individuals designated as hostage negotiators was introduced into 
the New York City Police Department for the first time. By April 1973 a team of 
negotiators had been selected from the ranks o f the Detective Bureau and put through a 
four week training program (Welch, p.66).
Police Commissioner Michael J. Codd (1977) in a report on police preparedness for 
terrorist events indicated that the hostage situation guide had been designed to “focus on 
functional team work, effective communications, and skilled coordination o f tactics, 
under the management of a high ranking police commander” (p.3). A major change to 
the original draft o f the plan, following John & Al’s, was the establishment of “a group of 
specially trained negotiators responsible for communicating with barricaded suspects” in 
place of “the more traditional response of unconditional assault” (Taylor, 1983, p.64).
The first formal practice of police hostage negotiation was established in New York 
City during the period between September 1972 and April 1973 (Bell, 1978; Moorehead,
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1980: Bolz and Hershey. 1979; Schlossberg and Freeman. 1974; Douglas & Olshaker. 
1995). In 1974, the New York City Police Department received a grant from the New 
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services to support the efforts that had been 
initiated post-Munich and revised as a result of John & AlQs. A hostage confrontation 
response system, utilizing Detective Bureau investigators and Emergency Service Unit 
tactical specialists, was formalized. The investigators and the tactical officers were 
trained to “meet the problem of hostage negotiating and rescue" under the direction of an 
incident commander, according to a Police Department document Terrorism Control in 
New York City (1979). The recommended guidelines had evolved into a Tactical Manual 
for Hostage Situations (1974).
The Emergency Service Unit of the New York City Police Department was a highly 
diverse mobile force of uniformed officers with full-time citywide responsibility. The 
members of this all volunteer group had to have extensive uniformed patrol experience 
before applying for a transfer into the Emergency Service Unit. The members were rescue 
oriented and performed a wide range of specialized tasks. According to their Operational 
Policies and Tactics (1977), among other tasks, they were certified Emergency Medical 
Technicians, took potential jumpers off bridges and buildings, handled radiation 
accidents, searched for and transported improvised explosive devices and operated the 
Emergency Rescue Vehicle (a tank). “They are the [New York City Police] Department’s 
Firearms Battalion. They are the only members qualified to use tear gas. They are also 
skilled in the use o f anti-sniper rifles, carbines, machine guns, and the shotgun, their most
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basic weapon” (p. 1). One chapter of their Operational Policies and Tactics manual was 
devoted to confrontations, which included “sniper, barricaded criminal/hostage, 
disorderly group/mob, civilian clothed member [and] dangerous psychotic” (p. 20). The 
Emergency Service Unit was selected to be the tactical [SWAT] component of the new 
hostage confrontation program because of its involvement in closely related activities for 
many years.
It was an Emergency Service Police Officer, Steve Gilroy, who was killed in the early 
stages of the siege at John & AT s. It was not surprising that officers assigned to 
Emergency Service might resent, if not resist, creation of a new team of officers to 
perform part of their [ESU] jobs as described by Welch (1984).
The newly created Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team was an all 
volunteer function mostly performed as needed by full-time New York City Police 
Investigators, primarily Detectives and Sergeants. This was an example of a shift to an 
organic operational function within the context of a primarily mechanistic organization, 
(see Bums & Stalker, 1961; Kuykendall & Roberg, 1982).
The decision to house the negotiator component of the new program in the Detective 
Bureau rather than Patrol or Special Operations was based on a variety of personnel 
factors which Schlossberg and Freeman (1974), Bard (1978) and Symonds (1980) had 
suggested as appropriate criteria for candidates to become successful hostage/crisis 
negotiators.
Since a range of other policing experiences had preceded assignment to the Detective
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Bureau, the investigator would be chronologically and experientially mature.
Investigators worked in civilian clothes, which fit with the crisis intervention notion of 
non-hostile representation of authority. Detective assignments were normally case driven 
as compared to uniformed patrol officers who were often radio-run-incident driven, so 
investigators did not have to be readily available for the next routine radio-run. 
Investigators were also expected to be competent in gathering and analysis of intelligence 
as well as in conducting interviews and interrogations. These skills were deemed 
necessary for success in hostage/crisis negotiation.
To have been accepted as a negotiator, the volunteer investigator needed a positive 
recommendation from his commander, participated in a paper and pencil psychological 
examination and a follow-up interview with a police department psychologist, and had to 
be favorably interviewed by the Hostage Team Coordinator. Those chosen were then 
assigned to a four week training program, designed specifically for the purpose and 
including: psychology, physical fitness, firearms, electronic equipment, and liaison 
(Culley, 1974, p.3). Assigned full time in civilian clothes to various Detective Squads, a 
number of trained negotiators, based on geographic area of assignment, scheduled work 
time and any special qualifications, were called together for an incident. After the 
incident, the negotiators returned to their regular investigative duties. These individuals 
performed the additional duties of hostage/crisis negotiator, without additional pay, 
although their base investigator’s salary was higher than the base pay of the uniformed 
Emergency Service Officers.
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During approximately the first ten years of existence, the New York City Police 
Department Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team was a function without a 
permanent home. When the hostage confrontation program was formally launched, as a 
result of the critique of the John & Al’s siege, the newly designated Hostage 
Coordinator, a Lieutenant assigned to the Brooklyn Detective command, was placed in 
charge and transferred into the Major Crimes Section of the citywide Special 
Investigation Division. In 1974 the function was moved to the Office of Chief of 
Detectives; the coordinator then reported directly to the Deputy Chief of Detectives. One 
year later the function and coordinator were shifted to a support staff of the Detective 
Bureau, the Management Control Division. Approximately three years later the 
coordinator was promoted to Captain and the Management Control Division was divided 
into two functional commands, Management Control and Technical Support in order to 
justify retention of the newly promoted Captain in the Detective Bureau. The hostage 
function became the responsibility of the new Technical Support Unit. In 1979 the 
Captain and activities related to hostage/crisis negotiation were transferred back to the 
Special Investigation Division, reporting directly to the Inspector-in-command. Non­
hostage related responsibilities were retained in the reconstituted Management Control 
Division. In the fall of 1981 the Captain was transferred to a Detective Borough 
command but retained as the Department’s Senior Hostage Negotiator. Command of the 
Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team was assigned to a Lieutenant, who had been 
second-in-command of the team since approximately 1978, and the functions remained in
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the Special Investigation Division. The Lieutenant was also responsible for various 
aspects of kidnap and extortion investigations.
In 1983, the Lieutenant and hostage/crisis negotiation function were transferred to a 
primarily staff unit in the Detective Bureau, the Central Investigation and Resource 
Division. In addition to coordination of the hostage team the Lieutenant continued to be 
responsible for supervision of kidnap and extortion investigations, and was also 
accountable for various other activities including the unit that provided technical support 
and surveillance at hostage situations. In April 1983 the then coordinator was formally 
promoted to Commander of Detective Squad, informally referred to as Detective 
Lieutenant. As of January 1999, the hostage/crisis negotiation function and current 
Detective Lieutenant in-command was still assigned to the Central Investigation and 
Resource Division of the Detective Bureau, but only responsible for hostage related 
duties. The other duties, which had been assigned as complementary to the hostage 
function in 1983, had since been assigned to other units and supervisors.
Most of these changes, which occurred during 1973 to 1983, were due to resistance or 
a lack of acceptance on the part of some senior police commanders during a period of 
adjustment for a new function. The personality of the hostage team coordinator and 
positive media attention to early successes of the team also created resentment. The 
original team coordinator was an extremely out going individual who was also active in 
many social organizations within the Department. The New York media provided 
extensive coverage to the highly successful operational activities of the hostage
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negotiators and the coordinator made himself available to a variety of interviewers. This 
was with the approval of the press office of the Police Department but yet engendered 
negative reaction by other commanders. This is consistent with Welch's (1984) 
observation about organizational resistance in his examination of hostage situations.
Another change, which took place during this same time period, was in the types of 
incidents to which hostage/crisis negotiators were dispatched. Originally they responded 
only to confirmed hostage holdings and the request for hostage/crisis negotiators was 
initiated by the Emergency Service Unit supervisor at the scene. Gradually, based on 
hostage/crisis negotiation success, and accompanying positive media attention, they were 
dispatched to some non-hostage crisis situation such as barricaded criminals and people 
threatening suicide. Both of these functions previously had been the exclusive purview of 
the Emergency Service Unit. Contemporaneous with these expanded duties hostage/crisis 
negotiation personnel were also being utilized in kidnap and extortion cases, and in 
operational planning for high risk raid and warrant execution. A significant change took 
place with the publication of the Police Department’s Interim Order # 51 (1984) when for 
the first time it was mandated that negotiators be dispatched to certain situations 
involving non-hostage holding emotionally disturbed persons. These situations were 
previously handled by the Emergency Service Unit. Likewise, prior to this, calls for the 
immediate services of hostage/crisis negotiators had been initiated by the Emergency 
Service Unit Supervisor. However, the new Interim Order specified that the requesting 
authority was to be the Incident Commander, normally the on-scene Duty Captain, who
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Previous Research on Police Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Units
Three bibliographies published by the U.S. Department of Justice encompassing 
certain aspects of policing that may be related to hostage negotiation were reviewed, i.e.. 
Police Discretion (1978a) contained 138 items; Police Management ( 1978b) contained 
123 items; and Police Crisis Intervention ( 1978c) contained 63 items. These three 
bibliographies did not contain references on organization and policy issues related to 
hostage/crisis negotiation. Three additional U.S. Department of Justice bibliographies, 
each entitled Topical Search: SWAT and Hostage Negotiations (1983: 1987; 1992), 
contained a total of 297 entries. Valuable references were obtained but none of the 
entries addressed the organization and procedures of hostage/crisis negotiation teams.
Bristow (1977) conducted one of the earliest research projects about police 
involvement in hostage situations, in connection with curriculum development for a 
college level police management course. He examined a five-year period (1970-1975), 
using newspaper and periodical indexes, to eventually identify media accounts of 185 
cases for examination through content analysis. Bristow’s report did not discuss police 
organizational or management issues, but two of his findings were of interest to this 
research. In 110 hostage negotiation incidents, 87 (79%) resulted in the unharmed release 
of the hostages. In 100% (13) of the cases in which trained negotiators were used no
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hostages were harmed. Bristow advised that this finding be viewed with caution due to 
the small number of cases (13) involving trained negotiators.
In June 1983 the Houston, Texas Police Department released the results of a 
survey of major police departments regarding hostage negotiation polices and procedures. 
They had mailed a thirty-one-item questionnaire to twenty-six agencies during February 
1983. Twenty-two (85%) useful responses were received. The report, Houston Police 
Department Hostage Negotiation Team Survey 1983. did not describe the criteria for 
selection of the sample or characteristics of the agencies. Twenty-one (95%) of the 
departments reported having a hostage negotiation team. The hostage negotiation 
function was assigned to the SWAT team in thirteen (59%) of the agencies. In addition to 
hostage negotiation duties, twenty (91%) also responded to barricaded suspects in which 
no hostages were being held, and sixteen (73%) responded to suicide attempts. The 
median number of years a team had been existence was six years. Three agencies listed 
1972 as the year in which their team was formed. However, the literature cited above 
(e.g., Schlossberg & Freeman, 1974; Bell, 1978, Bolz & Hershey, 1979) had indicated 
that the first team in the U.S. was formed in New York City in 1973. The submission to 
the survey from New York City indicated 1973 as the year that their team was formed.
The present research has helped to clarify when the first hostage negotiation team was 
established in the U.S.
In January 1983 a Memphis, Tennessee Police Officer was held hostage and 
murdered. Subsequently, the Memphis Police Department mailed a seventeen-page
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questionnaire to 230 agencies throughout the U.S. requesting detailed information about 
police officers that may have been held hostage in their jurisdiction. They received 156 
responses (68%). Neither the original survey nor the results indicated the criteria for 
selection of the sample or organizational characteristics of the responding agencies. 
Thirty-one (20%) of the responses contained extensive information about police officers 
who had been held hostage. There was only one question in the survey about response to 
these incidents by hostage negotiators, but this item was not tabulated in their Results of 
Analysis of Research from Hostage Officer Data (1984). Two survey items that were 
included in the summary of the results dealt with hostage negotiation training. Thirteen 
(41%) of the responses indicated that officers who had been held hostage had received 
recruit level academy training about hostage situations. Ten individuals (32%) had 
received in-service training about hostage situations.
One of the original FBI behavioral scientists and hostage negotiators, Thomas Strentz 
(1985), reported an analysis of 245 Hostage Incident Reports collected by the FBI from 
throughout the country concerning incidents that had occurred between 1976 and early 
1985. Two of his research questions were of interest to this project: The role of incident 
commanders and negotiation, and the effect of time in negotiation situations. Strentz 
found that during incidents, in which commanders also decided to negotiate, the subjects 
were shot 63% of the time. The commanders had themselves negotiated in only 14% of 
the cases and were accountable for 25 of the subjects being killed or wounded. Strentz 
also noted that non-command, untrained negotiators decided to shoot in a total of 27 out
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of 54 cases (50%). Trained negotiators were credited with taking into custody 193 (85%) 
of the subjects who were apprehended unharmed. Strentz also reported that there was a 
correlation between the length of time elapsed and a nonviolent solution to a hostage 
situation. ‘T he longer a hostage situation continues, the more likely it is that it will be 
successfully resolved” (p. 13). For example, in 63 cases lasting up to four hours only 36 
(57%) of the subjects were negotiated out, while in 80 situations lasting between seven 
and nine hours, 76 (95%) ended peacefully.
Koleas (1985) conducted an analysis of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of 
six police agencies in order to assess their ability to resolve hostage incidents. The 
agencies were not identified by name. The difference in the length of the published orders 
received and reviewed from each department ranged from a minimum of one page to a 
maximum of nineteen pages; the later was obtained from an unidentified East Coast 
department. Only the East Coast department’s procedure discussed chain of command 
sufficiently to determine if the negotiation function was part of or separate from the 
SWAT team. In that plan the hostage commander and the SWAT commander are 
separately accountable to the incident commander. Similarly, there was not sufficient 
information from the six departments to determine common features about selection or 
training of negotiators. There was a chart comparing the nature of events responded to, 
which Koleas called Department Adaptability, i.e., political, trapped criminal, mentally 
disturbed and domestic (p. 30). He concluded “that police agency response to hostage 
incident resolution is not the same everywhere. The Sop’s reviewed show a wide range of
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disparity in terms of specificity, adaptability, and awareness of state of the art techniques’* 
(p- 43).
Head (1989) examined U.S. law enforcement practices about hostage incidents for his 
doctoral dissertation at the State University of New York at Albany. His research was 
primarily concerned with characteristics of the situations and their outcomes. He 
examined 801 cases obtained from various databases over a ten-year period. His analysis 
utilized twenty-eight independent variables and three dependent variables. One 
independent variable, use of negotiators, revealed that 269 (34%) of the incidents were 
negotiated by trained law enforcement negotiators, another 70 (9%) were negotiated by 
untrained law enforcement personnel and in 270 cases (34%) hostages were released 
without negotiation. In 192 (23%) of the cases the use of negotiators was not clearly 
determined (p. 112a). One dependent variable dealt with the fate of hostages. In those 
cases in which hostages were safely recovered, 309 (40%) of the releases were with 
demands not being met and 192 (24%) were after demands were complied with. Another 
82 (10%) were safely rescued during a police tactical assault, 54 (7%) escaped, and 19 
(2%) were wounded by their captors. Finally 50 (6%) were killed by their captors and 
six(<l%) were killed or wounded during the police assault to rescue (p. 114c). Another 
dependent variable, final fate of hostage takers demonstrated that for the 801 cases, 485 
(60%) were arrested, 67 (8%) were killed or wounded by the police and 16 (2%) 
committed suicide. The fate of the remaining 233 (30%) was unknown or categorized as 
other (p. 115b). There were no data or discussion concerning organization, policy.
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selection, training, and workload or negotiator satisfaction.
For a dissertation submitted to the University of Iowa. Powell (1989) conducted 
research on the negotiation procedure involved in hostage and barricaded incidents. This 
was a sociological investigation designed to identify the processes involved in the 
incidents. His study was concerned with the social conduct of negotiations. However, of 
interest to this research, he noted that:
“In the last fifteen years, police at local, state and national levels have become well 
schooled in the techniques of enforcing policy through negotiation. Hostage-takers are 
met with trained negotiators, and barricaded incidents are almost always resolved by 
voice appeals alone. Although weapons forces secure the surrounding turf, and tactical 
solutions are considered necessary under extreme conditions, negotiation is the policy and 
practice of first resort” (p. 6).
Many other areas of sociological research also had relevance for examining diverse 
aspects of activity likely to have been linked to hostage/crisis negotiation situations. For 
example, Spunt, et.al. (1994) reported on the nexus between substance abuse and 
violence; research issues like this informed the development of training topics, the use of 
third party intermediaries, and whether or not it was appropriate to permit negotiators to 
bargain for alcohol or other drugs.
The first study aimed at “collecting and disseminating information on hostage 
negotiation team characteristics and crisis incidents” was claimed by Hammer, Van Zandt 
and Rogan (1994). The authors undertook the task because “little comprehensive data 
exist concerning crisis negotiation activities in the United States” (p. 8). For their study 
100-hostage unit team leaders from across the country completed a forty-four-item 
questionnaire in 1992. Among the issues of concern to the researchers were team
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demographics, selection and training, and workload.
The survey revealed that the majority of negotiators were white and male and 
assigned to investigative or patrol duties. Approximately 55% of the teams did not have a 
written negotiator selection policy. Seventy-four percent stated that initial negotiator 
training was ten days or less in duration and 61% received five days or less in service 
training. The FBI had provided the initial training for 40% of the teams. During 1991 
most teams negotiated less than ten times in actual situations. The team leaders surveyed 
also believed that there was a considerable need for additional information about the 
operations and functions of hostage/crisis negotiation teams.
Rogan, Hammer and Van Zandt (1994) revised the questionnaire for a follow-up 
study. They decreased the number of items to thirty-two. The new questionnaire was 
distributed late in 1992 to 142 individuals from twenty-six states, each representing a 
separate hostage/crisis team. The majority, 62%, reported that their team did not have 
written guidelines for selecting team members. They also did not spend much time 
between incidents involved in coordinating efforts or training with SWAT teams; 90% 
spent five or fewer days in such activities annually. Demographic, training and workload 
findings were consistent with their earlier study.
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Research Issues Concerning Hostage/Crisis Negotiation in U.S. Police
Organizations
Goddard and Stanley (1994) reported that the literature on theories of hostage 
taking are at an early stage of scientific development, and that authors vary in their views 
on the relative importance of certain features. A need existed to examine various issues 
in order to advance the development of a functional body of knowledge about 
hostage/crisis negotiation. This study focused especially on several issues including (1) 
the placement of a hostage/crisis negotiation unit within the chain of command and 
organizational structure of a police department, (2) the development of written policies 
related to hostage/crisis negotiation, (3) the potential for tension between hostage/crisis 
negotiation tactics and the direct action orientation of traditional law enforcement, and (4) 
the selection and training of hostage/crisis negotiators. These issues could be viewed 
within the framework of mechanistic or organic police department organizational 
structures.
Organizational Structure. There was a lack of systematized knowledge about the 
organization and functions of negotiating units. The International Association of Chiefs 
of Police (1991) and the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(1996) has published models and standards for hostage/crisis negotiation related activity.
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They have not specified the appropriate organizational configuration, routine procedures, 
or ideal selection and training needs.
Bums and Stalker (1961) attempted to determine the type of organizational 
design and management practices that were most appropriate under different 
environmental conditions. Langworthy (1994) in noting that there is an “illusion of 
simplicity when complexity is generally the case”(p. 166) could well have been speaking 
about hostage/crisis negotiation teams which must satisfy a host of demands 
simultaneously. These demands include concern for victim and officer safety under close 
observation by commanders, the media and the public. Langworthy observed that 
organizational goals are complex and often contradictory and speculated about the most 
appropriate organizational form in various circumstances. He reported that “police 
organizations are highly varied in hierarchical structure and in the degree to which they 
functionally divide the task of poIicing”(p.l78). Panzarella and Shapiro (1988) 
commented on the dilemmas faced by the police when faced with conflicting demands 
within the organization. Incidents which involve hostages draw so much public attention 
that the need to pinpoint responsibility and circumscribe liability for any negative 
outcomes may result in pressures to create a functional specialization under the command 
of a high ranking superior, even when the superior personally lacks appropriate expertise. 
The fixing of responsibility and accountability, coupled with the traditional paramilitary 
orientation of police organizations in the U.S., are characteristic of a mechanistic 
organizational orientation.
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While prepared and justified to use force, a hostage/crisis negotiation posture 
attempts resolution without resorting to violence. In a democracy police work by 
necessity focuses a great deal of attention on means as opposed to ends, which has an 
important impact on how the job is to be performed (Kuykendall & Roberg, 1982). 
Current discussions in policing dealing with concepts such as zero tolerance, pursuit 
driving and dealing with emotionally disturbed or mentally ill people may be related to 
justification for the use of force in a given incident. In each of these types of incidents an 
officer is faced with a choice of a means in order to achieve a desired end. The 
discussion of ends-means is a persistent dilemma in law enforcement and may be 
pertinent to the positioning of hostage/crisis negotiators in SWAT or non-SWAT 
components of an agency. The SWAT concept is action oriented, mostly associated with 
physical activities and specialized equipment. The negotiation concept is 
communications oriented, chiefly associated with patience and persuasion. Both concepts 
have the same end in sight, resolution of a situation, but each emphasizes a different 
means.
There are numerous organizational arrangements possible for the assignment of 
hostage negotiators. Some agencies assign their negotiation function to the special 
weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. However, Severn (1993) noted that many small to 
medium-sized law enforcement agencies have created tactical and negotiation teams but 
that situations are often managed in ways which do not follow accepted tactical 
procedures. The value of SWAT teams throughout the country has been questioned. He
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observed that some believe that there is no evidence that they are always used properly or 
even essential in some situations. An objective of this study was to gather data that may 
suggest the most appropriate placement of the hostage/crisis function within the 
organizational structure of a police department, especially its relation to SWAT teams.
Development o f Written Policies. Borum and Strentz (1992) emphasized that a 
planned and tested response was required due to the volatility and complexity of hostage 
incidents. Ochberg and Soskis (1982) indicated that only techniques that have 
demonstrably worked in the past should be used. MacWillson (1992) stressed that 
incident management, response planning, and strategic and tactical decision making help 
to determine the effectiveness o f government in crisis management, which is often the 
responsibility of a police department. Whittle (1988) discussed issues which must be 
considered in planning policies and procedures including resources, personnel and 
training. Friedland (1983) noted the need for constituent support for policy and public 
confidence in the soundness of government’s [the police] decisions. Public support and 
confidence are more likely if policies are in writing. Cooper (1985) explored the 
feasibility of developing uniform standards for dealing with hostage situations. Policies 
cannot be effective over time if they are not formally written. As Severn (1993) noted the 
most important asset for a situation commander is a clear policy or standard operating 
procedure manual that defines the chain of command and lays out the agency’s tactical 
principles, mission, and philosophy.
Direct Action Orientation vs. Negotiation. Noesner and Dolan (1992), both FBI
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hostage negotiators, have noted that from the first day of training and throughout their 
careers, police officers are taught to take the initiative to resolve situations that threaten 
life or property. They also cautioned that immediate, aggressive response might not be an 
appropriate course of action in every situation. Davis (1993) believed that law 
enforcement officers were generally action-oriented in a hostage crisis and that 
negotiation was underutilized. Wargo (1989) noted concern with the knowledge of the 
police officers on the scene about hostage/crisis policy. He was also interested in how to 
most effectively use personnel. Klein (1995) reported that hostage/crisis technique was 
very successful because of the ability of the police or military to contain and negotiate, 
but that most experts had focused on the negotiations within such operations.
Nudell and Antokol (1991) noted that although hostage taking is only a small part 
of a greater problem it often had impact out o f proportion to its actual threat. They 
recommended a strategy of ‘firm flexibility’ in dealing with such incidents. This concept, 
which involves communication without substantial compromise, seems to mesh with the 
notion of ‘dynamic inactivity’ introduced by Schlossberg (Law Enforcement News,
1977). His ‘dynamic inactivity’ referred to a negotiation posture in which no overt 
activity appears to be taking place, but in reality, in addition to preparation for physical 
force maneuvers, there are also planning and calculation of alternatives designed to 
maximize a nonviolent outcome. (Schlossberg, 1996).
Selection and Training of Negotiators. There was a lack o f information on the 
selection, preparation and self-expectation of negotiating unit members and their role in
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such events, which in turn makes it difficult to recommend the development of a standard 
to measure the readiness and competence of negotiating units and personnel. Benton 
(1988) discussed selection and training standards in the context of personnel development 
as a prerequisite for successful operations in a criminal justice agency. Hammer, et al. 
(1994) and Rogan, et al. (1994) reported that the majority of police departments did not 
have written guidelines for the selection of hostage/crisis negotiators. Hammer also noted 
that initial hostage/crisis negotiator training consisted of up to ten days of training for 
74% of the departments reporting. Culley (1974) reported that the first hostage 
negotiation team training was one month long.
Mechanistic vs. Organic Organization. The examination of how an organization, 
or part of an organization, is structured, particularly how it dealt with specialization, 
departmentalization and the coordination and control of specialized units, was essential in 
determining how an organization functions (Shafritz and Ott, 1996). Bums and Stalker 
(1961) outlined two management systems, mechanistic and organic, which they described 
as forms which an organization can take when that organization reacts to change. These 
organizational forms are not a dichotomy but a polarity, with intermediate and elastic 
relationships between them. Nor is there a “suggestion that either system is superior 
under all circumstances to the other” (Kuykendall and Roberg, 1982, p. 213).
The following depicts five polar constructs which Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) 
described as basic to mechanistic and organic models of organization (pp. 243-244):






4. Rule Oriented. Situation Oriented
5. Position Oriented. Goal Oriented
Police Departments in the U.S. are often referred to as military type organizations, 
which in many ways is analogous to mechanistic organizations. Pintrich (1996) in 
discussing the work of Bums and Stalker in relation to a criminal justice agency noted:
The mechanistic form is seen when there are “stable” conditions, and it is 
characterized by a traditional pattern of hierarchy, reliance on formal rules and 
regulations, accompanied by standard decision-making. In more dynamic conditions, 
where the environment changes rapidly, there is less rigidity, more participation by staff, 
and more reliance on workers to define problems. This form is known as the organic 
form of organization. While organic systems are not hierarchic in the same manner as are 
mechanistic, they remain stratified. Positions are differentiated according to seniority -,
i.e., and greater expertise (p.8).
Building on the work of Bums and Stalker and others, Kuykendall and Roberg 
(1982) noted that since the 1960's police departments have been “emphasizing a 
movement away from a mechanistic to more of an organic approach” (p. 241).
The present study contributes to the field of police management and operations by 
collecting and analyzing data about management orientation for hostage/crisis negotiation 
teams as well as by compiling and reporting on hostage/crisis negotiator satisfaction and 
subjective expectations of effectiveness of negotiation as a police tactic. A futures study 
by the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training examined the
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current status and future requirements of barricade and hostage situations in California 
and recommended proactive research and development (Giidea, 1992). Police related 
research by Langworthy (1983, 1986, 1994) dealt with a variety of factors such as agency 
size, specialization, reward structures, and community standards. These issues were 
relevant to this research because with little exception, there had not been a systematic 
collection and analysis of data about the formation and practices of hostage/crisis 
negotiation units in U.S. policing. There was a need to examine department size, 
organizational design, and staffing and administrative issues relative to hostage/crisis 
negotiation.
Police agencies in the U.S. are generally thought of as mechanistic, even quasi­
military organizations. There are, however, functions within an agency, which are more 
organic than mechanistic in nature. With the five polar constructs noted above in mind, 
the actual negotiation process of a hostage/crisis team, which was not the subject of this 
research, would likely be determined to be organic in nature. On the other hand, the 
substantive activities of the tactical/SWAT component of a police agency would probably 
be described as mechanistic. This research is concerned with a mix of elements in an 
agency, which impact on the functioning of the hostage/crisis negotiation process. 
Variables examined in this research, including assignment, reporting lines, the recording 
of incidents, selection process, written policy, and use of untrained officers to negotiate, 
allowed for an estimate of the degree of mechanistic or organic orientation of the agency.
When hostage/crisis negotiation was first introduced into the New York City
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Police Department there was some resentment and resistance. A police department that 
was viewed as a mechanistic organization abruptly had an organic function thrust upon it 
without an appropriate foundation for change. This research may demonstrate how the 
hostage/crisis negotiation function in U.S. police organization fits between the extremes 
noted for each of the five constructs.
It is also important to study the organizational structure of an agency or a function 
within that agency in an attempt to ascertain the effect that the organizational structure 
has on the negotiators’ perception of their role. In relating the agency chain of command 
for hostage/crisis incidents and the opinions of negotiators about effectiveness to organic 
and mechanistic attributes, the influence of the structure on the attitudes of negotiators 
may become apparent.




The following hostage/crisis negotiations related hypotheses were tested in this 
study. These hypotheses are related to the size of the agency and the timing of team 
formation, whether the organizational structure is mechanistic or organic, whether the 
agency is tactical/SWAT oriented or negotiation oriented, the relationship of having 
various written policy guidelines and the presence o f written hostage/crisis negotiation 
policy guidelines, the relationship between innovation and hostage/crisis negotiation team 
formation, the degree of hostage/crisis negotiator satisfaction, and the perceived 
effectiveness of hostage/crisis negotiation.
Hypothesis related to department size:
Larger police departments are more likely to have formed a hostage/crisis 
negotiation team earlier than smaller police departments. Larger police departments 
are generally considered more likely to have a greater number of specialized units and a 
clearer chain of command. This is in keeping with the mechanistic characteristics of an 
agency’s need to exercise control over their personnel. However, Langworthy’s (1986) 
discussion of differentiation in organizations noted that an examination of the relationship 
between agency size and structure was often inconclusive. The size of the agency and the 
year during which the agency hostage/crisis negotiation team was formed was obtained 
from the questionnaire.
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Hypothesis related to mechanistic orientation:
In a mechanistic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team will be a 
part o f the tactical team. Bums and Stalker (1961) and Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) 
reported on various aspects of the conventional elements present in organizations and the 
management orientation of those organizations, including specialization, hierarchy, 
authority, rule orientation and position orientation. The degree of mechanistic orientation 
was determined for each agency by assigning a score of between zero and five, based on 
the following factors from the questionnaire. There were specific reasons for considering 
each of the items as indication that an organization was mechanistic. In a mechanistic 
organization the patrol function is considered the backbone and specialists would be 
drawn from the patrol ranks. In keeping with a hierarchical orientation the unit 
commander must devote all of their working time to the function. Audio and video 
recordings permit greater control over the personnel and procedures. Mechanistic 
organizational adherence to rule orientation encourages adoption of written policy. And, 
only individuals selected and trained for a task are considered suitable for activities 
related to that position in mechanistic organizations. One point for each item present:
1. The usual assignment for hostage/crisis negotiators is patrol or SWAT.
2. The hostage/crisis negotiation team commander/leader is a full time position.
3. Audio or video recordings are usually made of hostage/crisis negotiation incidents.
4. The hostage/crisis negotiator selection process is contained in a written policy.
5. Officers not trained as hostage/crisis negotiators are not permitted to negotiate.
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Hypothesis related to organic orientation:
In an organic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team will not be a 
part of the tactical team . Bums and Stalker (1961) and Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) 
reported on various aspects of the conventional elements present in organizations and the 
management orientation of those organizations including generalization, collegiality, 
power, situation orientation and goal orientation. The degree of organic orientation will 
be determined for each agency by assigning a score o f between zero and five, based on 
the following items from the questionnaire. The items on the organic orientation scale are 
largely the inverse o f the items on the mechanistic orientation scale. One point for each 
item present:
1. The usual assignment for hostage/crisis negotiators is investigative or other duties.
2. The hostage/crisis negotiation team commander/leader is a part time position.
3. Audio or video recordings are usually not made o f hostage/crisis negotiation incidents.
4. The hostage/crisis negotiator selection process is not contained in a written policy.
5. Officers not trained as hostage/crisis negotiators are permitted to negotiate.
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Hypothesis related to Tactical (SWAT) Orientation:
The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report to the tactical team 
leader during an incident in SWAT oriented agencies. Kolman (1982) reported on the 
development o f SWAT teams in the U.S. and listed common characteristics. The 
Houston Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team Survey ( 1983) noted that the 
hostage/crisis negotiation team was assigned to the SWAT unit in 59% of the agencies 
that responded to their survey. The degree of tactical (SWAT) orientation was 
determined by assigning a score of between zero and five for each agency based on the 
presence of the following factors, obtained from the questionnaire, one point for each 
item present:
1. The agency maintains an armored vehicle.
2. The agency sets time limits for hostage/crisis negotiation prior to initiating a tactical 
solution.
3. The agency provides hazardous duty pay for officers in the hostage/crisis negotiation 
team.
4. Policy forbids movement of the hostage/crisis situation to a different location.
5. Hostage/crisis negotiators are usually deployed only to actual hostage situations and 
not to a variety o f assignments.
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The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report directly to the incident 
commander during hostage/crisis negotiation team deployments in negotiation 
oriented agencies. In the Koleas (1985) study the direct reporting line from 
hostage/crisis negotiation team leader to incident commander could only be determined 
for one of the six agencies studied. Gettinger (1983) reported on characteristics of 
hostage/crisis negotiation teams from several different jurisdictions. Degree of 
negotiation orientation was determined by assigning a score between zero and five based 
on the presence of the following factors, obtained from the questionnaire, one point for 
each item:
1. The agency has a variety of response assignments for hostage/crisis negotiation team 
members in addition to incidents in which hostages are actually being held.
2. The agency hostage/crisis plan permits movement of a situation to another site.
3. The agency provides merit pay for officers in the hostage/crisis negotiation unit.
4. Policy does not set time limits for negotiation prior to initiating a tactical solution.
5. The agency does not maintain an armored vehicle.
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Hypothesis related to written policies.
The more an agency has written policies to cover various other operational 
incidents, the more likely it is to have a written policy on hostage/crisis incidents.
Severn (1993) noted the importance o f a clear written policy or a standard operating 
procedure manual. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (1991) and the 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (1996) both recommend 
that police policy be written in order to be effective. Mechanistic organizations are more 
likely to have written policy about hostage/crisis negotiation. A written policy scale was 
constructed by determining if the agency has a written policy to deal with various issues. 
Each of these items is contained in the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics. 1993: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 or 
More Officers (1995). The percentage of reporting agencies is noted after each item.
Since some agencies have developed written policies pertaining to these items, they may 
also have a written policy related to hostage/crisis negotiation. Each item present will 
yield a numerical score of one point, so that each agency’s total score will have a possible 
range from zero to five.
1. Excessive force complaints are investigated outside the chain of command (57%)
2. Repeat offenders (40%)
3. Homeless persons (28%)
4. Private security firms (28%)
5. Environmental crimes (23%)
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Hypothesis related to innovation:
Innovative departm ents are more likely than non-innovative departments to 
have established a  hostage/crisis negotiation team at an earlier date. Zhao and 
Thurman (1996) discussed “ends and means of police innovations” and reported that 
there is a need to reprioritize the core mission or ‘ends’ of policing and create a new 
means to achieve the ends (p. 1). An innovation scale was constructed based on the 
degree to which an agency has adopted certain procedures or activities. Each of these 
items is contained in the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics. 
1993: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 or More Officers (1995).
The percentage of reporting agencies is noted after each item. The majority of agencies 
have not adopted these procedures or activities. Each item present will yield a numerical 
score of one point resulting in a total range of zero to seven. The year during which the 
agency hostage/crisis negotiation team was formed was obtained from the questionnaire.
1. Citizens have a right to an administrative appeal in excessive force cases (46%)
2. Established a special unit for victim assistance (44%)
3. Operates car-mounted digital computer terminals (32%)
4. Established a special unit for environmental crime (23%)
5. Has educational requirements above high school or GED for new officers (17%)
6. Operates hand-held digital computer terminals (11%)
7. Authorizes the use of at least one nonlethal weapon, including Stun Gun (16%),
Rubber Bullets (10%) or Soft Projectiles (8%)
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Hypothesis related to Negotiator Satisfaction:
Hostage/crisis negotiation team members are likely to report more personal 
satisfaction in their negotiation related work in organic oriented agencies than in 
mechanistic oriented agencies. Several authors (see e.g.. Schlossberg & Freeman, 1974; 
Bolz & Hershey, 1979: Gettinger, 1983) have commented on the satisfying nature of 
hostage/crisis negotiation work for participating police officers. Negotiator satisfaction 
was determined by responses to the first three opinion items (A, B, C) on page 3 of the 
questionnaire. These items inquire about personal satisfaction, career enhancement and 
recognition. The possible scores will range from three to 18. The scale for measuring 
mechanistic or organic orientation is described on pages 38-39 supra.
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Hypothesis related to perceived effectiveness:
Hostage/crisis negotiation teams in organic oriented agencies are likely to be 
perceived as more effective than hostage/crisis negotiation teams in mechanistic 
oriented agencies. Literature of police management generally cites quantitative factors 
when reporting on agency effectiveness, e.g., reported crime, arrests, clearance rates, 
overtime. Hostage/crisis events are not normally reported separately in such statistics. 
Brady (1996) noted that there is a need to assess police performance in useful and 
innovative ways. The questionnaire asks respondents several questions related to their 
perception of hostage/crisis negotiation effectiveness. These questions inquire about 
death or injury during an incident, the need for a tactical solution, repeat calls for the 
same subject, bystander reaction, citizen reaction and media reaction to hostage/crisis 
negotiation activities. An effectiveness score was determined by assigning a numerical 
value to each agency based on the answers to six of these questions (D, E, F. G, H, I) on 
page three of the questionnaire. The possible scores will range from six to 36. The scale 
for measuring mechanistic or organic orientation is described on pages 38-39 supra. .





This is a descriptive study which was designed to gather data about the formation 
and current status of hostage/crisis negotiation in U.S. policing. The study examined 
hostage/crisis negotiation and variables such as agency size, organizational structure, 
chain of command, written policy, and innovation. The opinions of respondents about 
satisfaction in hostage/crisis negotiation and about the effectiveness of negotiation were 
also examined. This study did not examine the inner workings of a hostage/crisis 
negotiation unit but focused on its relationship to the larger police organization.
Sample. Data was collected from police agencies in the U.S. which employ at 
least 100 officers. There were six hundred sixty one state and local law enforcement 
agencies that responded to the Law Enforcement Management and A dm inistrative 
Statistics: 1993 (1995) (LEMAS) survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics which employed at least 100 officers. Langworthy had noted 
that “LEMAS data is an incredibly valuable vehicle for providing information about 
policing” (see Brady, 1996, pl5). The selection o f the 661 agencies to receive the 
questionnaire was based primarily on two factors. One factor was agency size, there were
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approximately 17,000 police agencies in the U.S. with department size varying from one 
individual to more than 35,000 sworn officers. However, Murphy & Plate (1977) have 
suggested that small agencies probably did not have the resources to have their own 
hostage negotiation teams.
The second factor in the sample selection was geographical diversity. The mailing 
included all fifty states and the District of Columbia. It included municipal, county, 
sheriff, special police and state police agencies. Federal law enforcement agencies and 
U.S. military agencies which may have hostage/crisis negotiation teams were not 
included. Based on the response rates noted for the various studies in my literature 
review, it was envisioned that this research project would yield a return rate of 
approximately 50% (331).
An analysis of certain characteristics of police agencies in the United States as 
they pertain to hostage/crisis negotiation was the focus of this study. This research project 
yielded a return rate of approximately 48% (315), including 39 (6%) which were not 
useable because they did not contain sufficient information (16) or indicated that the 
agency did not have a hostage/crisis negotiation team (23). Data from 276 (42%) 
returned questionnaires were utilized for testing the hypotheses. Two hundred seventy- 
five of the respondents indicated that their agency had formed a hostage/crisis negotiation 
team and one agency did not organizationally have a team but had answered the 
questionnaire to a high degree of specificity. This was an adequate number of 
respondents for the purpose of data analysis and in order to provide a descriptive
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presentation of hostage/crisis negotiation units in U.S. police agencies (see Babbie.
1995).
Instrument. Data collection for this research project utilized a four-page 
questionnaire which was designed specifically for this study. The questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix A. This survey instrument was constructed based on prior 
professional knowledge, a review of the hostage negotiation literature, and interviews 
with Frank Bolz and Harvey Schlossberg. Frank Bolz was the first commander of the 
New York City Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team. Harvey Schlossberg was 
a psychologist who assisted in the formulation of the original principles. The author of 
this research was a hostage negotiator for the New York City Police Department for 
thirteen years. For six of those years he was the team commander and chief negotiator. 
The questionnaire was reviewed by the current commander of the New York City Police 
Department hostage negotiation team and by the coordinator of hostage negotiation for 
the New Jersey State Police. Appropriate suggestions were incorporated into the final 
version. This technique strengthened face validity.
The four page questionnaire was designed to collect maximum information while 
being minimally intrusive. The time required to complete the items was approximately 
30 minutes. It was divided into four parts. First were agency specific demographics, 
hostage/crisis incident workload, chain of command and operating policy. The second 
section was related to hostage/crisis negotiation training. Third, there was a series of 
statements designed to elicit the opinions of respondents about hostage/crisis negotiation.
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Last there was a series of biographical and operational questions about the individual 
completing the questionnaire, including the process they followed to be selected as a 
hostage/crisis negotiator. At the end of the agency related questions was a request for a 
copy of that organization's policy. At the end of the fourth section was an open-ended 
question about the questionnaire and about hostage/crisis negotiation in general. One 
hundred eight variables were contained in the questionnaire. Most of the information 
obtained from completed questionnaires was not available in the Law Enforcement 
Management and Administrative Statistics: 1993 (1995) report.
An additional fourteen variables were obtained from the LEMAS data. This data 
base provides a standardized source of valid information related to U.S. policing which is 
not otherwise readily available. LEMAS data has been in existence in one form or another 
for approximately ten years, and is updated periodically, i.e., 1993, 1990, 1987.1 decided 
not to include the LEMAS items in the questionnaire because the instrument would have 
had to be more complicated, potentially resulting in an increase in the amount of time 
required for completion and a subsequent decrease in the response rate.
Scales to determine the degree of mechanistic orientation and organic orientation 
were constructed by combining individual variables. Several other scales were similarly 
constructed from the data: written policy; innovation; negotiation orientation; SWAT 
orientation; negotiator satisfaction; and perceived effectiveness. The year in which the 
agency first formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team was also obtained from the 
questionnaire.
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The scales which determined the agency orientation, mechanistic or organic, were 
compared to the placement of the hostage/crisis negotiation team within the organization.
Mechanistic and organic orientation was also compared to the personal satisfaction of 
negotiators and to their perception of effectiveness. Negotiation orientation and SWAT 
orientation was compared to the chain of command during actual team deployments. The 
written policy scale was compared to the presence or absence of a written policy for 
hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. The year of hostage/crisis negotiation team formation 
was related to agency innovation and to the size of the agency.
Procedure. The questionnaire was mailed the Chief Executive Officer of the 
agency in each of the 661 identified departments. The list of agencies was obtained from 
the LEMAS data, and the current Chief and mailing address was obtained from an 
industry publication. National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators (1997). A 
one page cover letter explaining the research project and soliciting cooperation 
accompanied the questionnaire. The Chief was requested to designate the person in the 
agency who was responsible for the activities of the hostage/crisis negotiation unit to 
complete the questionnaire. A self-addressed stamped envelope was included for return 
of completed questionnaires. Respondents were not asked to identify themselves. They 
were assured individual anonymity. The aggregate results of the study were offered to 
contributing agencies. This process was designed to assure that responses would be 
prepared by knowledgeable individuals who were motivated to cooperate. Greene (see 
Brady, 1996, p. 15) discussing information that might be helpful to police chiefs and
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researchers noted that data must be collected “in fairly unobtrusive ways/' A master 
check list was maintained to account for a response from each agency. If a completed 
questionnaire was not received from an agency, an effort was made to contact potential 
respondents by e-mail or FAX and urge them to respond.
Human Subjects. The possibility of physical harm to anyone involved in this research 
was nonexistent and the probability of emotional harm was virtually nil. All 
questionnaires were prefaced with a complete disclosure of the research plan. Individual 
identifiers were not used. Participation was completely voluntary and anonymous.




Nine hypotheses were constructed and tested. As a result of an analysis of the 
data four hypotheses were supported and four were found to be not significant. One 
additional hypothesis was found to be significant but opposite to the prediction. The 
frequencies, range, mean and standard deviation for each of the variables are contained in 
Appendix B.
Hypothesis I. Larger police departments are more likely to have formed a hostage/crisis 
negotiation team earlier than smaller police departments. A correlation was used to 
assess the relationship between agency size and the age of the negotiation team. Larger 
police departments formed hostage/crisis negotiation teams earlier than smaller police 
departments (r = -.26, p = .001). (see Table 6-1)



























**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Hypothesis n. In a mechanistic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team 
will be part of the tactical team. A five item mechanistic organization scale was 
constructed based on the five polar constructs which Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) 
described as basic to mechanistic models of organization. The variables which were 
selected for this scale and their corresponding constructs were: (1) nature of current 
uniformed assignment, whether patrol or SWAT (specialization); (2) whether the job of 
the hostage/crisis negotiation team commander is a full time position (hierarchy); (3) 
whether audio or video recordings are usually made of hostage/crisis incidents 
(authority); (4) whether there is a written policy reflecting hostage/crisis negotiator 
selection (rule orientation); (5) and to what extent are untrained officers permitted to 
engage in hostage/crisis negotiation (position orientation). Data to determine the degree 
of mechanistic orientation was obtained from 245 responses. The mean scale score was 
1.58.
A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis team was part of 
the tactical team with agencies in which it was not part of the tactical team. Agencies in 
which the hostage/crisis negotiation team was part o f the tactical team scored 
significantly higher on the mechanistic organization variable (t = -2.19, p = .03).
(see Table 6-2).
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Group Statistics







mechanistic no 111 1.41 1.10 .10
organization yes 133 1.72 1.08 9.39E-02
Independent Samples Test
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Hypothesis m. In an organic organization the hostage/crisis negotiation team will 
not be part of the tactical team. A five item organic organization scale was constructed 
based on the five polar constructs which Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) described as 
basic to organic models of organization. The variables which were selected for this scale 
and their corresponding constructs were: (1) nature o f  current assignment, investigative or 
other (generalization); (2) whether the job of the hostage/crisis negotiation team 
commander is a part time position (collegiality); (3) whether audio or video recordings 
are usually made of hostage/crisis incidents (power); (4) whether there is a written policy 
reflecting hostage/crisis negotiator selection (situation orientation); and (5) to what extent 
are untrained officers permitted to engage in hostage/crisis negotiation ( goal orientation 
). Data to determine the degree of organic orientation were obtained from 252 responses. 
The mean scale score was 3.41.
A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis team was not 
part of the tactical team with agencies in which it was part of the tactical team. Agencies 
in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team was not part of the tactical team scored 
significantly higher on the organic organization variable (t = 2.37, p = .02). (see Table 6- 
3)












organic no 113 3.58 1.09 .10
orientation yes 139 3.26 1.07 9.10E-02
Independent Samples Test
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Hypothesis IV. The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report to the 
tactical team leader during an incident in SWAT oriented agencies. A scale was 
constructed to determine the degree of SWAT (tactical) orientation of the each 
responding agency. It was envisioned that five items from the questionnaire would be 
used to determine SWAT orientation. The five items were: (1) the agency maintains an 
armored car; (2) the agency sets time limits for hostage/crisis negotiation prior to 
initiating an assault; (3) the agency provides hazardous duty pay for officers in the 
hostage/crisis negotiation team; (4) policy forbids movement of the hostage/crisis 
situation to a different location; (5) and hostage/crisis negotiators are usually deployed 
only to actual hostage situations and not to a variety of assignments.
In constructing the SWAT orientation scale it was discovered that one item, 
number 5, hostage/crisis negotiators are usually deployed only to actual hostage situations 
and not to a variety of assignments, was not useful. There were no responding agencies 
in which hostage/crisis negotiation team members were utilized only for actual hostage 
situations. All responding agencies reported that hostage/crisis negotiators responded to a 
variety of negotiation assignments. Data to determine the degree of SWAT orientation 
were received from 87 respondents.
A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation 
team leader reported to the tactical team leader with agencies in which the hostage/crisis 
negotiation team leader did not report to the tactical team leader. As far as SWAT 
orientation is concerned, there was no significant difference between agencies in which
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the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the incident commander and 
agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the SWAT 
commander (t = .39, p = .70). (see Table 6-4)













commander 53 1.53 .67 9.18E-02
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commander 28 1.46 .74 .14
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not .381 50.147 .705 6.40E-02 .17 -.27 .40
assumed
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Hypothesis V. The hostage/crisis negotiation team leader will report directly to the 
incident commander during hostage/crisis negotiation team deployments in negotiation 
oriented agencies. A scale was constructed to determine the degree of negotiation 
orientation for each of the responding agencies. It was envisioned that five items from 
the questionnaire would be used to determine negotiation orientation. The five items 
were: ( I) the agency has a variety of response assignments for hostage/crisis negotiation 
team members in addition to incidents in which hostages are actually being held: (2) the 
agency hostage/crisis plan permits movement of a situation to another site; (3) the agency 
provides merit pay for officers in the hostage/crisis negotiation unit; (4) policy does not 
set time limits for negotiation prior to initiating a tactical solution; (5) and the agency 
does not maintain an armored car.
In constructing the negotiation orientation scale it was discovered that one item, 
number 1, the agency has a variety of response assignments for hostage/crisis 
negotiation team members in addition to incidents in which hostages are actually being 
held, was not useful. There were no responding agencies in which hostage/crisis 
negotiation team members were utilized only for hostage situations. All responding 
agencies reported that hostage/crisis negotiators respond to a variety of negotiation 
assignments. Data to determine the degree of negotiation orientation were received from 
87 respondents.
A t-test was used to compare agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation
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team leader reported to the incident commander with agencies in which the hostage/crisis 
negotiation team leader did not report directly to the incident commander. As far as 
negotiation orientation is concerned, there was no significant difference between agencies 
in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the incident commander 
and agencies in which the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader reported to the SWAT 
commander (t = 88, p = .38). (see Table 6-5)
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Hypothesis VI. The more an agency has written policies to cover various other 
operational incidents, the more likely it is to have a written policy on hostage/crisis 
negotiation incidents. A written policy scale was constructed based on the degree to 
which an agency had adopted written policies for certain procedures or activities. Five 
items were obtained from the LEMAS data for use in constructing the scale. A variety of 
the agencies included in LEMAS had adopted written policy for these procedures or 
activities. The items and percentages of agencies with written policies were: (1) 
excessive force complaints are investigated outside the chain of command where the 
incident occurred (57%); (2) processing of repeat offenders (40%); (3) dealing with 
homeless persons (28%); (4) liaison with private security firms (28%); (5) and 
investigation of environmental crimes (23%). Since the items were derived from the 
LEMAS data all 276 agencies were used in creating the written policy scale. Only three 
agencies (0.01%) scored the maximum, which was 5. Approximately 14% (39) scored 
zero indicating that they have not adopted written policy for any of these items. 151 
(55%) agencies may be identified as moderate in their adoption of written policy and 30% 
(83) may be characterized as high in their adoption of written policy.
A t- test was used to determine whether there was a difference between agencies 
having a written policy on hostage/crisis negotiation incidents and agencies which do not 
have a written policy on hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. There was no significant 
difference between the score on the written policy scale and whether the agency had a 
written policy for negotiation (t = .64, p = .53).
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Hypothesis VII. Innovative departments are more likely than non-innovative 
departments to have established a hostage/crisis negotiation team at an earlier date. An 
innovation scale was constructed based on the degree to which an agency had adopted 
certain procedures, activities or equipment. Seven items were obtained from the LEMAS 
data for use in constructing this scale. The majority of the agencies contained in LEMAS 
had not adopted these procedures, activities or equipment. The items and percentages of 
agencies utilizing them were: (1) citizens have a right to an administrative appeal in 
excessive force cases (46%); (2) a special unit was established for victim assistance 
(44%); (3) car-mounted digital computer terminal were used (32%); (4) a special unit was 
established for environmental crimes (23%); (5) entry requirements for new officers was 
above high school or GED (17%); (6) hand-held digital computers were used (11%); (7) 
and at least one of three nonlethal weapons was in use, stun gun (16%), rubber bullets 
(10%) or soft projectiles (8%). Since the items were derived from the LEMAS data all 
276 agencies were used in creating the innovation scale. No agency scored the 
maximum, which was 7. Approximately 10% (28) scored zero and were considered not 
to be innovative.
A correlation was used to assess the relationship between agency innovation and 
the age of the hostage/crisis negotiation team. The higher an agency scored on the 
innovation scale, the more likely it was that the agency established a hostage/crisis 
negotiation team at an earlier date (r = -. 15, p = .02). (see Table 6-7)

























* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Hypothesis VIII. Hostage/crisis negotiation team members are likely to report more 
personal satisfaction in their negotiation related work in organic oriented agencies than in 
mechanistic oriented agencies. A scale was constructed to reflect the personal 
satisfaction of hostage/crisis negotiation team members in their negotiator related work. 
The third section of the questionnaire contained eleven opinion items which requested 
respondents to select the most appropriate of six choices ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree. The first three of the opinion items (A,B,C) dealt with aspects of 
personal satisfaction: (A) hostage/crisis negotiation team work is personally satisfying;
(B) hostage/crisis negotiation team work has enhanced my career; and (C) I have received 
appropriate recognition/acknowledgement for my hostage/crisis negotiation team work. 
Data to determine the degree of negotiator satisfaction were received from 256 
respondents. Approximately 11% (27) of those respondents did not believe that 
hostage/crisis negotiation team work was personally beneficial, although no individuals 
indicated strong disagreement with the personal satisfaction items. A total of 229 (89%) 
reported varying degrees of positive satisfaction, including 102 (40%) reported being 
slightly satisfied and another 98 (38%) were moderately satisfied. Twenty nine (11%) 
reported strong agreement with the personal satisfaction items.
A t-test was used to compare the personal satisfaction of hostage/crisis negotiation 
team members in mechanistic and in organic organizations. Negotiators in more 
mechanistic agencies had a higher mean score for personal satisfaction than negotiators in 
more organic agencies (means o f 15.01 and 13.86, t = 3.73, p = .001). (see Table 6-8)
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Hypothesis EX. Hostage/crisis negotiation teams in organic oriented agencies are likely 
to be perceived as more effective than hostage/crisis negotiation teams in mechanistic 
oriented agencies. A scale was constructed to reflect the perceived effectiveness of 
hostage/crisis negotiation by team members. The third section of the questionnaire 
contained eleven opinion items which requested respondents to select the most 
appropriate o f six choices ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The fourth 
through ninth opinion items (DJ5J\G,H,I) dealt with aspects of effectiveness: (D) 
reduced chance of death or serious physical injury; (E) resolution is through negotiation 
rather than tactics; (F) there are fewer repeat calls for service; (G) bystanders are positive 
about negotiation team efforts; (H) citizens initiate positive phone calls or letters about an 
incident; (I) and there is an increased chance of positive media attention. Data to 
determine the degree of negotiator perception of effectiveness were received from 256 
respondents. Eleven (4%) of those respondents did not agree that hostage/crisis 
negotiation team work was effective. However, the majority 245 (96%) reported varying 
degrees of perceived effectiveness, including 89 (35%) who reported believing slightly 
that hostage/crisis negotiation team efforts were effective and another 149 (58%) were 
moderately sure that such efforts were effective. Seven (3%) reported strong agreement 
that hostage/crisis negotiation team work was effective.
A t-test was used to compare the perceived effectiveness of agencies in 
hostage/crisis negotiation team work in mechanistic organizations and in organic 
organizations. There were no significant differences between mechanistic and organic
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organizations with regard to perceived effectiveness of the hostage/crisis negotiation team 
(t = .78, p = .44). (see Table 6-9)
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Descriptive Data About the Agencies and Responents:
In addition to the analysis of variables which tested the nine hypotheses, a variety 
of deiptive data was obtained from the questionnaire. Some of these items provided a 
profile of the contributing agencies, including 1997 hostage/crisis negotiation team 
related workload and results. Other items provided a profile of individual respondents, 
their 1997 hostage/crisis negotiation workload and selected opinions about hostage/crisis 
negotiation. The letter to the agency Chief Executive which accompanied the 
questionnaire requested that the person responsible for the activities of the hostage/crisis 
negotiation unit be the individual who completed the questionnaire. Ninety-two percent 
(254) of useable questionnaires were completed by trained negotiators; seventy-five 
percent (204) identified themselves as the hostage/crisis negotiation team commander.
The groupings of some of the information requested in the questionnaire was 
based on the categories utilized by the U.S. Department of Justice (1996), i.e., 
geographical area of country, size of population served and number of sworn officers in 
the agency. This would allow for future correlation of data obtained from this research 
and other facets of police practices in the United States.
Useful responses were received from throughout the country. Forty-eight (17%) 
were from the Northeast, 107 (39%) from the South, 51 (19%) from the Midwest, and 70 
(25%) from the West. Twenty (7%) of them represented state police agencies, 72 (26%) 
came from county level agencies, and 184 (67%) were from local police departments. 
Seven agencies (3%) serviced a population of less than 50,000 people. Fifty-eight (22%)
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were from communities between 50,000 and 99,999, 103 (39%) represented between 
100,000 and 249,999 people and 96 (36%) serviced a population greater than 250,000. 
The agencies reported that some hostage/crisis negotiation units were less than one year 
old (2%) and some were more than 25 years old (3%). Basically, 51% of the units were 
formed at least fifteen years ago, and 49% were formed between 1983 and 1997.
Two hundred sixty four agencies reported on the number of sworn officers 
which they employed. The largest number of agencies, 124 (47%), employed between 
100 and 249 sworn officers. Another 61 (23%) had 250 - 499 officers and 31 (12%) over 
500 but less than one thousand. Forty-eight (18%) of the responding police agencies 
employed more than 1,000 sworn police officers.
The number of hostage/crisis negotiators in the 275 agencies which had teams 
ranged from four (2%) agencies reporting one negotiator to one agency (0.4%) reporting 
103 negotiators. Seventy-five percent (206) had up to ten trained negotiators. Fifty-six 
agencies (20%) had between 11 and 25 negotiators , and 5% (13) of the agencies 
maintained a roster of between 26 and 103 trained negotiators. The mean number of 
negotiators per agency was ten. Not all trained negotiators were dispatched to every 
incident. Forty-seven percent of the agencies deploy one, two or three negotiators. The 
greatest number of negotiators normally deployed, 11, was reported by only one agency. 
The average deployment was approximately four negotiators per incident.
Eighty-one percent of the responding agencies (222) had adopted a written policy 
for hostage/crisis negotiation incidents; only 19% (51) had not. Fifty-six percent (153) of
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the agencies reported that their hostage/crisis negotiation team was organizationally a 
component o f the SWAT team while the other 122 (44%) operated under some other 
organizational arrangement. Even though the negotiators in the majority of agencies 
(56%) were part of the SWAT team, 61% (168) of responding agencies reported that 
during an incident the negotiators did not report to the SWAT commander but directly to 
the incident commander. Only 33% (91) of the agencies had the negotiation commander 
reporting through the SWAT commander. In the remaining 17 agencies (6%) the 
negotiator component reported directly to the chief o f the agency. In the majority of 
agencies (93%) the rank of the incident commander was lieutenant, captain or major (or 
equivalent). In 96% of the agencies the SWAT commander was a corporal or sergeant, a 
lieutenant or a captain. For 86% of the agencies the rank of the hostage/crisis negotiation 
team commander was a corporal or sergeant or a lieutenant.
As noted above, the majority of agencies had a written policy for hostage/crisis 
negotiation incidents. However 56% (150) did not have a written policy for the selection 
of negotiators. Even without such a policy, 271 agencies did provide training to those 
individuals who had been chosen. The range in the number of hours of initial 
hostage/crisis negotiation training was from a low of two hours, one agency (0.4%), to a 
high of 250 hours, again one agency (0.4%). The mean was 47 hours. Sixty agencies 
(22%) reported that they provided their own initial hostage/crisis negotiator training. In 
40 agencies (14%) the training was provided by a regional academy and in 35 agencies 
(13%) the state academy provided the training. Ninety-seven (35%) local, county and
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state police agencies obtained initial hostage/crisis negotiator training from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Forty-four agencies (16%) received such training from a non-law 
enforcement agency, usually a college or university. Further, 204 agencies also provided 
in-service hostage/crisis negotiation training. The range was from four hours reported by 
3 agencies (1 %) to 210 hours reported by one agency (0.4%). The mean was 32 hours.
Among other reported facts related to hostage/crisis negotiation policy were: (1)
In 84% of the agencies a first responding police officer who had not been trained as a 
hostage/crisis negotiation could initiate discussion with a subject prior to the arrival of 
trained negotiators. That officer might even continue negotiating indefinitely in 3% of the 
agencies. In 16% (44) of the agencies the first responder would be replaced immediately. 
(2) Two-thirds (183) of the agencies did not maintain an armored car to assist in these 
incidents. (3) A prosecutor almost never (84%) responded to ongoing situations; one 
occasionally responded in 13% and usually responded in only three percent of the 
agencies. (4) Negotiators from 236 (86%) of the agencies did not receive any extra 
compensation, except perhaps situational overtime, for assuming the additional 
responsibility of being members o f a hostage/crisis negotiation team. Six percent (17) did 
receive hazardous duty pay and 23 agencies (8%) provide merit pay or other special 
compensation. (5) After an incident mandatory stress debriefing was provided to 
negotiators in 166 agencies (43%); in an additional 137 agencies (50%) it was offered but 
not required. Seven percent (20) of the agencies did not provide post incident stress 
debriefing. Two hundred fifty three responding
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agencies reported 2.887 deployments at hostage/crisis negotiation incidents during 1997, 
an average of 11 incidents per agency. Sixty-eight percent (1967) of those incidents were 
concluded through negotiation and 920 (32%) required tactical intervention by a SWAT 
team. That was approximately 8 situations per agency being solved through negotiation 
and 3 per agency requiring SWAT intercession. Interestingly, the median time elapsed in 
all situations was 3.5 hours.
Ninety-three percent (254) of the individuals who completed the questionnaire 
were male and seven percent (20) were female. The vast majority, 245 (89%) were white, 
while four percent (12) were black, five percent (14) were of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, 
one individual (0.4%) was Asian and two (0.7%) chose other, one of those was a native- 
American. Only 53 (20%) of the respondents indicated their age. The range of reported 
ages was 32 to 63; the mean reported age was 44. The education level was reported by all 
respondents (275) from agencies that had a hostage/crisis negotiation team: seventy-seven 
percent (212) had some college or had obtained a bachelorOs degree; 18% (49) had earned 
a masterOs degree; three percent (7) did not attain education beyond high school. A Ph.D. 
or JD degree had been acquired by seven individuals (3%).
The rank of the 275 individual respondents was from basic officer through chief 
executive officer. The largest number, 103 (38%), were corporals or sergeants, another 
101 (37%) were lieutenants, and 35 (13%) were captains. Ten percent (27) were police 
officers or deputies, or troopers. Nine individuals (3%) were above the rank of captain or 
were not sworn officers. Law enforcement experience for the respondents ranged from
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seven years to 37 years; the mean was 20 years. Two hundred fifty-six individuals 
reported that they were hostage/crisis negotiators; six percent (16) were full time in that 
role and (90%) performed those duties on a part-time basis. The usual current assignment 
for the respondents was patrol, 84 (31%), investigative. 72 (26%), SWAT, 14 (5%). One 
hundred five individuals (38%) reported that they were assigned to a variety of other 
duties other than the three noted.
The process of becoming a hostage/crisis negotiator was initiated in different 
ways: 32% (85) responded to a departmental posting or notice; 79 (30%) were 
encouraged to apply by someone in the agency; and 32% (85) presented themselves as 
volunteers without being prompted. The number of years experience as a hostage/crisis 
negotiator was reported by 234 individuals: the range was from less than one year to more 
than eight years; each of these categories accounted for three people (1 %). The mean was 
nine years. Two hundred four respondents (75%) reported that they were the commander 
of their agency hostage/crisis negotiation team.
The two hundred thirty-four respondents reported that they were deployed a 
hostage/crisis negotiation incidents a total of 1,734 times during 1997. The range was 
from zero deployments for 23 individuals (9%) to one individual (0.4%) being deployed 
100 times; the mean was seven situations. Two hundred forty-eight negotiators reported 
the approximate elapsed time since they were deployed at a situation. One individual had 
been deployed the same month that the research questionnaire was completed; another 
individual had not been deployed for ninety-six months. Fifty-five percent (137) were
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deployed within the prior three months; another 18% (45) had negotiated within the prior 
six months, and an additional 15% (36) had been active as negotiators within nine 
months. Ninety percent had been deployed within one year and 95% within the prior two 
years.
Sixty-six percent (180) of the respondents agreed with the statement that the 
hostage/crisis negotiation team should be part of the SWAT team: 7% (20) agreed 
slightly; 14% (38) were in moderate agreement; and 45% (122) strongly agreed with the 
statement. Ninety-seven percent (258) of the respondents also agreed that no time limit 
should be set in hostage/crisis negotiation incidents before a tactical solution is attempted, 
including 222 (84%) who strongly believed that time limits should not be set.




This research first sought to determine the extent to which hostage/crisis 
negotiation has been adopted as a formal practice in U.S. police organizations. Next, 
within the agencies which have incorporated such teams into their structure, the research 
attempted to assess organizational components related to administrative and operational 
chain of command for negotiator related activity. Finally, the opinions of respondents 
were sought concerning their satisfaction in being hostage/crisis negotiators and in their 
perception of the effectiveness of negotiation as a police tactic. This discussion considers 
the results of analyzed data across hypotheses and comments on implications for 
additional research.
Response rate
A total of 276 completed questionnaires were returned. The rate of return was 
sufficient for the purposes of statistical analysis of the hypotheses and also for additional 
descriptive information. The cover letter suggested that the questionnaire be completed 
by the individual in the agency who was responsible for the hostage/crisis negotiation 
function. Ninety-two percent of the respondents indicated that they were knowledgeable
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about the subject; 76% were the agency hostage/crisis negotiation team leaders; an 
additional 16% were trained negotiators but not the team leaders.
There was no easy way to determine why many agencies did not choose to 
respond. However, some agencies did indicate by mail or FAX the reason why they 
chose not to participate. A few stated that they simply did not have the time. One of the 
50 agencies that employed at least 1,000 sworn officers indicated that because they are 
one of the largest police departments in the US, they receive many requests for 
information and therefore it is their practice to participate only in surveys or 
questionnaires from governmental agencies. However, the agencies that were the next 
highest and next lowest in size returned completed questionnaires. All three of these 
agencies were among the five largest in the country. Another agency wrote that if the 
researcher wanted statistics on the subject, the FBI should be contacted, since they collect 
such data. Indeed, the FBI has been conducting research and writing about hostage 
negotiation for many years; but they had not collected the data sought in this study. The 
FBI Crisis Management Unit has been engaged in an open ended data collection effort on 
the subject since approximately 1996 (FBI, 1998) but only a few of the items in their 
study matched the variables in this study. Among those items which were consistent with 
this research, they reported that 62% of the situations ended through negotiation and 38% 
through tactical intervention. Further, 56% of the negotiated situations lasted less than 
four hours. The FBI study reported three negotiators per incident and this study 
determined that on average four negotiators were deployed at each incident. The
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consistency of findings between this study and the FBI study further strengthened the 
validity of this research project.
The cover letter which accompanied the questionnaire for this research was on the 
letter-head of a well known criminal justice college. Perhaps future research efforts could 
obtain prior endorsement o f a  government agency in order to increase the response rate. 
Also, the letter could clearly indicate that the researcher was seeking data which were not 
otherwise available.
Discussion of Hypotheses:
As the results of the analysis of each of the nine hypotheses has been reported 
separately; this discussion will also treat each hypothesis in the same manner. However, 
this discussion will alter the sequence of some of the hypotheses in order to facilitate 
discussion based on the presence of common factors which were involved in their 
analysis.
The first hypothesis (I) in this study postulated that larger police departments were 
more likely to have formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team earlier than smaller 
departments. This hypothesis was supported. Several factors may explain this finding. 
Larger police agencies may have had the capacity to create specialized units, such as a 
hostage/crisis negotiation team, in part because they had a large pool of personnel from 
which to solicit candidates for the new function. Similarly, individuals could be selected 
and trained for such tasks without negatively impacting on short term operational
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strength. This would be especially true when the assignment was not full time.
Consistent with prior research, the majority of responding agencies (87%) indicated that 
the hostage/crisis negotiation function was pan time. Larger agencies also networked 
with other large police agencies through organizations such as the Police Executive 
Research Forum and the Major City Chiefs. These associations, which have qualifying 
criteria for membership, provided an arena for information sharing and review of new 
practices. Most police departments in the country, including the larger ones, also 
belonged to the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Larger police agencies 
also tended to be located within major metropolitan areas or were responsible for a wide 
geographic area and thus were more likely to experience more hostage and hostage type 
incidents. These factors may have contributed to information sharing which resulted in 
adoption of hostage/crisis negotiation as a police practice.
Another hypothesis (VII) was also concerned with the year in which an agency 
had formed its hostage/crisis negotiation team. The hypothesis stated that innovative 
departments are more likely than non-innovative departments to have established a 
hostage/crisis negotiation team at an earlier date. An innovation scale was created from 
LEMAS data. Less than half of the agencies had adopted any of the policies, practices or 
equipment represented in the scale; most items had been adopted by less than one-third of 
the agencies. This tended to validate the innovative nature of the agencies scoring higher 
on the scale. Formation of a hostage/crisis negotiation team correlated positively with the 
degree of innovation, as predicted. The professional organizations noted in the discussion
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of Hypothesis I may have also contributed to a diffusion of ideas and adoption of 
practices through annual conferences, training programs and a variety of publications. 
Further, networking among agencies through meetings and published sources provided 
agency heads with a mechanism to study best practices in other agencies. These methods 
were consistent with the manner in which innovations were adopted by agencies. Even 
though police organizations are versatile and appear to careen from crisis to crisis (Meyer 
& Zucker, 1989), they have also proven to be remarkably stable institutions which are 
capable of systematic change, often accommodating opposing attitudes, in effect 
providing for the acceptance of new structure and operations.
All pertinent references in the literature on hostage negotiation credit New York 
City with forming the first hostage/crisis negotiation team in the United States. The New 
York City Police Department formed its hostage/crisis negotiation team in 1973 based on 
in-house studies begun in the fall of 1972. Two of the agencies which responded to this 
survey had reported formation dates, 1971 and 1972, earlier than New York City. A letter 
was sent to both agencies requesting verification, such as copies of internal 
documentation or media accounts; they both responded. The agency which had originally 
reported a 197 ldate indicated that that date was a typographical error; they had started 
their team in approximately 1975. The agency which had reported a 1972 formation date 
forwarded documentation concerning the initiation of a tactical patrol type unit, but none 
of the several items provided which included agency memorandum and newspaper stories 
mentioned the hostage/crisis negotiation function.
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Four of the nine hypotheses (II, HI, VIII. IX) analyzed in this study examined 
issues related to the mechanistic or organic orientation of the police organization. Bums 
and Stalker (1961) and Kuykendall and Roberg (1982) reported on various aspects of the 
conventional elements present in organizations and the management orientation of those 
organizations. Elements including specialization, hierarchy, authority, rule orientation and 
position orientation were associated with mechanistic organizations and those including 
generalization, collegiality, power, situation orientation and goal orientation were 
associated with organic organizations. Mechanistic and organic scales which each 
consisted of five items were derived from the questionnaire. The scales were designed to 
reflect the polar constructs of mechanistic and organic models of organizations. The first 
item in each scale dealt with the usual assignment of hostage/crisis negotiators. This was 
meaningful since most of the respondents were part-time in their negotiator role. The 
other four items in each scale were envisioned as mirror opposites so that the degree of 
contrast between them would be evident. The overall findings suggested that the majority 
of police departments were still operating as quasi-military or mechanistic organizations, 
55% of the agencies were mechanistic and in 56% of the agencies the hostage/crisis 
negotiation team was subordinate to the SWAT team. Traditionally, most American 
police departments had been organized similar to the military since soon after the 1829 
creation of the London Metropolitan Police. The quasi-military model has been 
associated with classical organization theory; it is analogous to bureaucratic structure and 
control. A SWAT or tactical team is probably the epitome of the quasi-military aspects
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of policing and it is logical that in such organizations the hostage/crisis negotiation team 
would report to the SWAT team.
The second hypothesis (II) in this study stated that in a mechanistic organization 
the hostage/crisis negotiation team would be part of the tactical team in the administrative 
organization of police departments. The hypothesis was confirmed by the data. This 
finding tended to support the view that most police agencies (55%) were mechanistic, 
quasi-military, in organizational structure. An important component of mechanistic 
organization was hierarchical ordering or chain of command; one aspect of chain of 
command is the concept of unity of command. In agencies which adhered to the 
management principle of unity of command each employee, or function, received 
direction from only one supervisor (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997). It was anticipated 
that in mechanistic organizations the hostage/crisis negotiation function would be placed 
in a clear chain of command; the hostage commander reported to the tactical commander.
The third hypothesis (El) in this study stated that in an organic organization the 
hostage/crisis negotiation team would not be part of the tactical team in the administrative 
organization of police departments. This hypothesis was also supported by the analysis. 
Although this hypothesis was substantially the opposite of the second hypothesis, the 
mechanistic and organic scales were not comprised of entirely the same items, so that a 
separate analysis was necessary. Less than half (45%) of the agencies were found to be 
organic organizations. The majority of organic agencies did not have the hostage/crisis 
negotiation function as part of the tactical team but assigned it to some other part of the
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agency. Organic organizations were more likely to be concerned with a collegial 
approach to reporting lines than to a strict hierarchical ordering. This finding indicated 
that there were police agencies which paid less attention to an assumed chain of 
command, and hence were less quasi-military. Such agencies had various degrees of 
organizational flexibility for specialized functions such as hostage/crisis negotiation.
The next hypothesis (VIII) concerned with mechanistic or organic organizational 
structure stated that hostage/crisis negotiation team members were likely to report more 
personal satisfaction in their negotiation related work in organic agencies than in 
mechanistic agencies. Contrary to the predicted outcome, this hypothesis was not 
supported by the data. This hypothesis was based in part on the notion that by having the 
hostage/crisis negotiation team placed in a more autonomous position within the overall 
organization, the hostage/crisis negotiator would report more satisfaction. But higher 
satisfaction was reported by negotiators in mechanistic oriented organizations than by 
negotiators in organic oriented organizations.
All of the negotiators (100%) reported positively (71% strongly agree, 25% 
moderately agree, 4% slightly agree) on one of the items in the satisfaction scale 
regardless of organizational orientation. This item stated that hostage/crisis negotiation 
team work is personally satisfying. Differentiation became apparent when the other two 
items in the satisfaction scale were weighed. These items dealt with career enhancement 
and recognition for hostage/crisis negotiation work. The reward and recognition system of 
the mechanistic police agencies apparently rewarded the traditional or formally organized
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units more than the more ambiguous or less formal units. While hostage/crisis 
negotiators in organic organizations reported that they were more satisfied with their 
hostage/crisis negotiation activities, they were less likely to report that their agency had 
appropriately recognized or rewarded their contributions to the agency. This finding may 
in fact support the perception noted above that police agencies were primarily 
mechanistic even though some agencies may allow for limited structural variations. 
Hostage/crisis negotiators in mechanistic organizations reported negotiation related 
satisfaction and they also reported organizational recognition. Those officers were 
probably identified within the organization as being part of an elite quasi-military unit 
and so their hostage/crisis negotiation work was recognized. It was apparent that 
negotiators in organic organizations did not believe that they were appropriately 
recognized for their negotiator work. This finding tends to reinforce the concern noted in 
the introduction to this research about the control of an incident being the domain of 
individuals who are not oriented toward hostage/crisis negotiation. If the negotiators 
believe that reward, recognition or career enhancement may not be forthcoming or 
possibly even negatively affected, will they be able to properly articulate their concerns 
and suggestions during an incident? Additional research, consisting in part of separate 
scales to measure career satisfaction and to measure intrinsic job satisfaction for 
hostage/crisis negotiators, is required.
The next hypothesis (IX) which dealt with mechanistic or organic orientation 
stated that hostage/crisis negotiation teams in organic oriented agencies are likely to be
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perceived as more effective than hostage/crisis negotiation teams in mechanistic agencies. 
Regardless of whether the organization was determined to be mechanistic or organic, no 
significant difference was found in hostage/crisis negotiator perception of team 
effectiveness. Contrary to the predicted outcome, there was no significant difference 
between mechanistic oriented and organic oriented organizations. This was consistent 
with the finding that negotiators in both types of organizations were individually satisfied 
with their negotiation work; seventy-one percent strongly agreed with the statement that 
hostage/crisis negotiation team work was personally satisfying. Individuals who were 
satisfied with their work would most likely report that such work was effective. 
Contributing effective work to an organization is an element of satisfaction. The key to 
perception of effectiveness may have been the way that the incident ended rather than the 
organizational nature of the agency. This was another example of dissonance between the 
means and ends of a function. The means was associated with either mechanistic or 
organic organizational structure. The end result, peaceful resolution, was more important 
to the negotiators than the organizational structure which they worked under.
The literature on the organizational structure of police departments has 
traditionally been normative, advocating particular types of structures to achieve 
organizational goals. However, police practices and organizational structures cannot be 
understood merely in terms of efficiency or effectiveness. As noted, mechanistic or 
organic orientations were considered polar opposites of a continuum which did not 
preclude incorporating disparate elements into the organization to serve potentially
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conflicting demands simultaneously. The organizational structure which a police 
department adopts is influenced in part by its institutional environment, including elite 
functions such as SWAT teams and hostage/crisis negotiation units. A new 
organizational grouping becomes an intersection for previously unconnected activities, or 
it increases the level of activity between linked specialties. For example, prior to the 
formation of the first New York City Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team any 
hostage related activities had been the responsibility of the tactical unit, the Emergency 
Service Unit. The creation of negotiators in 1973 forged an intersection of previously 
unconnected activities. As the duties of the hostage/crisis negotiation function expanded, 
there was an increased level of activity between the linked specialties. The effect was a 
new organizational construct (see Crank and Langworthy, 1992) which was composed of 
the Detective Bureau negotiators working in tandem with the Patrol Bureau tactical 
officers. This was consistent with the concept that mechanistic or organic organizations 
are not dichotomous but that they were part of a continuum between organizational 
extremes.
The above discussions about mechanistic or organic orientation was concerned 
with the organizational placement of the hostage/crisis negotiation function on a day to 
day administrative basis. Two additional organizational hypotheses (IV, V) were 
concerned with whether the agency was SWAT oriented or negotiation oriented and the 
chain of command during an actual hostage/crisis negotiation team deployment. Police 
organizations which have created specialized part-time units must be concerned with a
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least two working arrangements for the unit, the administrative arrangement and the 
deployment arrangement. The attempt to categorize an agency as SWAT or negotiation 
oriented was a recognition that the administrative tasks of providing for a unit on a daily 
basis may have been different than overseeing the deployment and operation of a unit at 
an incident. It was common that a unit might be placed under the day to day 
administration of the SWAT team but operated separately from the SWAT team at the 
scene of incidents. This adaptation resulted in the hostage/crisis negotiation function 
being placed at an equal or higher level in the chain of command when compared to the 
SWAT commander. The hostage/crisis negotiation leader reported to the same 
commander as the SWAT leader did and in some cases operationally reported to the 
Chief of Police. The attempt to go beyond mechanistic and organic orientations and to 
characterize agencies as SWAT or negotiation oriented was an attempt to more clearly 
define the role and placement of hostage/crisis negotiation teams within the police 
agency.
The first of these hypotheses (IV) stated that the hostage/crisis negotiation team 
leader will report to the tactical team leader during an incident in SWAT oriented 
agencies. The related hypothesis (V) stated that the hostage/crisis negotiation team leader 
will report directly to the incident commander during hostage/crisis negotiation team 
deployments in negotiation oriented agencies. Contrary to the predicted outcomes there 
were no significant differences found for operational chain of command during actual 
incident deployment in SWAT oriented agencies when compared to negotiation oriented
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agencies.
One explanation for this finding may be the relatively small number of cases 
available for analysis. When examining the relationship between SWAT orientation or 
negotiation orientation and to whom the negotiation team commander/leader reported 
during a typical hostage/crisis negotiation deployment, only 87 cases were available for 
analysis. The scales which were created to determine SWAT or negotiation orientation 
were derived from the questionnaire. Two of the items, hazardous duty pay and use of an 
armored vehicle, were also contained in the LEMAS data which provided a way to assess 
the validity of the responses. Twenty-eight percent of the LEMAS agencies provided 
hazardous duty pay for any function within the department compared with six percent of 
the agencies in this research which provided hazardous duty pay for hostage/crisis 
negotiators. Fourteen percent of the LEMAS agencies operated an armored vehicle 
compared with 34% of the agencies in this study. These factors may have contributed to 
the scale yielding a relatively small number of cases.
Another factor may be that there were only four items available to determine 
whether the agency was SWAT or negotiation oriented. Originally, five items from the 
questionnaire were to be used in construction of the SWAT oriented scale and the 
negotiation oriented scale. One o f the items, which was to be part of both scales, was 
whether the hostage/crisis negotiators responded only to confirmed hostage situations or 
were utilized in a variety of assignments. The hostage negotiators of the original New 
York City Police Department team were dispatched only to confirmed hostage situations.
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The data of this study revealed that no agency assigned hostage/crisis negotiators 
exclusively to hostage situations but assigned them to numerous activities. Perhaps a 
four-point scale was not sufficient to provide for the variation needed in order to have 
properly tested these two hypotheses.
Only 33% of respondents indicated that the hostage/crisis negotiation team 
commander/leader reported to the SWAT leader during an incident even though 
administratively the hostage/crisis negotiation team was part of the SWAT unit in 55% of 
the agencies. This finding supported an assumption that police departments may manage 
day-to-day activities one way but manage operational deployments another way. Similar 
to the concerns about reward, recognition and career enhancement noted in the discussion 
of hypothesis Xm and the issue of dissonance raised in the discussion of hypothesis XI, 
this split management arrangement may make sense organizationally, but may have the 
unintended end result of hostage/crisis negotiators experiencing contradictory loyalty in 
their hostage/crisis negotiation performance, thereby potentially depriving the chief 
executive or incident commander of unbiased input and advice.
There is potential in most organizational configurations for differences in the 
agency’s internal culture and its response pattern for a given task. Dissimilarity between 
SWAT team members and hostage/crisis negotiators provides a fitting illustration of this 
phenomenon. Vizzard (1998) noted that they may be viewed as “surrogates for two very 
diverse cultures within most large law enforcement agencies.’’ (p.l 16) Future research 
into organizational features of organic and mechanistic structures is appropriate in order
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to continue to identify other implications for this division in police agencies.
The final hypothesis (VI) stated that the more an agency has written policies to 
cover various other operational incidents, the more likely it is to have a written policy on 
operational aspects of hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. A five item written policy 
scale was developed from LEMAS data to test this hypothesis. Contrary to the predicted 
outcome, there was no significant association between the written policy scale scores and 
the presence of a written policy related to the operation of hostage/crisis negotiation 
teams. Apparently, many agencies did not believe that the practice of a particular 
operational activity required the adoption of written policy about that activity. Unless an 
agency voluntarily submitted to a process of review and accreditation, either by the 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (1996) or by one of the 
states which have adopted a similar process, there was no mandate that written policy be 
adopted. This position was contrary to previous studies which recommended the 
adoption of written policies for most police procedures and operations.
Sixty written police protocols concerning hostage/crisis negotiation operations 
were provided to this researcher. There was a wide range in degree of specificity. Two 
agencies provided a single page policy statement. Another agency provided a 
comprehensive document which exceeded 60 pages. Some policy documents contained 
revision dates during 1997 and 1998; one agency provided a three page item dated 1975. 
An undated and untitled ten-page checklist, which was apparently obtained from a 
different agency, was submitted by one responding agency. In 33 (55%) of the
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documents the hostage/crisis negotiators reported to the incident commander, this was 
consistent with organic orientation. Twenty-three (38%) of the documents indicated that 
the reporting line was to the SWAT team commander, consistent with mechanistic 
orientation. In four (7%) cases there was insufficient information to determine chain of 
command. The Koleas’ (1985) examination of six written hostage/crisis negotiation 
policies had contained only one (17%) example of clear chain of command, to the 
incident commander. The other five were not detailed enough to make a determination. 
The findings of this study tended to support the perception that written operational 
policies, although not completely accepted, were more widespread and comprehensive 
than in the earlier days of adoption of hostage/crisis negotiation as a police practice.
Discussion of Descriptive Findings: In addition to the variables analyzed in connection 
with the nine hypotheses, additional descriptive data were obtained. Comparison of 
selected aspects of those data with some of the earlier research cited in the literature 
review is relevant.
One area requiring review was whether agencies had written policies specifically 
related to the selection of personnel for hostage/crisis negotiators. Consistent with the 
findings of Hammer, et.al.( 1994) which reported that 55% of agencies did not have a 
written negotiator selection policy and Rogan, et.al.(1994) which reported 62% of 
agencies without such a written policy, this research determined that 56% of the 
respondents did not have a written policy for selecting hostage/crisis negotiators even
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though 82% did have a written operational policy for hostage/crisis negotiation. Both of 
the 1994 studies also reported that most hostage/crisis negotiation commanders were 
white males: this too was consistent with the findings of this research project. The 
LEMAS data had reported 90% of sworn officers in their data base were male and 80% 
were white.
The Hammer, et.al. (1994) study also reported that initial negotiator training was 
ten days or less for 74% of the cases studied; sixty-one percent received five days or less 
of inservice training. The FBI had provided the initial training for 40% of the agencies. 
This study, again consistent with prior research, found a mean of 47 hours, approximately 
six days, for initial negotiator training and 32 hours, approximately four days, for 
inservice. The FBI was the initial training provider in 35% of the cases.
Another area of interest involved whether or not the hostage/crisis negotiation 
function was part of the SWAT team. The Houston Police Department (1983) 
study had reported that the hostage negotiation function was assigned to the SWAT team 
in 59% of the cases. This research resulted in a similar finding; 56% were part of the 
SWAT team..
Previous research had also reported on the relative effectiveness of negotiation as 
a police tactic. Strentz (1985) had reported that 85% of the subjects who had been taken 
into custody unharmed were talked out by trained negotiators, while Head (1989) 
determined that 34% of the cases he studied credited a trained negotiator with peaceful 
resolution. The current study found that 68% of 1997 cases reported were concluded
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through negotiation. Strentz (1985) had also reported that in 63 cases lasting up to four 
hours only 36 (57%) of the subjects were negotiated out. while in 80 situations lasting 
between seven and nine hours, 76 (95%) ended peacefully. The research reported here 
determined that for almost 3,000 team deployments during 1997. approximately 68% 
were concluded through negotiation and 32% utilized tactical intervention by a SWAT 
team after some period of negotiation. The mean time elapsed in both types of 
resolutions was 3.5 hours.
The finding that both negotiated solutions and tactical solutions, on average, were 
accomplished in the same time frame makes it important to consider issues of the means 
and ends of policing. Emphasis on SWAT tactics after a given period of time could 
become a self fulfilling prophecy. Average time experiences should not become more 
important than deciding whether negotiation or SWAT intervention contributed to the 
safest police response.
In the United States a variety of policing agencies are among the principle 
elements of government that may legitimately use force to accomplish their mission. This 
might engender a military mind-set which stressed strict adherence to a chain of 
command and the use of force as the appropriate means to solve problems. The essence 
of the police function could be reduced to a threat to use force, not only as an option of 
last resort (see Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). Bittner (1975) noted that the police are a 
mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society. A skeptical view 
of this characterization is that the most expedient police route to solving problems is
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operationalized through military-style tactics which focus on either the threatened or the 
actual use of force. A more open-minded interpretation might be that the constitutional 
authority of policing is, in and of itself, a use of force and from that a continuum starts, 
beginning with verbal suggestion and can ultimately conclude in justifiable deadly 
physical force. This continuum was one way to express the range of action available to 
the police when weighing the means and ends of their activity.
Conclusion
This research has determined whether a responding agency organizational 
structure was more mechanistic or more organic. It also identified whether an agency 
hostage recovery program appeared to place more emphasis on SWAT activities or on 
negotiation oriented practices. It has also established the extent to which responding 
police negotiators are personally satisfied in their hostage/crisis negotiation related work 
and that they believe that hostage/crisis negotiation is an effective police practice. The 
work of Bums and Stalker (1961) which examined organizational designs and practices in 
different environmental conditions provided the foundation for many of the issues in this 
study. Their emphasis on the importance of considering differing work place atmospheres 
is well noted, especially when estimating whether a mostly classic bureaucratic approach 
(mechanistic) may be more appropriate for the placement of a hostage/crisis negotiation 
team than an approach which tends to stress collegiality and shared decision making 
(organic). Because policing in the United States is an extremely complex subject
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which exhibits a high degree of variety in size of agencies, of hierarchy in structure and in 
division of functional tasks, a determination of an agency being fully mechanistic or fully 
organic will seldom be made. But, as stressed by Bums and Stalker, the attributes which 
tend toward one or the other organizational structures are not polar opposites but are part 
of a continuum, involving various degrees of flexibility. A recognition and acceptance of 
organizational flexibility would appear to be in the best interest of the institutionalization 
of a hostage/crisis negotiation program. While U.S. policing continues to be primarily 
mechanistic, a more organic strategy of formal hostage negotiation has been demonstrated 
to be useful in reducing violence in such situations.
This research sought, in part, to determine if there was a best practice 
organizational arrangement for a hostage/crisis negotiation unit in American police 
agencies. The answer is still unknown. In a published book review about various aspects 
of the WACO incident, Vizzard (1998) noted that there is often a tendency to “over 
simplify the complex” (p. 116), and he also suggested that consideration of organizational 
routines and cultures should probably be part of the review of “pragmatic problems in 
developing law enforcement strategies for dealing with armed groups” (p.l 18). He 
additionally stressed that “determining the proper response is no easy task.” (p. 118).
Twenty-five years ago hostage/crisis negotiation did not exist as an operational 
task in U.S. police departments. In 1972-3 the largest law enforcement agency in the 
U.S., NYPD, reacted to a critical hostage incident in Munich, West Germany, by 
beginning an examination of police operational responses to hostage situations. As a
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result of their in-house studies hostage negotiators were created. Subsequently, agencies 
throughout the country studied the NYPD development and many adapted the concept to 
local requirements. Within ten years more than half of the agencies responding to this 
survey had adopted some form of the strategy. It is apparent that hostage/crisis 
negotiation is now an established tactic in American policing and that specially trained 
police negotiators have been recognized as most suited to carry out this function.
Although some unfortunate examples of the manner in which siege events had 
been handled in various parts of this country were referred to in the introduction to this 
research, also stressed was the fact that countless lives including hostages, police 
personnel and captors were protected by adherence to a posture which underscored the 
importance of coordinated negotiation over a potentially premature tactical intervention. 
Even if the number of negative incidents highlighted were the only examples of their 
kind, a review of organizational structure and reporting lines would be appropriate in an 
effort to better insure that these particular histories do not repeat themselves. The 
decision-making chief executive or incident commander should have available the best 
information from the potentially two extreme views of the incident. As Kuykendall and 
Roberg (1992) noted in their discussion of organic and mechanistic organizations, neither 
is superior to the other under all circumstances. So too, neither SWAT tactics nor 
negotiation tactics is the most appropriate response to all situations. An appreciation of 
the contribution of a more adaptable organizational structure which contains elements of 
the mechanistic and the organic should tend to provide for a more informed decision-
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JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE / CUNY 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER
Security Ji{ana gem cm Institute
899 Tenth Avenue. Suite 6-36T 
New York. NY 10019-1029
(212) 237-8638 Fax: (212) 237-8637
January I, 1998
Dear Chief,
The enclosed questionnaire is part of a project to gather data about hostage/crisis 
negotiation units in American policing. The results will provide a synthesis of organizational and 
procedural aspects of hostage/crisis negotiation and enable Chiefs to be more familiar with how 
similar agencies across the country handle this function.
My interest in this subject is not only academic. During my twenty-one-year police career 
I was a hostage negotiator for thirteen years and team commander and chief negotiator for six o f 
those years.
It may be most practical if the person responsible for the activities of your hostage/crisis 
negotiation unit is the individual who completes the questionnaire. It should take approximately 
thirty (30) minutes to complete. All questions can be answered on the form. A postage-paid return 
envelope is provided.
Obviously, participation is voluntary. No identifier information about the officer who 
completes the questionnaire is required. The name of the agency is requested only to account for 
returned questionnaires but will not be used in reporting the results. The information provided 
will be collated and presented in the form of statistical summaries. A synopsis of the research 
findings will be sent to you.
Thank you for contributing to this project. If there are any questions I may be contacted 
as follows:
Robert J. Louden
Director, Criminal Justice Center
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
899 Tenth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Phone (212) 237 8639 
Fax (212)237 8637 
E-mail: ijlouden@facuIty.jjay. cuny. edu
Sincerely,
Robert J. Louden 
Director
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Thefollowing items are about your agency: TODA Y'S DA_TE:___________________
Your agency function is primarily:  police/law enforcement  corrections court
Agency level of government is : local / municipal countv state federal military
What state is your agency located in ? Name of_Agency________________________
Size of population served Number of sworn officers in agency___________
Does your agency have a Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team? ______no  yes
What year did your agency first form a Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team ? _________________
Is the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team a part of the Tactical (SWAT) Team?  no  yes
How many trained Hostage/Crisis Negotiators are in your agency’s team?_______ _____ _____________
What is the usual number of Hostage/Crisis Negotiators deployed at a call-up?_______________________
For each type of incident which your Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team may respond to, please indicate approximately 
how many incidents of each type the Team was deployed at during 1997:
(Mark item NA if not included in team duties. Write 0 if included in duties but no deployments in 1997)
______hostages being held [all reasons]  barricaded criminal, no hostages
_suicidal / jumper, no hostages _____ planned high risk raid / warrant situations
.kidnaping situations _____ emotionally disturbed / mentally ill. no hostages
.extortion situations____________________ _____ other, namely_________________________
How many Hostage/Crisis Negotiation deployments did your agency team participate in during;
1995___________  1996_____  1997_
How many of these incidents ended with the subject being negotiated-out without a need to resort to a tactical solution; 
1995___________  1996 1997
What was the average elapsed time (hours) for these incidents during which the subject was negotiated-out;
1995___________  1996 1997
What was the average elapsed time (hours) for these incidents in which there was a need to resort to a tactical solution; 
1995___________  1996 1997______
The rank of the Incident Commander at a typical Hostage/Crisis Negotiation deployment is __________________
The rank of the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team commander / leader at a typical deployment is. 
The rank of the Tactical (SWAT) Team commander /  leader at a typical deployment is_______
At a typical Hostage/Crisis Negotiation deployment the Negotiation Team commander /  leader reports to: (check one) 
 Incident Commander  Tactical (SWAT) Commander  Other,_____________________
Does a prosecutor usually respond to Hostage/Crisis situations?
______no  yes, occasionally____ ________ yes, usually
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Do Hostage/Crisis Negotiators receive additional pay? 
_____ no  yes, hazardous duty pay
Does your agency maintain an armored vehicle?




Does your agency have a written policy for Hostage/Crisis Negotiation situations? no ves
For each of the following activities indicate if your agency’s policy for Hostage/Crisis Negotiation situations.
A = Allows; F = Forbids;
.movement to another site with hostages
.movement to another site without hostages
N = Not Mentioned 
______ exchange of hostages
______ exchange of weapons
.providing illegal drugs / substances .amnesty for actions
.providing legal drugs or alcohol .release of prisoners
.elected officials to negotiate
.mental health professionals to negotiate
.clergy to negotiate 
.media to negotiate 
.family / friends to negotiate lawyers / attorneys to negotiate __
sets a time limit for negotiation  other gamely________________________
Is each negotiator given a copy of the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation policy? no  yes
If a police officer who is not a trained hostage/crisis negotiator is communicating with a subject prior to the arrival of a 
trained hostage/crisis negotiator, is he replaced immediately monitored kept talking mdefinctlv?
Stress debriefing after an incident for Negotiators is .mandatory .sometimes offered . never offered
Does the agency usually record (audio or video) Hostage/Crisis Negotiation incidents?__
The following items are about your agency’s hostage/crisis negotiation training: 
Approximate number of hours of your agency’s initial Hostage/Crisis Negotiator training.
no _yes
Your agency’s initial Hostage/Crisis Negotiator training is provided by: (select one) 
 your agency _____regional academy state academy _FBI other
Give the approximate number of hours for each item during initial hostage/crisis training (mark item N if not included);
A. active listening skills B. communication skills.
C. crisis intervention techniques.
E. dealing with emotionally aroused people.
G. dealing with substance abusers_______
L dealing with terrorists______________
K. firearms proficiency_______________
D. dealing with domestic disputes. 
F. dealing with mental illness
H. dealing with suicidal people. 
J. empathy______________
L first-aid /  CPR.




M. foreign language skills_______________ N. history of hostage/cnsis negotiation_________
O. interaction with media________________ P. interaction with the SWAT team_____________
Q. legal considerations________________  R. liaison with other agencies____________
S. physical fitness___________________  T. sign language_____________________
U. unarmed self-defense_______________  V. other, namely_________________________________
What is the average number of hours your agency requires annually as in-service or refresher training for 
Hostage/Crisis Negotiators? ______________________
Would it be possible to obtain a copy of the non-confidential components of your Hostage/Crisis Negotiation 
Policy /Plan to assist in this study?
 yes, attached ________ yes, being forwarded separately  no. not permitted
 yes, contact_________________________ at___________________ __ _______ to make arrangements.
The following items are your opinion: On a scale of 1= Strongly Disagree 4= Slightly Agree
2= Moderately Disagree 5= Moderately Agree
3= Slightly Disagree 6= Strongly Agree
A. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team work is personally satisfying.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
B. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team work has enhanced my career.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
C. I have received appropriate recognition /  acknowledgment for my Hostage/Crisis Negotiation work.
Disagree I 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
D. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation reduces the chance of death or serious physical injury during a contained incident 
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
E. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation usually results in resolution through negotiation rather than a need for a tactical solution. 
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
F. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation results in fewer call-backs or repeat calls for the same person.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
G. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation results in bystanders at incidents being positive about negotiation team efforts.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
H. Hostage/Crisis Negotiation results in citizens initiating positive phone calls or letters about an incident.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
L Hostage/Crisis Negotiation increases the ''hmr* of positive media attention after an incident.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
J. The Hostage/Crisis Negotiation team should be part of the Tactical (SWAT) team.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
K. There should be a pre-determined time limit set for negotiating during Hostage/Crisis situations.
Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Agree
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Thefollowing items are about you:
Rank/title:  PO /D ep/Tip____ __Cpl/Sgt  Lt.  CapL Above Capt
Education: HS/GED Some College  Bachelor  Master  Ph.D7 JD
Gender Female ___ Male Age:________
Ethnicity: Asian  Black Hispanic/Latin  White Other_________
Are you currently a trained Hostage/Crisis Negotiator for your agency? ____ no ves
If yes. Is your assignment as a Hostage/Crisis Negotiator considered full time?  no ves
Number of years as a sworn officer  Number of years as a Hostage/Crisis Negotiator_____
Are you the Hostage/Crisis Negotiation Team commander for your agency? _______ no _yes
Your usual current assignment is:______ patrol investigative _____SWAT other________
Do you usually negotiate:  in uniform  in civilian clothes
If you usually negotiate in civilian clothes, do you wear?
 suit/tie  casual _____ 'raid* jacket  ‘Jump "suit
Do you usually wear a ballistic vest when negotiating?
_______no  yes, hidden _yes, visible
Do you usually wear your handgun when negotiating?
 no _________ yes, hidden _________ yes, visible
What is the approximate date of your last deployment as a negotiator?___________________________
Approximately how many Hostage/Crisis Negotiation incidents were you deployed at during:
1995_____  1996________________ 1997______
How did you initiate the process to become a trained Hostage/Crisis Negotiator? (check the main one only)
_______I responded to a posting or vacancy notice
_______I sought out the information and volunteered
_______I was encouraged to apply by someone in the agency
What selection steps did your agency use to pick you as a hostage/crisis negotiator? (Check all that apply)
 application form / packet ____ recommendation of supervisor
 review of departmental record ____ medical examination
 one on one interview with team leader ____ panel interview
 physical agility test ____ paper & pencil psychological test
 interview with psychiatrist/psychologist  other, namely______________________________
0
Are these agency selection procedures included in a written document or policy?_______ no _______ yes
Please comment about this questionnaire or about anything related to Hostage/Crisis Negotiation_______________
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APPENDIX “B”
Variables (Frequency, Mean, Range, Standard Deviation)





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
Above 
high school 276 0 .18 .39 1
Comments
added 275 1 1.39 .49 1
Age 53 223 44.87 6.40 31
Agility test 276 0 .38 1.57 8
Citizen
appeal 276 0 46 .50 1
Application 276 0 .73 1.57 8
Armored
car 276 0 1.34 .47 1
Records
incidents 274 2 1.55 .50 1
Civilian
clothes 272 4 3.58 2.42 7
Wear
negotiating 271 5 2.22 1.59 7
Computer







Valid 0 226 81.9 81.9 81.9
1 50 18.1 18.1 100.0








Valid no 168 60.9 61.1 61.1
yes 107 38.8 38.9 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0
Missing 9 1 4
Total 1 .4
Total 276 100 0








Valid 32 1 4 1.9 1.9
34 1 4 19 3.8
35 2 7 3.8 7.5
38 4 1.4 7.5 15.1
39 1 1.9 17.0
40 4 1.4 7.5 24.5
41 4 1.4 7.5 32.1
42 4 7.5 39.6
43 4 1.4 7.5 47.2
44 5 9.4 56.6
45 2 3.8 60.4
46 2 3.8 642
47 2 3.8 67.9
48 2 3.8 71.7
49 1 1.9 73.6
50 5 1.8 9.4 83.0
51 1 1.9 84.9
52 1 1.9 86.8
53 1 1.9 88.7
54 1 1.9 90.6
55 2 . / 3.8 94.3
56 1 1.9 96.2
57 1 1.9 98.1
63 1 .A 1.9 100.0
Total 53 19.2 100.0









Valid 0 249 90.2 90.2 90.2
1 16 5.8 5.8 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0








Valid 0 148 53.6 53.6 53.6
1 128 46.4 46.4 100 0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0








Valid 0 154 55.8 55.8 55.8
1 109 39.5 39.5 95.3
2 1 .4 .4 95.7
3 1 .4 .4 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0







Valid no 183 66.3 66.3 66.3
yes 93 33.7 33.7 100.0








Valid no 123 44.6 44.9 44.9
yes 151 54.7 55.1 100.0
■ Total 274 99.3 100.0









Valid suit/tie 18 6.5 6.6 6.6
casual 114 41.3 41.9 48.5
raid jacket 67 24.3 24.6 73.2
jumpsuit 14 5.1 5.1 78.3
not 59 21.4 21.7 100.0applicable
Total 272 98.6 100.0
Missing 9 4 1.4
Total 4 1.4
Total 276 100.0







Valid uniform 48 17.4 17 7 17.7
civilian
clothes 205 74.3 75.6 93.4
not a
negotiator 18 6.5 6.6 100.0
Total 271 98.2 100.0
Missing 9 5 1.8
Total 5 1.8







valid 0 179 64.9 64.9 64.9
1 97 35.1 35.1 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
Current
assignment 275 1 2.51 1.28 3
deployments
1995 240 36 8.97 13.90 100
deployments
1996 246 30 9.70 14.21 109
deployments
1997 265 11 10.52 15 09 120
Education
level 275 1 2.76 .86 4
effectiveness
scale 256 20 29.91 3.24 16
Environmental
crime 276 0 1.22 .42 1
Environmental
unit 276 0 .23 42 1







Valid patrol 84 30.4 30.5 30.5
investigative 72 26.1 26.2 56.7
SWAT 14 5.1 5.1 61.8
other 105 38.0 38.2 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0
Missing 9 1 .4
Total 1 .4
Total 276 100.0








Valid 0 33 12.0 13.8 13.8
1 15 5.4 6.3 20.0
2 26 9.4 10.8 30.8
3 27 9.8 11.3 42.1
4 15 5.4 6.3 48.3
5 14 5.1 5.8 54.2
6 17 6.2 7.1 61.3
7 8 2.9 3.3 64.6
8 8 2.9 3.3 67.9
9 7 2.5 2.9 70.8
10 10 3.6 4.2 75.0
11 4 1.4 1.7 76.7
12 8 2.9 3.3 80.0
13 4 1.4 1.7 81.7
14 5 1.8 2.1 83.8
15 2 .7 .8 84.6
16 4 1.4 1.7 86.3
17 3 1.1 1.3 87.5
18 4 1.4 1.7 89.2
20 3 1.1 1.3 90.4
23 1 .4 .4 90.8
24 3 1.1 1.3 92.1
25 6 2.2 2.5 94.6
26 1 .4 .4 95.0
28 1 .4 .4 95.4
30 .7 .8 96.3
34 1 .4 .4 96.7
44 1 .4 .4 97.1
48 1 4 .4 97.5
50 1 .4 .4 97.9
52 1 .4 .4 98.3
72 1 .4 .4 98.8
91 1 .4 .4 99.2
100 2 .7 .8 100.0
Total 240 87.0 100.0
Missing 999 36 13.0
Total 36 13.0
276 100.0








Valid 0 27 9.8 11.0 11.0
1 7 2.5 2.8 13.8
2 36 13.0 14.6 28.5
3 27 9.8 11.0 39.4
4 16 5.8 6.5 45.9
5 14 5.1 5.7 51.6
6 14 5.1 5.7 57.3
7 8 2.9 3.3 60.6
8 14 5.1 5.7 66.3
9 5 1.8 2.0 68.3
10 7 2.5 2.8 71.1
11 8 2.9 3.3 74.4
12 5 1.8 2.0 76.4
13 4 1.4 1.6 78.0
14 6 2.2 2.4 80.5
15 9 3.3 3.7 84.1
16 2 .7 .8 85.0
17 3 1.1 1.2 86.2
18 4 1.4 1.6 87.8
20 1 4 .4 88.2
21 1 .4 .4 88.6
22 2 .7 .8 89.4
24 2 .7 8 90.2
25 4 1.4 1.6 91.9
26 1 .4 .4 92.3
29 3 1.1 1.2 93.5
30 3 1.1 1.2 94.7
31 1 .4 .4 95.1
32 2 .7 8 95.9
33 1 .4 .4 96.3
38 1 4 .4 96.7
45 3 1.1 1.2 98.0
50 1 .4 .4 98.4
56 1 4 .4 98.8
100 2 7 .8 99.6
109 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 246 89.1 100.0
Missing 999 30 10.9
Total 30 10.9
Total 276 1000








Valid 0 13 4.7 4.9 4.9
1 21 7.6 7.9 12.8
2 26 9.4 9.8 22.6
3 27 9.8 10.2 32.8
4 24 8.7 9.1 41.9
5 14 5.1 5.3 47.2
6 20 7.2 7.5 54.7
7 13 4.7 4.9 59.6
8 12 4.3 4.5 64.2
9 7 2.5 2.6 66.8
10 9 3.3 3.4 70.2
11 7 2.5 2.6 72.8
12 12 4.3 4.5 77.4
13 2 .7 .8 78.1
14 5 1.8 1.9 80.0
15 3 1.1 1.1 81.1
16 6 2.2 2.3 83.4
17 2 .7 .8 84.2
18 1 .4 .4 84.5
19 3 1.1 1.1 85.7
20 3 1.1 1.1 86.6
21 2 .7 8 87.5
22 5 1.8 1.9 89 4
23 2 .7 .8 90.2
24 1 .4 .4 90.6
25 2 .7 .8 91.3
26 1 4 .4 91.7
27 1 .4 .4 92.1
28 2 .7 8 92.8
30 3 1.1 1.1 94.0
32 1 .4 4 94.3
33 1 .4 .4 94.7
34 2 .7 8 95.5
38 1 .4 4 958
39 1 .4 4 96.2
40 1 .4 .4 96.6
43 1 .4 .4 970
50 2 .7 8 97.7
55 1 .4 .4 98.1
60 1 .4 .4 98.5
82 1 .4 4 98.9
100 2 .7 .8 99.6
120 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0
Missing 999 11 4.0
Total 11 4.0
Total 276 100.0








Valid ns/ged 7 2.5 2.5 2.5
some 115 41.7 41.8 44.4college
Bachelor 97 35.1 35.3 79.6
Master 49 17.8 17.8 97.5
PhO/JD 7 2.5 2.5 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0









Valid 20 1 .4 .4 .4
21 2 .7 .8 1.2
22 3 1.1 1.2 2.3
23 5 1.8 2.0 4.3
24 6 2.2 2.3 6.6
25 12 4.3 4.7 11.3
26 11 4.0 4.3 15.6
27 14 5.1 5.5 21.1
28 20 7.2 7.8 28.9
29 26 9.4 10.2 39.1
30 35 12.7 13.7 52.7
31 32 11.6 12.5 65.2
32 36 13.0 14.1 79.3
33 26 9.4 10.2 89.5
34 12 4.3 4.7 94.1
35 8 2.9 3.1 97.3
36 7 2.5 2.7 100.0
Total 256 92.8 100.0









Valid 1 214 77.5 77.5 77.5
2 62 22.5 22.5 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0







WaiKj 0 213 77.2 77.2 77.2
1 63 22.8 22.8 100.0








Valid Asian 1 .4 .4 .4
Black 12 4.3 4.4 4.7
Hispanic/Latin 14 5.1 5.1 9.9
White 245 88.8 89.4 99.3
Other 2 .7 .7 100.0
Total 274 99.3 100.0
Missing 9 2 .7
Total 2 .7
Total 276 100.0






Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
Full time 
negotiator 256 20 1.06
.24 1
Agency
function 276 0 1.02
19 2
Gender 274 2 1.93 .26 1
Geographic
area 276
0 2.52 1.05 3
Get copy of 
policy 227
49 2.59 1.68 7
Level of 
government 276










276 0 2.00 6.02E-02 1
Hostage
commander 269 7 1.76
.43 1
Homeless








Valid no 240 87.0 93.8 93.8
yes 16 5.8 6.3 100.0
Total 256 92.8 100.0










Valid police 272 98.6 98.6 98.6
corrections 2 .7 .7 99.3
court 2 .7 .7 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
276 100.0








Valid female 20 7.2 7.3 7.3
male 254 92-0 92.7 100.0
Total 274 99.3 100.0









Valid Northeast 48 17.4 17.4 17.4
South 107 38.8 38.8 56.2
Midwest 51 18.5 18.5 74.6
West 70 25.4 25.4 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0






Valid no 75 27.2 33.0 33.0
yes.
attached 62 22.5 27.3 60.4
yes.

































Valid local 184 66.7 66.7 66.7
county 72 26.1 26.1 92.8
state 20 7.2 72 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0







Valid no 14 5.1 5.5 5.5
yes.






























Valid 0 236 85.5 85.5 85.5
1 40 14.5 14.5 100.0








Valid no 1 .4 .4 .4
yes 275 99.6 99.6 100.0








Valid no 65 23.6 242 24.2
yes 204 73.9 75.8 100.0
Total 269 97.5 100.0












Valid 1 193 69.9 69.9 69.9
2 83 30.1 30.1 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0











271 5 47.1993 26.8674 248.00
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Vand 2.00 1 4 .4 4
5.00 1 4 .4 7
8.00 4 1.4 1.5 2.2
15.00 1 4 .4 2.6
16.00 3 1.1 1.1 3.7
20.00 1 .4 .4 4.1
24.00 27 9.8 10.0 14.0
28.00 1 .4 .4 14.4
30.00 1 .4 .4 14.8
32.00 3 1.1 1.1 15.9
40.00 158 57.2 58.3 74.2
44.00 1 .4 .4 74.5
46.00 1 .4 .4 74.9
48.00 6 2.2 2.2 771
50.00 5 1.8 1.8 79.0
51.00 1 79.3
56.00 3 1.1 1.1 80.4
58.00 1 80.8
60.00 5 1.8 1.8 82.7
64.00 1 83.0
68.00 1 .A 83.4
70.00 2 .7 84.1
72.00 2 84.9
78.00 1 85.2
80.00 28 10.1 10.3 95.6
90.00 1 .A 95.9
96.00 1 .A 96.3
98.00 1 96.7
100.00 2 974
118.00 1 .A 97.8
120.00 3 1.1 1.1 98.9
176.00 1 .A 99.3
220.00 1 .A .A 99.6
250.00 1 4 4 100.0
Total 271 98.2 100.0
Missing 999.00 5 1.8
Total 5 1.8
Total 276 100.0









valid 0 28 10.1 10.1 10.1
1 62 22.5 22.5 32.6
2 89 32.2 32.2 64.9
3 53 19.2 19.2 84.1
4 34 12.3 12.3 96.4
5 9 3.3 3.3 99.6
6 1 4 .4 100.0




Vafid Missing Mean Deviation Range
innovation
scale 276 0 2.12 1.29
6
In-service
training 263 13 31.5817 36.9187 210.00
Provider of 
training 275 1 3.09 1.42 4
Investigate






organization 245 31 1.58 1.10
5
mechvorg 253 23 1.45 .50 1
Medical
exam 276 0 .36 1.57
8
MOVEMEN2 150 126 .32 .69 2
MOVEMENT 151 125 1.68 .69 2
Copy of 
policy 270 6 2.88 2.21
7
NEGORIE 87 189 1.37 .72 4
Negotiated 
out 1995 226 50 6.49 9.98
80
negotiated 
out 1996 237 39 6.91 10.28
97








Valid .00 59 21.4 22.4 22.4
4.00 3 1.1 1.1 23.6
6.00 2 .7 .8 24.3
8.00 25 9.1 9.5 33.8
9.00 4 1.4 1.5 35.4
10.00 6 2.2 2.3 37.6
12.00 6 2.2 2.3 39.9
15.00 2 .7 .8 40.7
16.00 25 9.1 9.5 50.2
20.00 8 2.9 3.0 53.2
24.00 12 4.3 4.6 57.8
25.00 2 .7 .8 58.6
27.00 1 .4 .4 58.9
28.00 1 .4 .4 59.3
30.00 2 .7 .8 60.1
32.00 11 4.0 4.2 64.3
36.00 3 1.1 1.1 65.4
40.00 40 14.5 15.2 80.6
45.00 1 .4 .4 81.0
48.00 3 1.1 1.1 82.1
50.00 1 .4 .4 82.5
56.00 4 1.4 1.5 84.0
60.00 4 1.4 1.5 85.6
80.00 4 1.4 1.5 87.1
88.00 1 .4 .4 87.5
96.00 18 6.5 6.8 94.3
100.00 5 1.8 1.9 96.2
104.00 1 .4 .4 96.6
116.00 1 .4 .4 97.0
120.00 1 4 .4 97.3
128.00 1 .4 .4 97.7
136.00 1 .4 .4 98.1
144.00 2 .7 .8 98.9
180.00 1 .4 .4 99.2
190.00 1 .4 .4 99.6
210.00 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 263 95.3 100.0
Missing 99.00 13 4.7
Total 13 4.7
Total 276 100.0







Valid own 60 21.7 21.8 21.8agency
regional 39 14.1 14.2 36.0academy
state 35 12.7 12.7 48.7academy
FBI 97 35.1 35.3 84.0
other 44 15.9 16.0 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0









Valid 1 119 43.1 43.1 43.1
2 157 56.9 56.9 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0








Valid 0 1 .4 4 .4
1 86 31.2 34.7 35.1
2 29 10.5 11.7 46.8
3 21 7.6 8.5 55.2
4 25 9.1 10.1 65.3
5 10 3.6 4.0 69.4
6 14 5.1 5.6 75.0
7 16 5.8 6.5 81.5
8 9 3.3 3.6 85.1
9 11 4.0 4.4 89.5
10 2 .7 .8 90.3
11 1 .4 .4 90.7
12 1 .4 .4 91.1
14 1 .4 .4 91.5
15 1 .4 .4 91.9
16 2 .8 92.7
17 1 .4 .4 93.1
18 2 , f .8 94.0
19 1 .4 94.4
20 1 .4 94.8
24 3 1.1 1.2 96.0
30 2 , § .8 96.8
36 3 1.1 12 98.0
42 1 .4 98.4
60 2 .8 99.2
88 1 .4 99.6
96 1 ,4 .4 100.0
Total 248 89.9 100.0
Missing 98 11 4.0









Valid 0 50 18.1 20.4 20.4
1 61 22.1 24.9 45.3
2 87 31.5 35.5 80.8
3 38 13.8 15.5 96.3
4 8 2.9 3.3 99.6
5 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 245 88.8 100.0
Missing 9 31 11.2
Total 31 11.2
Total 276 100.0







































Valid 0 255 92.4 92.4 92.4
1 10 3.6 3.6 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0








Valid 0 121 43.8 80.7 80.7
1 10 3.6 6.7 87.3
2 19 6.9 12.7 100.0
Total 150 54.3 100.0









VaMd 0 19 6.9 12.6 12.6
1 10 3.6 6.6 19.2
2 122 44.2 80.8 100.0
Total 151 54.7 100.0
Missing 9 125 45.3
Total 125 45.3
Total 276 100.0








Valid no 15 5.4 5.6 5.6
yes 213 77.2 78.9 84.4
no
written 42 15.2 15.6 100.0
policy
Total 270 97.8 100.0









Valid 0 8 2.9 92 9.2
1 42 15.2 48.3 57.5
2 35 12.7 40.2 97.7
3 1 .4 1.1 98.9
4 1 4 1.1 100.0
Total 87 31.5 100.0
Missing 9 189 68.5
Total 189 68.5
Total 276 100.0








Valid 0 38 13.8 16.8 16.8
1 18 6.5 8.0 24.8
2 32 11.6 14.2 38.9
3 29 10.5 12.8 51.8
4 16 5.8 7.1 58.8
5 14 5.1 62 65.0
6 10 3.6 4.4 69.5
7 6 2.2 2.7 72.1
8 6 22 2.7 74.8
9 7 2.5 3.1 77.9
10 11 4.0 4.9 82.7
11 7 2.5 3.1 85.8
12 6 22 2.7 88.5
13 4 1.4 1.8 90.3
14 1 .4 90.7
15 3 1.1 1.3 92.0
17 1 .4 .4 92.5
18 1 .4 92.9
20 3 1.1 1.3 94.2
21 1 .4 94.7
23 2 .9 95.6
24 2 .9 96.5
26 2 , / .9 97.3
29 1 .4 97.8
35 1 .4 .4 98.2
41 1 .4 .4 98.7
58 1 .4 .4 99.1
75 1 .4 99.6
80 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 226 81.9 100.0
Missing 99 50 18.1
Total 50 18.1
Total 276 100.0








Valid 0 32 11.6 13.5 13.5
1 19 6.9 8.0 21.5
2 41 14.9 17.3 38.8
3 20 72 8.4 47.3
4 13 4.7 5.5 52.7
5 22 8.0 9.3 62.0
6 13 4.7 5.5 67.5
7 4 1.4 1.7 69.2
8 12 4.3 5.1 74.3
9 7 2.5 3.0 77.2
10 11 4.0 4.6 81.9
11 4 1.4 1.7 83.5
12 7 2.5 3.0 86.5
13 3 1.1 1.3 87.8
15 5 1.8 2.1 89.9
16 2 . f .8 90.7
17 2 . ( .8 91.6
18 1 .4 92.0
19 1 .4 92.4
20 1.4 1.7 94.1
21 1 .4 A 94.5
23 .8 95.4
24 1 .A 95.8
25 1 .4 .4 96.2
26 .7 .8 97.0
28 1 .4 .4 97.5
30 1 A .4 97.9
32 1 .4 98.3
35 1 .4 98.7
50 1 A .4 99.2
75 1 .4 4 99.6
97 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 237 85.9 100.0
Missing 99 39 14.1
Total 39 14.1
Total 276 100.0















38 238 2.13 .93 2
without
hostages
248 28 1.84 .93 2
Provide 





247 29 1.73 .85 2
officials
negotiate







Time limit 248 28 2.14 .97 2
Exchange 








Valid no. fbrtids 123 44.6 50.0 50.0
yes, allows 16 5.8 6.5 56.5
not 107 38.8 43.5 100.0mentioned
Total 246 89.1 100.0
Missing 9 30 10.9
Total 30 10.9
276 100.0








Valid no. forbids 81 29.3 32.9 32.9
yes. allows 68 24.6 27 6 606
not
mentioned 97 35.1 39.4 100.0

















































Valid no, forbids 130 47.1 52.4 52.4
yes. allows 27 9.8 10.9 63.3
not
mentioned 91 33.0 36.7 100.0














Valid no, forbids 192 69.6 77.1 77.1
yes. allows 1 .4 .4 775
not
mentioned 56 20.3 22.5 100.0
















Valid no. foroids 131 47.5 53.0 53.0
yes. allows 52 18.8 21.1 74.1
not
mentioned 64 23.2 25.9 100.0
Total 247 89.5 100.0









Valid no. forbids 119 43 1 48.4 48.4
yes, allows 11 4.0 4.5 52.8
not
mentioned 116 42.0 47.2 100.0
Total 246 89.1 100.0









Valid no. forbids 59 21.4 24.0 24.0
yes. allows 85 30.8 34.6 58.5
not
mentioned 102 37.0 41.5 100.0














Valid no. forbids -  91 33.0 37.0 37.0
yes. allows 30 10.9 12.2 49.2
not
mentioned 125 45.3 50.8 100.0
















1 Valid no. fortids 100 36.2 40.3 40.3
yes. allows 13 4.7 5.2 45.6
not 135 48.9 54.4 100.0mentioned
Total 248 89.9 100.0









Valid no. fortids 194 70.3 78.5 78.5
yes. allows 6 2.2 2.4 81.0
not 47 17.0 19.0 100.0mentioned
Total 247 89.5 100.0
Missing 9 29 10.5
Total 29 10.5
276 100.0





Valid Missinq Mean Deviation Range
Population 264 12 5.08 .88 5size
Prosecutor 276 0 1.19 46 2responds
Psychological 276 0 .53 1.58 8interview
Private 276 0 1.33 .47 1security
Rank of
negotiate 272 4 2.58 .80 5
commander
Rank of
incident 275 1 3.87 .94 5
commander
Respondent 275 1 2.62 .94 4
Rank of swat 
commander 272 4 2.92 .77
5
RARMEDVE 275 1 .34 .47 1
RAVERECO 273 3 .55 .50 1











24.999 2 .7 .8
1.1
25.000-
49.999 4 1.4 1.5
2.7
50.000-
99.999 58 21.0 22.0 24.6
100.000

























































Valid 0 208 75.4 75.4 75.4
1 57 20.7 20.7 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0








Valid 1 186 67.4 67.4 67.4
2 90 32.6 32.6 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
i Total 276 100.0






Valid po/dep/tpr 12 4.3 4.4 4.4
cpl/sgt 123 44.6 45.2 49.6
It 111 40.2 40.8 90.4
capt 20 7.2 7.4 97.8
maj/dc/ac/ltc 5 1.8 1.8 99.6
chief/comm/supt/dir 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 272 98.6 100.0
Missing 9 4 1.4
Total 4 1.4
Total 276 100.0
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Valid po/dep/tpr 1 4 .4 4
cpl/sgt 8 2.9 2.9 3.3
It 98 35.5 35.6 38.9
capt 101 36.6 36.7 75.6
maj/dc/ac/ltc 54 19.6 19.6 95.3
chief/comm/supt/dir 13 4.7 4.7 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0









Valid po/dep/tpr 27 9.8 9.8 9.8
cpl/sgt 103 37.3 37.5 47.3
It 101 36.6 36.7 84.0
capt 35 12.7 12.7 96.7
capt 9 3.3 3.3 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0
Missing 9 1 .4
Total 1 .4
Total 276 100.0






Valid po/dep/tpr 4 1.4 1.5 1.5
cpl/sgt 71 25.7 26.1 27.6
It 149 54.0 54.8 82.4
capt 40 14.5 14.7 97.1
maj/dc/ac/ltc 7 2.5 2.6 99.6
chief/comm/supt/dir 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 272 98.6 100.0
Missing 9 4 1.4
Total 4 1.4
276 100.0
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armored 182 65.9 66.2 66.2
vehicle
has
armored 93 33.7 33.8 100.0
vehicle
Total 275 99.6 100.0






































































Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
REARMEDV 275 1 .34 .47 1
REAVEREC 273 3 .45 .50 1
RECURASG 275 1 .64 .48 1
REFULLTI 268 8 .90 .31 1
REMOVE2 150 126 .19 .40 1
RENEGPAY 276 0 7.25E-03 8.50E-02 1
RENOTTRA 272 4 .84 .37 1
RENVICRM 276 0 22 .42 1
Repeat
offender 276
0 1.44 .50 1
REPOUC1 169 107 .15 .36 1







Valid 0 182 65.9 66.2 66.2
1 93 33.7 33.8 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0









Valid records 15C 54.3 54.9 54.9
does not 123 44.6 45.1 100.0record
Total 273 98.9 100.0
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Valid fulltime 28 10.1 10.4 10.4
part time 240 87.0 89.6 100.0
Total 268 97.1 100.0










Valid 0 121 43.8 80.7 80.7
1 29 10.5 19.3 100.0
Total 150 54.3 100.0









Valid 0 274 99.3 99.3 99.3
1 2 .7 .7 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0
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•"'alid 0 130 47.1 82.8 82.8
1 27 9.8 17.2 100.0
Total 157 56.9 100.0
Missing 9 119 43.1
Total 119 43.1
Total 276 100.0





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
REPOUC8 113 163 88 .32 1






20 6.25E-02 .24 1
RHOMELES 276 0 .30 46 1
RINVSFOR 275 0 .57 .50 1
RMOVE 151 125 .87 .33 1
RNEGPAY 276 0 6.16E-Q2 .24 1
untrained
negotiator 272 4 .16
.37 1
forbids
whostages 169 107 .85
.36 1
forbids








Valid 0 13 4.7 11.5 11.5
1 100 36.2 88.5 100.0
Total 113 40.9 100.0









Valid yes 115 41.7 43.4 43.4
no 150 54.3 56.6 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0
Missing 9 8 2.9











•Valid 0 93 33.7 33.7 33.7
1 172 62.3 62.3 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0









































Valid 0 193 69.9 69.9 69.9
1 83 30.1 30.1 100.0








Valid 0 119 43.1 43.1 43.1
1 157 56.9 56.9 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0
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RMOVE 150
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid no
movement 19 6.9 12.6 12.6
movement 132 47.8 87.4 100.0














Valid no extra 
pay 259 93.8 93.8 93.8
hazardous
pay 17 6.2 6.2 100.0









negotiate 228 82.6 83.8 83.8
not
permitted 44 15.9 16.2 100.0













































bail'd movement 27 9.8 17.2 17.2
no 130 47.1 82.8 100.0movement
Total 157 56.9 100.0
Missing 9 119 43.1
Total 119 43.1
Total 276 100.0





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
RPOUCY8 113 163 .12 .32 1
RPVTSCTY 276 0 .33 .47 1
RREPEAT 276 0 .44 .50 1
select policy 265 11 .43 .50 1
Rubber






selection 267 9 1.43 .50 1
policy
Soft
projectile 276 0 1.08
27 1
Become












Valid no time 100 36 2 88.5 88.5limit
has time 13 4.7 11.5 100.0limit
Total 113 40.9 100.0









Valid 0 186 67.4 67.4 67.4
1 90 32.6 32.6 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0
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RREPEAT 153
r... Frequency Percent ValidPercent CumulativePercent
ilid 0 154 55.8 55.8 55.8
1 122 44.2 44.2 100.0








Valid not written 150 54.3 56.6 56.6
written 115 41.7 43.4 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0
Missing 9 8 2.9










Valid 1 248 89.9 89.9 89.9
2 28 10.1 10.1 100.0
| Total 276 100.0 100.0
I Totai 276 100.0








Valid 6 1 .4 4 .4
7 2 .7 8 1.2
8 3 1.1 1.2 2.3
9 3 1.1 1.2 3.5
10 7 2.5 2.7 6.3
11 11 4.0 4.3 10.5
12 21 7.6 8.2 18.8
13 32 11.6 12.5 31.3
14 49 17.8 19.1 50.4
15 37 13.4 14.5 64.8
16 34 12.3 13.3 78.1
17 27 9.8 10.5 887
18 29 10.5 11.3 100.0
Total 256 92.8 100.0









Valid no 151 54.7 56.6 56.6
yes 116 42.0 43.4 100.0
Total 267 96.7 100.0









Valid 1 255 92.4 92.4 92.4
2 21 7 6 7.6 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
276 100.0







'alid posting/ 85 30.8 32.1 32.1notice
volunteered 87 31.5 32.8 64.9
encouraged 79 28.6 29.8 94.7
not a 14 5.1 5.3 100.0negotiator
Total 265 96.0 100.0









Valid no. not 
offered 20 72 7.3 7.3
yes.



























Valid 1 230 83.3 83.3 83.3
2 46 16.7 16.7 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0









SWATORI 87 189 1.52 73 4
Tactical hours 
1995 198
78 2.4422 30416 12.00
Tactical hours 
1996 211






















77 6.2697 4.9920 50.00
Crisis
intervention 200
76 6.6059 6.5985 53.00







Valid 0 73 26.4 27.5 27.5
1 192 69.6 72.5 1000
Total 265 96.0 100.0









Valid 0 4 1.4 4.6 4.6
1 41 14.9 47.1 51.7
2 36 13.0 41.4 93.1
3 5 1.8 5.7 98.9
4 1 .4 1.1 100.0
Total 87 31.5 100.0
Missing 9 189 68.5
Total 189 68.5
276 1000








atid .00 100 36.2 50.5 50.5
1.00 3 1.1 1.5 52.0
1.50 2 .7 1.0 53.0
1.75 1 .4 .5 53.5
2.00 9 3.3 4.5 58.1
2.50 2 .7 1.0 59.1
2.75 1 .4 .5 59.6
3.00 12 4 3 6.1 65.7
3.25 2 .7 1.0 66.7
3.50 2 .7 1.0 67.7
4.00 15 5.4 7.6 75.3
4.50 2 .7 1.0 76.3
5.00 9 3.3 4.5 80.8
5.25 1 .4 .5 81.3
5.30 1 .4 .5 81.8
5.50 1 .4 .5 82.3
6.00 9 3.3 4.5 86.9
6.50 2 .7 1.0 879
7.00 6 2.2 3.0 90.9
8.00 11 4.0 5.6 96.5
8.50 1 .4 .5 97.0
9.00 1 .4 .5 97.5
10.00 2 .7 1.0 98.5
12.00 3 1.1 1.5 100.0
Total 198 71.7 100.0
Missing 99.00 78 28.3
Total 78 28.3
276 100.0








Valid .00 104 37.7 49.3 49.3
.75 1 .4 .5 49.8
1.00 3 1.1 1.4 51.2
1.50 4 1.4 1.9 53.1
2.00 12 4.3 5.7 58.8
2.50 5 1.8 2.4 61.1
2.75 1 .4 .5 61.6
3.00 9 3.3 4.3 65.9
3.25 1 .4 .5 66.4
3.50 1 .4 .5 66.8
4.00 20 7.2 9.5 76.3
4.30 1 .4 .5 76.8
4.40 1 .4 .5 77.3
4.50 2 .7 .9 78.2
5.00 10 3.6 4.7 82.9
6.00 7 2.5 3.3 86.3
6.50 2 .7 .9 87.2
7.00 3 1.1 1.4 88.6
8.00 10 3.6 4.7 93.4
9.00 3 1.1 1.4 94.8
10.00 5 1.8 2.4 97.2
11.00 1 .4 .5 97.6
12.00 1 .5 98.1
12.50 1 .5 98.6
14.00 1 .4 .5 99.1
20.00 1 A .5 99.5
36.00 1 A .5 100.0
Total 211 76.4 100.0
Missing 99.00 65 23.6
Totai 65 23.6
Total 276 100.0








Valid 00 95 34.4 40.4 404
1.00 7 2.5 3.0 43.4
1.50 3 1.1 1.3 44.7
2.00 18 6.5 7.7 52.3
2.50 3 1.1 1.3 53.6
2.75 1 .4 .4 54.0
3.00 18 6.5 7.7 61.7
3.17 1 .4 .4 62.1
3.50 3 1.1 1.3 63.4
4.00 26 9.4 11.1 74.5
4.50 2 .7 .9 75.3
5.00 12 4.3 5.1 80.4
5.50 1 .4 4 80.9
6.00 13 4.7 5.5 86.4
6.50 3 1.1 1.3 87.7
7.00 2 .7 .9 88.5
7.50 1 .4 .4 88.9
8.00 5 1.8 2.1 91.1
9.00 6 22 2.6 93.6
10.00 6 22 2.6 96.2
12.00 1 .4 .4 96.6
12.50 1 .4 4 97.0
13.00 1 .4 .4 97.4
14.00 1 .4 .4 97.9
16.00 1 .4 .4 98.3
20.00 1 .4 .4 98.7
22.00 1 .4 .4 99.1
29.00 1 .4 .4 99.6
96.00 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 235 85.1 100.0









Valid 0 183 66.3 66.3 66.3
1 82 29.7 29.7 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Totai 276 100.0
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160
Trained negotiator
r- Frequency Percent ValidPercent CumulativePercent
/alid no 22 8.0 8.0 8.0
yes 254 92.0 92.0 100.0








Valid .00 3 1.1 1.5 1.5
.33 1 .4 .5 2.0
.50 2 .7 1.0 3.0
1.00 16 5.8 8.0 11.0
1.50 3 1.1 1.5 12.5
2.00 33 12.0 16.5 29.0
2.50 1 .4 .5 29.5
3.00 13 4.7 6.5 36.0
4.00 52 18.8 26.0 62.0
5.00 11 4.0 5.5 67.5
6.00 7 2.5 3.5 71.0
6.50 1 .4 .5 71.5
7.00 1 .4 .5 72.0'
8.00 28 10.1 14.0 86.0
9.00 1 .4 .5 86.5
10.00 11 4.0 5.5 92.0
12.00 2 .7 1.0 93.0
15.00 2 .7 10 94.0
16.00 9 3.3 4.5 98.5
20.00 1 .4 .5 99.0
50.00 1 .4 .5 995
150.00 1 4 .5 100.0
Total 200 72.5 100.0
Missing 99.00 76 27.5
Totai 76 27.5
Total 276 100.0
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Communication sfciHs





alid .00 1 4 5 .5
.17 1 .4 .5 1.0
.50 1 4 .5 1.5
1.00 6 2.2 3.0 4.5
1.50 1 .4 .5 5.0
2.00 20 72 10.1 15.1
2.50 4 1.4 2.0 17.1
3.00 7 2.5 3.5 20.6
4.00 52 18.8 26.1 46.7
5.00 13 4.7 6.5 53.3
6.00 18 6.5 9.0 62.3
6.50 1 .4 .5 62.8
7.00 1 4 .5 63.3
8.00 43 15.6 21.6 84.9
9.00 3 1.1 1.5 86.4
10.00 11 4.0 5.5 92.0
11.00 1 .4 .5 92.5
12.00 3 1.1 1.5 94.0
16.00 6 2.2 3.0 97.0
20.00 5 1.8 2.5 99.5
50.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Totai 199 72.1 100.0
.Missing 99.00 77 2 7 9
x Total 77 27.9
LE25!__________ 276 100.0








Valid .00 2 .7 1.0 1.0
17 1 .4 .5 15
.50 1 .4 .5 2.0
1.00 6 2.2 3.0 5.0
2.00 28 10.1 14.0 19.0
2.50 2 .7 1.0 20.0
3.00 9 3.3 4.5 24.5
4.00 55 19.9 27.5 52.0
5.00 13 4.7 6.5 58.5
6.00 8 2.9 4.0 62.5
6.50 1 .4 .5 63.0
7.00 1 .4 .5 63.5
8.00 43 15.6 21.5 85.0
10.00 9 3.3 4.5 89.5
12.00 * 6 2.2 3.0 92.5
16.00 5 1.8 2.5 95.0
20.00 3 1.1 1.5 96.5
21.00 1 .5 97.0
25.00 2 1.0 98.0
30.00 1 .5 98.5
40.00 2 . f 1.0 99.5
53.00 1 .5 100.0
Total 200 72.5 100.0
Missing 99.00 76 27.5
Totai 76 27.5
Total 276 100.0








Valid 00 26 9.4 13.2 13.2
.17 1 .4 .5 13.7
.50 1 .4 .5 14.2
1.00 31 11.2 15.7 29.9
2.00 53 19.2 26.9 56.9
2.50 3 1.1 1.5 58.4
3.00 10 3.6 5.1 63.5
4.00 45 16.3 22.8 86.3
5.00 8 2.9 4.1 90.4
6.00 3 1.1 1.5 91.9
6.50 1 .4 .5 92.4
8.00 11 4.0 5.6 98.0
9.00 1 .5 98.5
10.00 1 .4 .5 99.0
20.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
30.00 1 .5 100.0
Total 197 71.4 100.0
Missing 99.00 79 28.6
Total 79 28.6
276 100.0





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
Emotionally
aroused 196 80 3.7075 2.5925
16.00
Mental
illness 198 78 3.8140 3.3583
24.00
Substance
abusers 196 80 2.3929 2.2789
20.00
Suicidal
















































Valid .00 8 2.9 4.1 4.1
.17 1 .4 .5 4.6
50 2 .7 1.0 5.6
1.00 19 6.9 9.7 15.3
1.50 2 .7 1.0 16.3
2.00 47 17.0 24.0 40.3
2.50 2 .7 1.0 41.3
3.00 12 4.3 6.1 47.4
4.00 60 21.7 30.6 78.1
5.00 9 3.3 4.6 82.7
6.00 5 1.8 2.6 85.2
6.50 1 .4 .5 85.7
7.00 1 .4 .5 86.2
8.00 19 6.9 9.7 95.9
10.00 6 2.2 3.1 99.0
12.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
16.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 196 71.0 100.0
Missing 99.00 80 29.0
Total 80 29.0
Total 276 100.0








Valid .00 7 2.5 3.5 3.5
17 1 4 .5 4.0
.50 2 .7 1.0 5.1
1.00 21 7.6 10.6 15.7
1.50 2 .7 1.0 16.7
2.00 57 20.7 28.8 45.5
2.50 2 .7 1.0 46.5
3.00 9 3.3 4.5 51.0
3.50 1 .4 .5 51.5
4.00 54 19.6 27.3 78.8
5.00 8 2.9 4.0 82.8
6.00 6 2.2 3.0 85.9
6.50 1 .4 .5 86.4
8.00 17 6.2 8.6 94.9
10.00 3 1.1 1.5 96.5
12.00 2 .7 1.0 97.5
16.00 3 1.1 1.5 99.0
20.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
24.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 198 71.7 100.0









Valid .00 21 7.6 10.7 10.7
.50 7 2.5 3.6 14.3
1.00 40 14.5 20.4 34.7
1.50 1 .4 .5 35.2
2.00 65 23.6 33.2 68.4
2.50 3 1.1 1.5 69.9
3.00 9 3.3 4.6 74.5
4.00 37 13.4 18.9 93.4
5.00 3 1.1 1.5 94.9
6.50 1 .4 .5 95.4
7.00 1 .4 .5 95.9
8.00 3 1.1 1.5 97.4
9.00 1 4 .5 98.0
10.00 3 1.1 1.5 99.5
20.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 196 71.0 100.0
Missing 99.00 80 29.0
Total 80 29.0
Total 276 100.0








Valid .00 2 .7 1.0 1.0
33 1 .4 5 1.5
.50 3 1.1 1.5 3.1
1.00 17 6.2 8.8 11.9
1.50 1 .4 .5 12.4
2.00 46 16.7 23.7 36.1
2.50 2 .7 1.0 37.1
3.00 8 2.9 4.1 41.2
4.00 65 23.6 33.5 74.7
5.00 9 3.3 4.6 79.4
6.00 6 2.2 3.1 82.5
6.50 1 .4 .5 83.0
7.00 1 .4 .5 83.5
8.00 17 6.2 8.8 92.3
9.00 2 .7 1.0 93.3
10.00 4 1.4 2.1 95.4
12.00 1 4 .5 95.9
15.00 1 4 .5 96.4
16.00 3 1.1 1.5 97.9
24.00 1 .4 .5 98.5
40.00 3 1.1 1.5 100.0
Total 194 70.3 100.0
Missing 99.00 82 29.7
Total 82 29.7
Total 276 100.0









257 19 7.65 11.69 119
get extra 
pay
276 0 1.30 .83 3
Negotiator 
reports to 276
0 1.45 .61 2
Negotiate 
hours 1995 217
59 32012 2.8932 24.00
Negotiate 
hours 1996 226
50 3.5842 3.1171 23.00
Negotiate 
hours 1997 251








272 4 1.86 .41 2
sworn
officers
264 12 2.01 1.15 3
Negotiators 
at incident 274
2 3.97 1.89 10
Number of 
I negotiators 274
2 9.96 11.12 102








Valid 0 24 8 7 9.3 9 3
1 26 9.4 10.1 19.5
2 33 12.0 12.8 32.3
3 30 10.9 11.7 44.0
4 22 8.0 8.6 52.5
5 13 4.7 5.1 57.6
6 17 6.2 6.6 64.2
7 6 2.2 2.3 66.5
8 10 3.6 3.9 70.4
9 8 2.9 3.1 73.5
10 15 5.4 5.8 79.4
11 7 2.5 2.7 82.1
12 9 3.3 3.5 85.6
13 4 1.4 1.6 87.2
14 2 .7 .8 87.9
15 4 1.4 1.6 89.5
16 2 .7 .8 90.3
17 2 .  / .8 91.1
18 2 . 7 .8 91.8
19 3 1.1 1.2 93.0
20 1 .4 .4 93.4
22 2 .7 8 942
24 2 .8 94.9
27 1 4 4 95.3
28 2 77 .8 96.1
30 2 77 .8 96.9
31 1 .4 97.3
32 1 .4 97.7
35 1 4 .4 98.1
40 1 .4 .4 98.4
42 1 .4 98.8
73 1 ,4 .4 99.2
75 1 .4 .4 99.6
119 1 ,4 .4 100.0
Total 257 93.1 100.0
Missing 99 19 6.9
Total 19 6.9
Total 276 100.0
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Valid no 236 85.5 85.5 8 5 5
yes.
hazardous 17 6.2 6.2 91.7
yes, merit 2 .7 .7 92.4
yes. other 21 7.6 7 6 100.0









commander 168 60.9 60.9 60.9
swat
commander 91 33.0 33.0 93.8
orther 17 6.2 6.2 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0








Valid 00 37 13.4 17.1 17.1
.50 2 .7 .9 18.0
.67 1 .4 .5 18.4
1.00 15 5.4 6.9 25.3
1.50 5 1.8 2.3 27.6
1.75 1 .4 .5 28.1
1.90 1 .4 .5 28.6
2.00 32 11.6 14.7 43.3
2.50 4 1.4 1.8 45.2
3.00 31 11.2 14.3 59.4
3.20 1 .4 .5 59.9
3.50 7 2.5 3.2 63.1
3.75 1 .4 .5 63.6
3.90 1 .4 .5 64.1
4.00 29 10.5 13.4 77.4
4.50 1 .4 .5 77.9
5.00 11 4.0 5.1 82.9
5.50 1 .4 .5 83.4
6.00 18 6.5 8.3 91.7
6.50 1 .4 .5 92.2
7.00 5 1.8 2.3 94.5
8.00 2 .7 .9 95.4
9.00 3 1.1 1.4 96.8
10.00 4 1.4 1.8 98.6
12.00 1 .4 .5 99.1
15.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
24.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 217 78.6 100.0
Missing 99.00 59 21.4
Total 59 21.4
276 100.0








Valid .00 31 11.2 13.7 13.7
.17 1 .4 .4 14.2
.75 1 .4 .4 14.6
1.00 10 3.6 4.4 19.0
1.50 6 2.2 2.7 21.7
1.75 2 .7 .9 22.6
2.00 X 10.9 13.3 35.8
2.50 8 2.9 3.5 39.4
3.00 36 13.0 15.9 55.3
3.50 7 2.5 3.1 58.4
4.00 35 12.7 15.5 73.9
4.50 1 .4 .4 74.3
5.00 17 6.2 7.5 81.9
5.10 1 .4 82.3
6.00 15 5.4 6.6 88.9
7.00 6 2.9 3.5 92.5
7.50 1 .4 .4 92.9
8.00 4 1.4 1.8 94.7
9.00 2 .7 .9 95.6
10.00 4 1.4 1.8 97.3
12.00 2 .7 .9 98.2
13.00 1 .4 98.7
16.00 1 .4 .4 99.1
20 .X 1 .4 4 99.6
23 .X 1 .4 .4 1X .0
Total 226 81.9 1X.0
Missing 99 .X 50 18.1
Total 50 18.1
276 1X .0








Valid .00 21 7.6 8 4 8.4
25 1 .4 4 8.8
.30 1 .4 .4 9.2
.50 1 .4 .4 9.6
1.00 12 4.3 4.8 14.3
1.50 9 3.3 3.6 17.9
1.67 1 .4 .4 18.3
2.00 44 15.9 17.5 35.9
2.25 1 .4 .4 36.3
2.50 10 3.6 4.0 40.2
3.00 46 16.7 18.3 58.6
3.50 6 2.2 2.4 61 0
3.75 1 .4 .4 61.4
4.00 28 10.1 112 72.5
4.50 4 1.4 1.6 74.1
4.75 1 4 .4 74.5
5.00 22 8.0 8.8 83.3
5.50 2 .7 .8 84.1
6.00 22 8.0 8.8 92.8
7.00 5 1.8 2.0 94.8
7.25 1 .4 .4 95.2
7.50 1 .4 .4 95.6
8.00 3 1.1 12 96.8
9.00 1 .4 A 97 2
10.00 1 .4 .4 97.6
12.00 2 .7 .8 98.4
13.00 1 .4 .4 98.8
18.00 2 .7 .8 99.6
20.00 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 251 90.9 100.0






Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid does not 
use
nonlethal




Total 276 100.0 100.0
276 100.0









replace 44 15.9 16.2 16.2
yes.
monitored 221 80.1 81.3 97.4
yes.
indefinetly 7 2.5 2.6 100.0














Valid 100-249 124 44.9 47.0 47.0
250-499 61 22.1 23.1 70.1
500-999 31 11.2 11.7 81.8
1.000 + 48 17.4 18.2 100.0
Total 264 95.7 100.0









Valid 1 9 3.3 3.3 3.3
2 60 21.7 21.9 25.2
3 59 21.4 21.5 46.7
4 56 20.3 20.4 672
5 37 13.4 13.5 80.7
6 24 8.7 8.8 89.4
7 14 5.1 5.1 94.5
8 9 3.3 3.3 97.8
9 3 1.1 1.1 98.9
10 2 .7 .7 99.6
11 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 274 99.3 100.0
Missing 99 2 .7
Total 2 .7
Total 276 100.0







valid 1 4 1.4 1.5 1.5
2 10 3.6 3.6 5.1
3 11 4.0 4.0 9.1
4 30 10.9 10.9 20.1
5 30 10.9 10.9 31.0
6 43 15.6 15.7 46.7
7 22 8.0 8.0 54.7
8 22 8.0 8.0 62.8
9 13 4.7 4.7 67.5
10 21 7.6 7.7 75.2
11 4 1.4 1.5 76.6
12 14 5.1 5.1 81.8
13 2 .7 .7 82.5
14 4 1.4 1.5 83.9
15 7 2.5 2.6 86.5
16 8 2.9 2.9 89.4
18 2 .7 .7 90.1
20 8 2.9 2.9 93.1
22 2 .7 . ( 93.8
23 1 .4 94.2
24 2 .7 .  I 94.9
25 2 .7 95.6
26 1 .4 96.0
27 1 .4 96.4
28 1 .4 4 96.7
33 1 .4 97.1
38 1 .4 ,4 97.4
40 1 .4 97.8
44 1 .4 98.2
49 1 .4 98.5
50 1 .4 98.9
60 1 .4 99.3
100 1 .4 .4 99.6
103 1 .4 4 100.0
Total 274 99.3 100.0








Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
ONLYHOST 0 276
Satisfaction 261 15 5.66 .56 2
Enhanced
career 259 17
4 68 1.22 5
Recognition 259 17 4.08 1.36 5
Chance of 
death 266





























Valid slightly 11 4.0 4.2 4.2
agree
moderately 66 23.9 25.3 29 5agree
strongly 184 66.7 70.5 100.0agree
Total 261 94.6 100.0









Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid strongly 8 2 9 3.1 3.1disagree
moderately 6 2.2 2.3 5.4disagree
slightly 18 6.5 6.9 12.4disagree
slightly 76 27.5 29.3 41.7agree
moderately 71 25.7 27.4 69.1agree
strongly 80 29.0 30.9 100.0agree
Total 259 93.8 100.0










Valid strongly 17 6.2 6.6 6.6disagree
moderately 18 6.5 6.9 13.5disagree
slightly 31 11.2 12.0 25.5disagree
slightly 95 34.4 36.7 62.2agree
moderately 57 20.7 22.0 84.2agree
strongly 41 14.9 15.8 100.0agree
Total 259 93.8 100.0












moderately 25 9.1 9.4 10.5agree
strongly 238 86.2 89.5 100.0agree
Total 266 96.4 100.0






Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid moderately 1 .4 .4 4disagree
slightly 3 1.1 1.1 1.5disagree
slightly 14 5.1 5.3 6.8agree
moderately 93 33.7 35.0 41.7agree
strongly 155 56.2 58.3 100.0agree
Total 266 96.4 100.0








Freauency Percent Percent Percent
Valid strongly
disagree 2 7 .8 8
moderately
disagree 10 3.6 3.8 4.6
slightly
disagree 27 9.8 10.4 15.0
slightly 95 34.4 36.5 51.5agree
moderately 79 28.6 30.4 81.9agree
strongly 47 17.0 18.1 100.0agree
Total 260 94.2 100.0






Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid strongly
disagree 2 .7 .8 .8
moderately
disagree 6 2.2 2.3 3.0
slightly
disagree 14 5.1 5.3 8.3
slightly
agree 56 20.3 21.2 29.5
moderately
agree 109 39.5 41.3 70.8
strongly
agree 77 27.9 29.2 100.0
Total 264 95.7 100.0








Freauency Percent Percent Percent
^ Valid strongly
disagree 7 2.5 2.7 2.7
moderately
disagree 17 6.2 6.6 9.3
slightly
disagree 41 14.9 15.8 25.1
slightly
agree 103 37.3 39.8 64.9
moderately
agree 67 24.3 25.9 90.7
strongly
agree 24 8.7 9.3 100.0
Total 259 93.8 100.0






Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid strongly 1 .4 .4 .4disagree
moderately
disagree 5 1.8 1.9 2.3
slightly
disagree 5 1.8 1.9 4.1
slightly 48 174 18.0 22.2agree
moderately 96 34.8 36.1 58.3agree
strongly 111 40.2 41.7 100.0agree
Total 266 96.4 100.0












Valid strongly 56 20.3 21.1 21 1disagree
moderately 18 6.5 6.8 27.8disagree
slightly 12 4.3 4.5 32.3disagree
slightly 20 7.2 7.5 39.8agree
moderately 38 13.8 14.3 54.1agree
strongly 122 44.2 45.9 100.0agree
Total 266 96.4 100.0
Missing 8 8 2.9
9 2 .7
Total 10 3.6
Total 276 100 0





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
Time limit 273 3 1.47 1.37 7
organic










is part of 
SWAT 275 1 1.56
.50 1
Movement 





Amnesty 246 30 2.13 .95 2
Release
prisoners 246 30 1.96
.94 2
Clergy








Valid strongly 222 80.4 81.3 81.3disagree
moderately 28 10.1 10.3 91.6disagree
slightly 8 2.9 2.9 94.5disagree
slightly 3 1.1 1.1 95.6agree
moderately 1 .4 .4 96.0agree
strongly 3 1.1 1.1 97 1agree
8 8 2.9 2.9 100.0
Total 273 98.9 100.0
Missing 9 3 1.1
Total 3 1.1
Total 276 100.0







Valid 0 1 .4 4 .4
1 8 2.9 3.2 3.6
2 40 14.5 15.8 19.4
3 91 33.0 36.0 55.3
4 63 22.8 24.9 80.2
5 50 18.1 19.8 100.0
Total 253 91.7 100.0









Valid 0 221 80.1 83.4 83.4
1 44 15.9 16.6 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0









Valid 0 155 56.2 58.5 58.5
1 110 39.9 41.5 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0









Valid 0 231 83.7 83.7 83.7
1 34 12.3 12.3 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0
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Valid no 122 44.2 44.4 4 4 4
yes 153 554 55.6 100.0
Total 275 99.5 100.0












































Valid no. forbids 203 73.6 82.5 82.5
yes. allows 3 1.1 1.2 83.7
not 40 14.5 16.3 100.0mentioned
Total 246 89.1 100.0









Valid no. forbids 97 35 1 39.4 39.4
yes. allows 20 72 8.1 47.6
not 129 46.7 52.4 100.0mentioned
Total 246 89.1 100.0
Missing 9 30 10.9
Total 30 10.9
Total 276 1000














































































Valid Missing Mean Deviation Ranqe
Media
negotiate 246
30 1.93 .97 2
Famity/fremds
negotiate 246




38 238 2.13 93 2
without
hostages
248 28 1.84 .93 2
Provide 
illegal drugs 249




247 29 1.73 85 2
officials
negotiate
246 30 1.99 .98 2
Mental health 
negotiate 246
30 2.17 .79 2
Lawyers
negotiate 246
30 2.14 .93 2
Timelimit 248 28 2.14 .97 2







Valid no. forbids 123 44.6 50.0 50.0
yes. allows 16 5.8 6.5 56.5
not 107 38.8 43.5 100.0mentioned
Total 246 89.1 100.0
Missing 9 30 10.9
Total 30 10.9
Total 276 100.0







x Valid no. toroids 81 29.3 32.9 32.9
yes. allows 68 24.6 276 60.6
not
mentioned 97 35.1 39.4 100.0




















































































Valid no. forbids 192 69 6 77.1 77.1
yes. allows 1 .4 .4 77.5
not
mentioned 56 20.3 22.5 100.0
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Time limit 188
Valid Cumulative
Freauency Percent Percent Percent
Walid no. forbids 100 36.2 40 3 40.3
yes. allows 13 4.7 5.2 45.6
not
mentioned 135 48.9 54.4 100.0
















































Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
Population
size 264 12 5.08
.88 5
Prosecutor
responds 276 0 1.19
46 2
Psychological








272 4 2.58 80 5
incident
commander
275 1 3.87 .94 5
Respondent 275 1 2.62 94 4
Rank of swat 
commander 272 4 2.92
.77 5
RARMEDVE 275 1 .34 .47 1
RAVERECO 273 3 .55 .50 1







Valid up to 
10,000 1 .4 .4
.4
10.000-






99.999 58 21.0 22.0 24.6
100.000

























































Valid 0 208 75.4 75.4 75.4
1 57 20.7 20.7 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0








Valid 1 186 67.4 67.4 67.4
2 90 32.6 32.6 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
'— i Total 276 100.0






Valid po/dep/tpr 12 4.3 4.4 4 4
cpl/sgt 123 44.6 45.2 49.6
It 111 40.2 40.8 90.4
capt 20 7.2 7 4 97.8
maj/dc/ac/ltc 5 1.8 1.8 99.6
chief/comm/supt/dir 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 272 98.6 100.0
Missing 9 4 1.4
Total 4 1.4
Total 276 100.0
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Rank of incident commander 191
1 Frequency Percent ValidPercent CumulativePercent
~S/alid po/dep/tpr 1 4 .4 4
cpi/sgt 8 2.9 2.9 3.3
It 98 35.5 35.6 38.9
capt 101 36.6 36.7 75.6
maj/dc/ac/ltc 54 19.6 19.6 95.3
chief/comm/supt/dir 13 4.7 4.7 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0
Missing 9 1 .4
Total 1 .4







Valid po/dep/tpr 27 9.8 9.8 9.8
cpi/sgt 103 37.3 37.5 47.3
It 101 36.6 36.7 84.0
capt 35 12.7 12.7 96.7
capt-*- 9 3.3 3.3 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0
Missing 9 1 .4
Total 1 4
Total 276 100.0






Valid po/dep/tpr 4 1.4 1.5 1.5
cpi/sgt 71 25.7 26.1 27.6
It 149 54.0 54.8 82.4
capt 40 14.5 14.7 97.1
maj/dc/ac/ltc 7 2.5 2.6 99.6
chief/comm/supt/dir 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 272 98.6 100.0
Missing 9 4 1.4
Total 4 1.4
276 100.0








armored 182 65.9 66.2 66.2
vehicle
has
armored 93 33.7 33.8 100.0
vehide
Total 275 99.6 100.0



































Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid investor
other 177 64.1 64.4 64.4
patrol or 
swat 98 35.5 35.6 100.0







Total 276 100 0





Valid Missing Mean Oeviaton Range
REARMEDV 275 1 .34 .47 1
REAVEREC 273 3 45 .50 1
RECURASG 275 1 .64 .48 1
REFULLTI 268 8 90 .31 1
REMOVE2 150 126 .19 40 1
RENEGPAY 276 0 7.25E-03 8.50E-02 t
RENOTTRA 272 4 84 37 1
RENVtCRM 276 0 .22 42 1
Repeat
offender 276
0 1.44 .50 1
REPOUC1 169 107 15 .36 1







Valid C 182 65.9 66.2 66.2
1 93 33.7 33.8 100.0
Total 275 99.6 100.0









Valid records 150 54.3 54.9 54.9
does not 123 44.6 45.1 1000record
Total 273 98.9 100.0












aiid patrol or 98 35.5 35.6 35.6swat
investigate 177 64.1 64.4 100.0or other
Total 275 99.6 100.0









Valid full time 28 10.1 10.4 10.4
part time 240 87.0 89.6 100.0
Total 268 97.1 100.0










Valid 0 121 43.8 80.7 80.7
1 29 10.5 19.3 100.0
Total 150 54.3 100.0









Valid 0 274 99.3 99.3 99.3
1 2 .7 .7 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 1000
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
195
REPOUC2





aiid 0 130 47.1 82.8 82.8
1 27 9.8 17.2 100.0
Total 157 56.9 100.0
Missing 9 119 43.1
Total 119 43.1
Total 276 100.0








Valid not 44 15.9 16.2 16.2negotiate
can 228 82.6 83.8 100.0negotiate
Total 272 98.6 100.0









Valid 0 214 77.5 77.5 77.5
1 62 22.5 22.5 100.0








Valid 1 154 55.8 55.8 55.8
2 122 44.2 44.2 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0







Valid 0 144 52.2 85.2 85.2
1 25 9.1 14.8 100.0
Total 169 61.2 100.0
Missing 9 107 38.8
Total 107 38.8
Total 276 100.0




Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
REPOL1C8 113 163 .88 .32 1






20 6.25E-02 .24 1
RHOMELES 276 0 30 .46 1
RINVSFOR 276 0 .57 .50 1
RMOVE 151 125 .87 .33 1
RNEGPAY 276 0 6.16E-02 .24 1
untrained
negotiator 272
4 .16 37 1
forbids
whostages 169 107 .85
.36 1
forbids








Valid 0 13 4.7 11.5 11.5
1 100 36.2 88.5 100.0
Total 113 40.9 100.0









Valid yes 115 41.7 43.4 434
no 150 54.3 56.6 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0
Missing 9 8 2.9











' Valid 0 93 33.7 33.7 33.7
1 172 62.3 62 3 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0









































Valid 0 193 69.9 69.9 69.9
1 83 30.1 30.1 100.0








Valid 0 119 43.1 43.1 43.1
1 157 56.9 56.9 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0







Valid no 19 6.9 12.6 12.6movement
movement 132 47.8 87.4 100.0
Total 151 54.7 100.0









Valid no extra 
pay 259 93.8 93.8 93.8
hazardous 17 6.2 6.2 100.0pay








Valid may 228 82.6 83.8 83.8negotiate
not 44 15.9 16.2 100.0permitted
Total 272 98.6 100.0









Valid movement 25 9.1 14.8 14.8
no 144 52.2 85.2 100.0movement
Total 169 61.2 100.0
Missing 9 107 38.8
Total 107 38.8
Total 276 100.0







</alid movement 27 9.8 17.2 17.2
no 130 47.1 82.8 100.0movement
Total 157 56.9 100.0
Missing 9 119 43.1
Total 119 43.1
Total 276 100.0





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
RPOUCY8 113 163 .12 .32 1
RPVTSCTY 276 0 .33 .47 1
RREPEAT 276 0 .44 .50 1







256 20 14.44 2.43 12
selection
policy
267 9 1.43 50 1
Soft















Valid no time 
limit 100 36.2 88.5
88.5
has time 13 4.7 11.5 100.0limit
Total 113 40.9 100.0









Valid 0 186 67.4 67.4 67.4
1 90 32.6 32.6 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0







ilid 0 154 55.8 55.8 55.8
1 122 44.2 44.2 100.0








Valid not written 150 54.3 56.6 56.6
written 115 41.7 43.4 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0
Missing 9 8 2.9










Valid 1 248 89.9 89.9 89.9
2 28 10.1 10.1 100.0
I  Total 276 100.0 100.0
1 Total 276 100.0








Valid 6 1 4 4 4
7 2 7 8 12
8 3 1.1 1.2 2.3
9 3 1.1 1.2 3.5
10 7 2.5 2.7 6.3
11 11 4.0 4.3 10.5
12 21 7.6 8.2 18.8
13 32 11.6 12.5 31.3
14 49 17.8 19.1 50.4
15 37 13.4 14.5 64.8
16 34 12.3 13.3 78.1
17 27 9.8 10.5 8 87
18 29 10.5 11.3 100.0
Total 256 92.8 100.0









Valid no 151 54.7 56.6 56.6
yes 116 42.0 43.4 100.0
Total 267 96.7 100.0









Valid 1 255 92.4 924 92.4
2 21 7 6 7.6 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0







~»v/alid posting / 85 30.8 32.1 32.1notice
volunteered 87 31 5 32.8 64.9
encouraged 79 28.6 29.8 94.7
not a 14 5.1 5.3 100.0negotiator
Total 265 96.0 100.0









Valid no. not 
offered 20 12 7.3 7.3
yes.
























Valid 1 230 83.3 83.3 83.3
2 46 16.7 16.7 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0









SWATORI 87 189 1.52 .73 4
Tactical hours 
1995 198
78 2.4422 3.0416 12.00
Tactical hours 
1996 211
65 2.6964 4.0808 36.00
Tactical hours 
1997 235
41 3.4529 7.2569 96.00
Team leader 
interview 276




Active listening 200 76 6.0441 11.3946 150.00
Communication
skills











Valid 0 73 26.4 27.5 27.5
1 192 69.6 72.5 100.0
Total 265 96.0 100.0









Valid 0 4 1.4 4.6 4.6
1 41 14.9 47.1 51.7
2 36 13.0 41.4 93.1
3 5 1.8 5.7 98.9
4 1 .4 1.1 100.0
Total 87 31.5 100.0
Missing 9 189 68.5
Total 189 68.5
276 100.0
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Tactical hours 1995
L Freauency Percent ValidPercent CumulativePercent
alid .00 100 36.2 50.5 50.5
1.00 3 1.1 1.5 52.0
1.50 2 .7 1.0 53.0
1.75 1 .4 .5 53.5
2.00 9 3.3 4.5 58.1
2.50 2 .7 1.0 59.1
2.75 1 .4 .5 59.6
3.00 12 4.3 6.1 65.7
3.25 2 .7 1.0 66.7
3.50 2 .7 1.0 67.7
4.00 15 5.4 7.6 75.3
4.50 2 .7 1.0 76.3
5.00 9 3.3 4.5 80.8
5.25 1 .4 .5 81 3
5.30 1 .4 .5 81.8
5.50 1 .4 .5 82.3
6.00 9 3.3 4.5 86.9
6.50 2 .7 1.0 87.9
7.00 6 2.2 3.0 90.9
8.00 11 4.0 5.6 96.5
8.50 1 .4 .5 97.0
9.00 1 .4 .5 975
10.00 2 .7 1.0 98.5
12.00 3 1.1 1.5 100.0
Total 198 71.7 100.0
N»ssing 99.00 78 28.3
Total 78 28.3
Total 276 100.0








Valid .00 104 37.7 49.3 49.3
.75 1 4 .5 49.8
1.00 3 1.1 1.4 51.2
1.50 4 1.4 1.9 53.1
2.00 12 4.3 5.7 58.8
2.50 5 1.8 2.4 61.1
2.75 1 4 .5 61.6
3.00 9 3.3 4.3 65.9
3.25 1 .4 .5 66.4
3.50 1 .4 .5 66.8
4.00 20 7.2 9.5 76.3
4.30 1 .4 .5 76.8
4.40 1 .4 .5 77.3
4.50 2 .7 .9 78.2
5.00 10 3.6 4.7 82.9
6.00 7 2.5 3.3 86.3
6.50 2 .7 .9 87.2
7.00 3 1.1 1.4 88.6
6.00 10 3.6 4.7 93.4
9.00 3 1.1 1.4 94.8
10.00 5 1.8 2.4 97.2
11.00 1 .5 97.6
12.00 1 .5 98.1
12.50 1 .5 98.6
14.00 1 .5 99.1
20.00 1 .5 99.5
36.00 1 .5 100.0
Total 211 76.4 100.0
Missing 99.00 65 23.6
Total 65 23.6
Total 276 100.0








Valid .00 95 34.4 40.4 40.4
100 7 2.5 3.0 43.4
1.50 3 1.1 1.3 44.7
2.00 18 6.5 7.7 52.3
2.50 3 1.1 1.3 53.6
2.75 1 .4 .4 54.0
3.00 18 6.5 7.7 61.7
3.17 1 .4 .4 62.1
3.50 3 1.1 1.3 63.4
4.00 26 9.4 11.1 74.5
4.50 2 .7 .9 75.3
5.00 12 4.3 5.1 80.4
5.50 1 .4 4 80.9
6.00 13 4.7 5.5 86.4
6.50 3 1.1 1.3 87.7
7.00 2 .7 .9 88.5
7.50 1 .4 .4 88.9
8.00 5 1.8 2.1 91.1
9.00 6 22 2.6 93.6
10.00 6 2.2 2.6 96.2
12.00 1 .4 .4 96.6
12.50 1 .4 4 97.0
13.00 1 .4 4 97.4
14.00 1 .4 .4 97.9
16.00 1 .4 4 98.3
20.00 1 .4 .4 98.7
22.00 1 .4 .4 99.1
29.00 1 .4 .4 99.6
96.00 1 4 .4 100.0
Total 235 85.1 100.0









Valid 0 183 66.3 66.3 66.3
1 82 29.7 29.7 96.0
8 11 4.0 4.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0 100.0
Total 276 100.0
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Trained negotiator
r Frequency Percent ValidPercent CumulativePercent
/alid no 22 8.0 8.0 8.0
yes 254 92.0 92.0 100.0








Valid .00 3 1.1 1.5 1.5
.33 1 .4 .5 2.0
.50 2 .7 1.0 3.0
1.00 16 5.8 8.0 11.0
1.50 3 1.1 1.5 12.5
2.00 33 12.0 16.5 29.0
2.50 1 .4 .5 29.5
3.00 13 4.7 6.5 36.0
4.00 52 18.8 26.0 62.0
5.00 11 4.0 5.5 67.5
6.00 7 2.5 3.5 71.0
6.50 1 .4 .5 71.5
7.00 1 .4 .5 72.0
8.00 28 10.1 14.0 86.0
9.00 1 .4 .5 86.5
10.00 11 4.0 5.5 92.0
12.00 2 .7 1.0 93.0
15.00 2 .7 1.0 94.0
16.00 9 3.3 4.5 98.5
20.00 1 4 .5 99.0
50.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
150.00 1 4 .5 100.0
Total 200 72.5 100.0
Missing 99.00 76 2 7 5
Total 76 27.5
Total 276 100.0
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Communication skills
L Frequency Percent ValidPercent CumulativePercent
alid .00 1 .4 .5 .5
.17 1 .4 .5 1.0
.50 1 .4 .5 1.5
1.00 6 2.2 3.0 4.5
1.50 1 .4 .5 5.0
2.00 20 7 2 10.1 151
2.50 4 1.4 2.0 17.1
3.00 7 2.5 3.5 20.6
4.00 52 18.8 26.1 46.7
5.00 13 4.7 6.5 53.3
6.00 18 6.5 9.0 62.3
6.50 1 .4 .5 62.8
7.00 1 .4 .5 63.3
8.00 43 15.6 21.6 84.9
9.00 3 1.1 1.5 86.4
10.00 11 4.0 5.5 92.0
11.00 1 .4 .5 92.5
12.00 3 1.1 1.5 94.0
16.00 6 2.2 3.0 97.0
20.00 5 1.8 2.5 99.5
50.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 199 72.1 100.0
. Missing 99.00 77 27.9
Total 77 27.9
276 100.0








Valid .00 2 .7 1.0 1.0
.17 1 .4 .5 1.5
.50 1 .4 .5 2.0
1.00 6 22 3.0 5.0
2.00 28 10.1 14.0 19.0
2.50 2 .7 1.0 20.0
3.00 9 3.3 4.5 24.5
4.00 55 19.9 27.5 52.0
5.00 13 4.7 6.5 58.5
6.00 8 2.9 4.0 62.5
6.50 1 .4 .5 63.0
7.00 1 .4 .5 63.5
8.00 43 15.6 21.5 85.0
10.00 9 3.3 4.5 89.5
12.00 6 22 3.0 92.5
16.00 5 1.8 2.5 95.0
20.00 3 1.1 1.5 96.5
21.00 1 .A .5 97.0
25.00 2 .7 1.0 98.0
30.00 1 .5 98.5
40.00 2 .7 1.0 99.5
53.00 1 .5 100.0
Total 200 72.5 100.0
Missing 99.00 76 27.5
I Total 76 27.5
276 100.0








Valid 00 26 9.4 13.2 13.2
.17 1 .4 .5 13.7
.50 1 .4 .5 14.2
1.00 31 11.2 15.7 29.9
2.00 53 19.2 26.9 56.9
2.50 3 1.1 1.5 58.4
3.00 10 3.6 5.1 63.5
4.00 45 16.3 22.8 86.3
5.00 8 2.9 4.1 90.4
6.00 3 1.1 1.5 91.9
6.50 1 .4 .5 92.4
8.00 11 4.0 5.6 98.0
9.00 1 .5 96.5
10.00 1 .5 99.0
20.00 1 ,4 .5 99.5
30.00 1 .5 100.0
Total 197 71.4 100.0
Missing 99.00 79 28.6
Total 79 28.6
276 100.0





Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
Emotionally
aroused 196 80 3.7075 2.5925 16.00
Mental




















































Valid .00 8 2.9 4.1 4.1
.17 1 .4 .5 4.6
.50 2 .7 1.0 5.6
1.00 19 6.9 9.7 15.3
1.50 2 .7 1.0 16.3
2.00 47 17.0 24.0 40.3
2.50 2 .7 1.0 41.3
3.00 12 4.3 6.1 47.4
4.00 60 21.7 30.6 78.1
5.00 9 3.3 4.6 82.7
6.00 5 1.8 2.6 85.2
6.50 1 .4 .5 85.7
7.00 1 .4 .5 86.2
8.00 19 6.9 9.7 95.9
10.00 6 2.2 3.1 99.0
12.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
16.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 196 71.0 100.0
Missing 99.00 80 29.0
Total 80 29.0
Total 276 100.0








' Valid .00 7 2.5 3.5 3.5
.17 1 .4 .5 4.0
.50 2 .7 1.0 5.1
1.00 21 7.6 10.6 15.7
1.50 2 .7 1.0 16.7
2.00 57 20.7 28.8 45.5
2.50 2 .7 1.0 46.5
3.00 9 3.3 4.5 51.0
3.50 1 .4 .5 51.5
4.00 54 19.6 27.3 78.8
5.00 8 2.9 4.0 82.8
6.00 6 2 2 3.0 85.9
6.50 1 4 .5 86.4
8.00 17 6.2 8.6 94.9
10.00 3 1.1 1.5 96.5
12.00 2 .7 1.0 97.5
16.00 3 1.1 1.5 99.0
20.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
24.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 198 71.7 100.0









Valid .00 21 7.6 10.7 10.7
.50 7 2.5 3.6 14.3
1.00 40 14.5 20.4 34.7
1.50 1 .4 .5 35.2
2.00 65 23.6 33.2 68.4
2.50 3 1.1 1.5 69.9
3.00 9 3.3 4.6 74.5
4.00 37 13.4 18.9 93.4
5.00 3 1.1 1.5 94.9
6.50 1 .4 .5 95.4
7.00 1 .4 .5 95.9
8.00 3 1.1 1.5 97.4
9.00 1 4 .5 98.0
10.00 3 1.1 1.5 99.5
20.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 196 71.0 100.0
Missing 99.00 80 29.0
Total 80 29.0
276 100.0








Valid .00 2 .7 1.0 1.0
.33 1 .4 .5 1.5
.50 3 1.1 1.5 3.1
1.00 17 6.2 8.8 11.9
1.50 1 .4 .5 12.4
2.00 46 16.7 23.7 36.1
2.50 2 .7 1.0 37.1
3.00 8 2.9 4.1 41.2
4.00 65 23.6 33.5 74.7
5.00 9 3.3 4.6 79.4
6.00 6 2.2 3.1 82.5
6.50 1 .4 .5 83.0
7.00 1 .4 .5 83.5
8.00 17 6 2 8.8 92.3
9.00 2 .7 1.0 93.3
10.00 4 1.4 2.1 95.4
12.00 1 4 .5 95.9
15.00 1 .4 .5 96.4
16.00 3 1.1 1.5 97.9
24.00 1 4 .5 98.5
40.00 3 1.1 1.5 100.0
Total 194 70.3 100.0
Missing 99.00 82 29.7
Total 82 29.7
276 100.0








Valid .00 29 10.5 14.4 14.4
.17 1 .4 .5 14.9
.50 8 2.9 4.0 18.8
1.00 42 15.2 20.8 39.6
1.50 1 .4 .5 40.1
2.00 67 24.3 33.2 73.3
2.50 3 1.1 1.5 74.8
3.00 11 4.0 5.4 80.2
4.00 24 8.7 11.9 92.1
5.00 3 1.1 1.5 93.6
6.50 1 .4 .5 94.1
7.00 1 .4 .5 94.6
8.00 7 2.5 3.5 98.0
10.00 1 .4 .5 98.5
12.00 2 .7 1.0 99.5
15.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 202 73.2 100.0









Valid .00 31 11.2 16.2 16.2
.17 1 .4 .5 16.8
50 4 1.4 2.1 18.8
1.00 55 19.9 28.8 47.6
2.00 47 17.0 24.6 72.3
2.50 2 .7 1.0 73.3
3.00 7 2.5 3.7 77.0
4.00 25 9.1 13.1 90.1
5.00 5 1.8 2.6 92.7
6.00 3 1.1 1.6 94.2
6.50 1 .4 .5 94.8
8.00 6 2.2 3 1 97.9
10.00 1 A .5 98.4
12.00 1 .4 .5 99.0
20.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
40.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 191 69.2 100.0
Missing 99.00 85 30.8
Total 85 30.8
Total 276 100.0







Valid .00 209 75.7 91.7 91.7
.50 1 .4 92.1
1.00 6 2.2 2.6 94.7
2.00 2 .7 .9 95.6
2.50 1 A .4 96.1
3.00 2 . ( .9 96.9
4.00 1 A .4 97.4
6.00 1 .4 97.8
8.00 2 . I .9 98.7
16.00 2 . ( .9 99.6
24.00 1 A .4 100.0
Total 228 82.6 100.0









VaM .00 210 76.1 91.7 91.7
.50 2 .7 .9 92.6
1.00 5 1.8 22 94.8
2.00 3 1.1 1.3 96.1
4.00 6 2-2 2.6 98.7
8.00 3 1.1 1.3 100.0
Total 229 83.0 100.0









Valid .00 211 76.4 95.0 95.0
.50 1 .4 .5 95.5
1.00 7 2.5 3.2 98.6
2.00 3 1.1 1.4 100.0
Total 222 80.4 100.0
Missing 99.00 54 19.6
Total 54 19.6
276 100.0









,’alid .00 27 9.8 14.0 14.0
.50 10 3.6 5.2 19.2
1.00 79 28.6 40.9 60.1
1.50 3 1.1 1.6 61.7
2.00 43 15.6 22.3 83.9
2.50 1 .4 .5 84.5
3.00 3 1.1 1.6 86.0
4.00 15 5.4 7.8 93.8
6.00 1 .4 .5 94.3
7.00 1 4 .5 94.8
8.00 6 2.2 3.1 97.9
9.00 2 7 1.0 99.0
10.00 2 .7 1.0 100.0
Total 193 69.9 100.0









Valid .00 93 33.7 46.0 46.0
.50 12 4.3 5.9 52.0
1.00 59 21.4 29.2 81.2
2.00 27 9.8 13.4 94.6
2.50 1 .4 .5 95.0
3.00 2 .7 1.0 96.0
4.00 6 2.2 3.0 99.0
5.00 1 4 .5 99.5
10.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 202 73.2 100.0
Missing 99.00 74 26.8
Total 74 26.8
Total 276 100.0








SWAT 188 88 2.4282 2.6120
Legal 189 87 1.7566 1.6732
Agency liason 183 93 .8862 1.6279
Physical fitness 215 61 .2116 .6138
Sign language 222 54 .1374 .7057
Self-defense 218 58 .2064 .9301
Other topics 89 187 3.8090 8.4240
hostage 
incidents 1997 243 33 1.39 2.99
suidde/jumper
1997 243 33 3.44 4.20
kidnaping 1997 210 66 .12 .40



















Valid .00 25 9.1 13.3 13.3
.50 12 4.3 6.4 19.7
1.00 47 17.0 25.0 44.7
1.50 1 .4 .5 45.2
2.00 50 18.1 26.6 71.8
3.00 9 3.3 4.8 76.6
4.00 21 7.6 11.2 87.8
5.00 3 1.1 1.6 89.4
6.00 2 .7 1.1 90.4
8.00 12 4.3 6.4 96.8
10.00 4 1.4 2.1 98.9
12.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
16.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 188 68.1 100.0
Missing 99.00 88 31.9
Total 88 31.9
Total 276 1000








Valid .00 31 11.2 16.4 16.4
50 8 2.9 4.2 20.6
1.00 60 21.7 31.7 52.4
2.00 55 19.9 29.1 81.5
2.50 2 .7 1.1 82.5
3.00 5 1.8 2.6 852
4.00 20 7.2 10.6 95.8
5.00 2 .7 1.1 96.8
6.00 2 .7 1.1 97.9
8.00 2 .7 1.1 98.9
10.00 2 .7 1.1 100.0
Total 189 68.5 100.0
Missing 99.00 87 31.5
Total 87 31.5







Valid .00 95 34.4 51.9 51.9
.17 1 .4 .5 52.5
.50 7 2.5 3.8 5b.3
1.00 47 17.0 25.7 82.0
2.00 19 6.9 10.4 92.3
2.50 1 .4 .5 92.9
3.00 3 1.1 1.6 94.5
4.00 6 2.2 3.3 97.8
8.00 2 .7 1.1 98.9
10.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
12.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 183 66.3 100.0
Missing 99.00 93 33.7
Total 93 33.7
Total 276 100.0








Valid 00 1841 66.7 85.6 856
.50 4 1.4 1.9 87.4
1.00 15 5.4 7.0 94.4
2.00 9 3.3 4.2 98.6
2.50 1 .4 .5 99.1
4.00 2 .7 .9 100.0
Total 215 77.9 100.0









Valid .00 208 75.4 93.7 93.7
.50 1 .4 .5 94.1
1.00 5 1.8 2.3 96.4
2.00 5 1.8 2.3 98.6
3.00 1 .4 .5 99.1
4.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
8.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 222 80.4 100.0
Missing 99.00 54 19.6
I Total 54 19.6







Valid .00 203 73.6 93.1 93.1
1.00 5 1.8 2.3 95.4
2.00 3 1.1 1.4 96.8
4.00 5 1.8 2.3 99.1
6.00 1 .4 .5 99.5
8.00 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 218 790 100.0
Missing 99.00 58 21.0
Total 58 21 0
Total 276 100.0








-Valid .00 57 20.7 64.0 64.0
1.00 3 1.1 3.4 6 7 4
1.50 2 .7 2Z 69.7
ZOO 8 2.9 9.0 78.7
3.00 1 .4 1.1 79.8
3.50 1 .4 1.1 80.9
5.00 2 .7 2.2 83.1
8.00 2 .7 2.2 85.4
14.00 3 1.1 3.4 88.8
15.00 2 .7 2Z 91.0
16.00 1 .4 92.1
17.50 1 A 93.3
18.00 1 94.4
24.00 1 95.5
26.00 1 1.1 96.6
35.00 1 1 .1 97.8
36.00 1 98.9
40.00 1 1 .1 100.0
Total 89 32.2 100.0









Valid 0 113 40.9 46.5 46.5
1 56 20.3 23.0 69.5
2 34 1Z3 14.0 83.5
3 17 6.2 7.0 90.5
4 8 2.9 3.3 93.8
5 6 Z2 2.5 96.3
6 2 7 8 97 1
7 3 1.1 1.2 98.4
8 1 .4 .4 98.8
10 2 .7 .8 99.6
39 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 243 88.0 100.0












Valid 0 46 16.7 18.9 18.9
1 45 16.3 18.5 37.4
2 47 17.0 19.3 56.8
3 24 8.7 9.9 66.7
4 24 8.7 9.9 76.5
5 15 5-t 6.2 82.7
6 8 * . 3.3 86.0
7 6 - 2.5 88.5
8 5 1.8 2.1 90.5
9 1 .4 .4 90.9
10 8 2.9 3.3 94.2
12 2 .7 .8 95.1
14 3 1.1 1.2 96.3
15 3 1.1 12 97.5
18 1 .4 .4 97.9
20 4 1.4 1.6 99.6
26 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 243 88.0 100.0










Valid 0 188 68.1 89.5 89.5
1 19 6.9 9.0 98.6
2 2 .7 1.0 99.5
3 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 210 76.1 100.0












Valid 0 185 67.0 97.4 9 7 4
1 2 .7 1.1 98.4
3 3 1.1 1.6 100.0
Total 190 68.8 100.0



















incidents 78 198 1.53 4.82 28
1997
Age of unit 254 22 1983.09 6.62 26




WRITSCAL 276 0 1.86 1.24 5
Written
policy 273




Years sworn 272 4 20.45 5.10 30








Vaiid 0 49 17.8 19.7 19.7
1 54 19.6 21.7 41.4
2 49 17.8 19.7 61.0
3 28 10.1 11.2 72.3
4 20 7.2 8.0 80.3
5 13 4.7 52 85.5
6 7 2.5 2.8 88.4
7 7 2.5 2.8 91.2
8 4 1.4 1.6 92.8
9 3 1.1 1.2 94.0
10 3 1.1 1.2 95.2
11 1 .4 95.6
12 1 .4 96.0
14 1 .4 96.4
15 4 1.4 1.6 98.0
16 1 .4 98.4
20 2 .8 99.2
23 1 .4 99.6
52 1 .4 100.0
Total 249 90.2 100.0











alid 0 89 32.2 47.1 47 1
1 17 6.2 9.0 56.1
2 17 6.2 9.0 65.1
3 11 4.0 5.8 70.9
4 6 2.2 3.2 74.1
5 7 2.5 3.7 77.8
6 8 2.9 4.2 82.0
8 3 1.1 1.6 83.6
9 3 1.1 1.6 85.2
10 5 1.8 2.6 87.8
12 2 .7 1.1 88.9
13 2 .7 1.1 89.9
14 1 .5 90.5
15 1 .4 .5 91.0
20 .7 1.1 92.1
21 1 .4 .5 92.6
25 1 .4 .5 93.1
30 .7 1.1 94.2
35 1 .4 .5 94.7
40 1.1 1.6 96.3
44 1 .5 96.8
46 1 .4 .5 974
50 1 .5 97.9
63 1 .4 .5 98.4
100 1 .A .5 98.9
145 1 .4 .5 99.5
164 1 .5 100.0
Total 189 68.5 100.0












valid 0 92 33.3 40.4 40.4
1 43 15.6 18.9 59.2
2 38 13.8 16.7 75.9
3 13 4.7 5.7 81.6
4 11 4.0 4.8 86.4
5 8 2.9 3.5 89.9
6 3 1.1 1.3 91.2
7 2 .7 .9 92.1
8 2 .7 .9 93.0
10 6 2.2 2.6 95.6
11 1 4 .4 96.1
12 1 .4 .4 96.5
15 2 .7 .9 97.4
20 3 1.1 1.3 98.7
25 1 .4 .4 99.1
26 1 .4 .4 99.6
50 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 228 82.6 100.0










Valid 0 58 21.0 74.4 74.4
1 5 1.8 6.4 80.8
2 4 1.4 5.1 85.9
3 4 1.4 5.1 91.0
5 3 1.1 3.8 94.9
6 1 .4 1.3 96.2
21 1 .4 1.3 97.4
24 1 .4 1.3 98.7
28 1 .4 1.3 100.0
Total 78 28.3 100.0













valid 1971 1 .4 .4 4
1972 1 .4 .4 8
1973 6 2.2 2.4 3.1
1974 14 5.1 5.5 8.7
1975 15 5.4 5.9 14.6
1976 14 5.1 5.5 20.1
1977 4 1.4 1.6 21.7
1978 22 8.0 8.7 30.3
1979 8 2.9 3.1 33.5
1980 29 10.5 11.4 44.9
1981 7 2.5 2.8 47.6
1982 8 2.9 3.1 50.8
1983 8 2.9 3.1 53.9
1984 10 3.6 3.9 57.9
1985 18 6.5 7.1 65.0
1986 14 5.1 5.5 70.5
1987 7 2.5 2.8 73.2
1988 10 3.6 3.9 77.2
1989 6 2.2 2.4 79.5
1990 9 3.3 3.5 83.1
1991 5 1.8 2.0 85.0
1992 8 2.9 3.1 88.2
1993 8 2.9 3.1 91.3
1994 9 3.3 3.5 94.9
1995 4 1.4 1.6 96.5
1996 4 1.4 1.6 98.0
1997 5 1.8 2.0 100.0
Total 254 92.0 100.0









Valid no 67 24.3 26.6 26.6
yes. 148 53.6 58.7 85.3hidden
yes. 37 13.4 14.7 100.0visible
Total 252 91.3 100.0













Valid 0 144 52.2 52.2 52.2
1 132 47.8 47.8 100.0








Valid 0 39 14.1 14.1 14.1
1 79 28.6 28.6 42.8
2 72 26.1 26.1 68.8
3 56 20.3 20.3 89.1
4 27 9.8 9.8 98.9
5 3 1.1 1.1 100.0








Valid no 51 18.5 18.7 18.7
_ • yes 222 80.4 81.3 100.0
Total 273 98.9 100.0
Missing 9 3 1.1
Total 3 1.1
Total 276 100.0








Valid 0 3 1.1 1.3 1.3
1 8 2.9 3 4 4.6
2 17 6.2 7.1 11.8
3 12 4.3 5.0 16.8
4 18 6.5 7.6 24.4
5 20 72 8.4 32.8
6 9 3.3 3.8 36.6
7 15 5.4 6.3 42.9
9 13 4.7 5.5 48.3
10 25 9.1 10.5 58.8
11 11 4.0 4.6 63.4
12 14 5.1 5.9 69.3
13 8 2.9 3.4 72.7
14 11 4.0 4.6 77.3
15 16 6.5 7.6 84.9
16 6 2.2 2.5 87.4
17 7 2.5 2.9 90.3
18 6 2.2 2.5 92.9
19 2 . / .8 93.7
20 4 1.4 1.7 95.4
21 2 .8 96.2
22 1 .4 96.6
23 2 .8 97.5
24 1 .4 97.9
25 1 .4 98.3
88 1 .4 98.7
98 3 1.1 1.3 100.0
Total 238 86.2 100.0












Valid 7 1 4 4 4
9 3 1.1 1.1 1.5
10 3 1.1 1.1 2.6
11 1 .4 .4 2.9
12 3 1.1 1.1 4.0
13 12 4.3 4.4 8.5
14 8 2.9 2.9 11.4
15 15 5.4 5.5 16.9
16 14 5.1 5.1 22.1
17 15 5.4 5.5 27.6
18 23 8.3 8.5 36.0
19 14 5.1 5.1 41.2
20 40 14.5 14.7 55.9
21 16 5.8 5.9 61.8
22 15 5.4 5.5 67.3
23 12 4.3 4.4 71.7
24 17 6.2 6.3 77.9
25 19 6.9 7.0 84.9
26 8 2.9 2.9 87.9
27 12 4.3 4.4 92.3
28 5 1.8 1.8 94.1
29 5 1.8 1.8 96.0
30 3 1.1 1.1 97.1
31 1 .4 4 97.4
32 3 1.1 1.1 98.5
33 1 .4 .4 98.9
34 1 .4 .4 99.3
36 1 .4 .4 99.6
37 1 .4 .4 100.0
Total 272 98.6 100.0








Valid Missing Mean Deviation Range
1995
Incidents 218 58 6.62 11.19
100
1996
incidents 222 54 7.11 11.81
105
1997








Valid 0 49 17.8 22.5 22.5
1 18 6.5 8.3 30.7
2 25 9.1 11.5 42.2
3 23 8.3 10.6 52.8
4 17 6.2 7.8 60.6
5 10 3.6 4.6 65.1
6 13 4.7 6.0 71.1
7 6 2.2 2.8 73.9
8 4 1.4 1.8 75.7
9 6 2.2 2.8 78.4
10 7 2.5 3.2 81.7
11 3 1.1 1.4 83.0
12 6 Z2 2.8 85.8
14 4 1.4 1.8 87.6
15 2 .7 .9 88.5
16 2 .7 .9 89.4
17 2 .7 .9 90.4
18 3 1.1 1.4 91.7
20 4 1.4 1.8 93.6
22 1 .4 .5 94.0
24 2 7 .9 95.0
25 5 1.8 2.3 97.2
27 1 .4 .5 97.7
30 1 .4 .5 98.2
35 1 .4 .5 98.6
45 1 .4 .5 99.1
89 1 .4 .5 99.5
100 1 .4 .5 100.0
Total 218 79.0 100.0












Valid 0 39 14.1 176 17.6
1 14 5.1 6.3 23.9
2 28 10.1 12.6 36.5
3 26 9.4 11.7 48.2
4 15 5.4 6.8 55.0
5 14 5.1 6.3 61.3
6 15 5.4 6.8 68.0
7 8 2.9 3.6 71.6
8 8 2.9 3.6 75.2
9 7 2.5 3.2 78.4
10 11 4.0 5.0 83.3
11 4 1.4 1.8 85.1
12 3 1.1 1.4 86.5
13 4 1.4 1.8 88.3
14 1 .4 .5 88.7
15 3 1.1 1.4 90.1
16 1 .5 90.5
18 2 .9 91.4
'20 2 .7 .9 92.3
21 1 4 .5 92.8
22 2 .9 93.7
23 1 .5 94.1
25 3 1.1 1.4 95.5
29 1 ,4 .5 95.9
30 2 .9 96.8
31 1 .5 97.3
33 1 .5 97.7
35 1 .4 .5 98.2
38 1 .4 .5 98.6
40 1 .5 99.1
100 1 .5 99.5
105 1 ,4 .5 100.0
Total 222 80.4 100.0












Valid 0 23 8.3 9 8 9.8
1 30 10.9 12.8 22.6
2 28 10.1 12.0 34.6
3 21 7.6 9.0 43.6
4 21 7.6 9.0 52.6
5 19 6.9 8.1 60.7
6 11 4.0 4.7 65.4
7 9 3.3 3.8 69.2
8 9 3.3 3.8 73.1
9 6 2.2 2.6 75.6
10 13 4.7 5.6 81.2
11 6 2.2 2.6 83.8
12 5 1.8 2.1 85.9
13 1 .4 .4 86.3
14 3 1.1 1.3 87.6
15 6 2.2 2.6 90.2
16 1 ,4 90.6
17 1 .4 ,4 91.0
19 1.1 1.3 92.3
20 1 .4 92.7
22 1.4 1.7 94.4
23 1 .4 .4 94.9
24 1 .4 95.3




34 1 .4 97.9
35 i 98.3
43 1 .4 98.7
45 1 .4 99.1
80 1 .4 99.6
100 1 .4 100.0
Total 234 84.8 100.0
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STUDYNO = 6708; 237
DATE-ADDED = Sep. 30, 1996;
DATE-UPDATED = Sep. 30, 1996;
INVESTIGATOR = United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics.;
TITLE = LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS 
(LEMAS), 1993;
SUMMARY = This survey, the third in the Bureau of Justice Statistics' program on Law Enforcement 
and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), presents information on five types o f general-purpose law 
enforcement agencies; state police, county police, special police (state and local), municipal police, and 
sheriffs departments. Variables include size of the population served by the police or sheriffs department, 
levels of employment and spending, various functions of the department, average salary levels for 
uniformed officers, policies and programs, and other matters related to management and personnel.;
EXt e NT.COI .T .F.CT = l data file + machine-readable documentation (text) + SAS data definition 
statements + SPSS data definition statements + data collection instruments (PDF);
EXTENT.PROCESS = CDBK.ICPSR/ CONCHK.ICPSR/ DDEF.ICPSR/ MDATA.ICPSR/ 
FREQ.ICPSR/ UNDOCCHK.ICPSR/ RECODE/ SCAN;
DATA.TYPE = survey data;
TIME.PERIOD = 1993;
DATE OF COT.T.FCT = June 1992-June 1993;
DATA.SOURCE = self-enumerated questionnaires;
PATA.FORMAT = LRECL with SAS and SPSS data definition statements;
COT .T .F.CT NQTF = The data collection instruments are provided as Portable Document Format (PDF) 
files. The PDF file format was developed by Adobe Systems Incorporated and can be accessed using the 
Adobe Acrobat reader. Information on how to obtain a copy of the Acrobat Reader is provided through 
the ICPSR Website on the Internet. Additional documentation available for this collection includes 
Attachments L (Crosstabulation charts by agency: Weighting and Imputation Cell Collapsing SR: 1993 
LEMAS Response Hie), M (Crosstabulation chart by agency; Weighting and Imputation Cell Collapsing 
NSR: 1993 LEMAS Response Hie), X (Crosstabulation charts by agency: Variance Estimation Cell 
Collapsing SR* 1993 LEMAS Response Hie), and Y (Crosstabulation chart by agency; Variance 
Estimation Cell Collapsing NSR: 1993 LEMAS Response Hie). These charts are available only in 
hardcopy form upon request from ICPSR. SAMPLING = A nationally representative sample of the nearly 
17,000 publicly funded state and local law enforcement agencies with 100 or more sworn officers. The 
survey also included a nationally representative sample of agencies that employed fewer than 100 officers. 
A stratified random sampling method was used in selecting the smaller agencies.;
UNIVERSE = All state, county, municipal, special, and sheriffs law enforcement agencies in the United 
* States.;
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RELATED PI IBS = Reaves, Brian A. "A LEMAS Report: Local Police Departments, 1993." BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. Bureau 
of Justice Statistics.;
RFI.ATKD.PUBS -  Reaves, Brian A., and Pheny Z. Smith. "A LEMAS Report: Law Enforcement 
Management and Administrative Statistics, 1993: Data for Individual State and Local Agencies with 100 
or More Officers." Washington, DC : United States Department o f Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. ;
RELATED,PUBS -  Reaves, Brian A., and Pheny Z. Smith. "A LEMAS Report: Sheriffs’ Departments, 
1993." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN. Washington, DC: United States Department 
of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics.;
PART:
PARTNO = 1 
PART.NAME = Data File 
FILE.STRUCT = rectangular 
CASE.COUNT = 3,028 
VARIABLE.COUNT = 700 









RECORDS JER.CASE = inap.
PART;
PARTNO = 3
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LRECL = inap.
RECORDS.PER.CASE = inap.
KEYWORDS -  Law enforcement, police, employment;
CITATION = United States Department of Justice, Bureau o f Justice Statistics. LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS), 1993 [Computer file]. 
Conducted by U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1996.;
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